**Cyborg Writing Aff**

**2AC -- Queer Time Travel**

**Thus we affirm queer time travel – an understanding of queer histories of violence, trauma, kinship, and hope as always already materializing in the present. The 1AC is a queer time machine through which we become unstuck in time, existing at the confluence of past, present, and future that lies beyond the productive regimes of chrononormativity. Our hauntological echo of the calls of the dead embraces queer collectivity across time and generates possibilities of life in moments outside the sequence.**

**Ghan ‘20** -- queer Jewish writer, editor, and scholar based as a settler in Tkaronto/Toronto, site of Treaty 13 and Williams Treaty territory. He has been an editor at The Spectatorial, The Goose, The Hart House Review, The White Wall Review, and Terse Journal. He has an HBA from the University of Toronto where he graduated with distinction and an MA in English Literature from Ryerson University’s Literature of Modernity program [Ben Berman Ghan, 1-1-2020, “Queer Time Machines: Hauntologies of Literature”, Terse Journal, <https://tersejournal.com/2020/01/01/queer-time-machines-hauntologies-of-literature-by-ben-berman-ghan/>, accessed 4-15-2021] //nikki

When I talk about **time travel as a weapon of queer culture and against chrononormativity,** I am speaking conceptually not of a linear time machine that can travel up and down a time stream a la Robert Zemeckis’ Back to the Future (1985) where the past, present, and future become wholly separated countries that can be visited, left, and returned to, but of a time travel that **is an unmooring. Part of a rebellion against chrononormativity is, to** borrow a term from Kurt Vonnegut Jr’s 1969 novel Slaughterhouse-Five, to **become “unstuck in time.”** (Vonnegut 24). A good breakdown of the static and cyclical nature of womanhood under chrononormativism appears in author Ted Chiang’s novella Story of Your Life (2000). In Chiang’s work, it takes an encounter with an inhuman subjectivity, through the extra-terrestrial language of the Heptapods that the narrator Louise’s perception of self becomes unstuck. Through her experience of past and future as present Louise’s experience of time becomes a “simultaneous mode of awareness” (Chiang 31), making her experience the chrononormative stages of womanhood both out of order and all at once. Through this experience, her sense of self is redrawn from static, sequential and separate identities of different productive moments into an identity of many simultaneous selves, structured around the life and death of her daughter, forcing her to reconsider the artificial barriers between the different stages of her life: childless, a new mother, and a mother who has lost their child. Louise must experience the loss of her daughter before her birth, going against the schedule of chronobiopolitics. Freeman notes that “mourning, romance, empathy, and affection” (Freeman 6) are all imperfect acts of resisting the imposed system, as these feelings cannot be “segmented into clock time” (6) even if public artifices such as funerals or weddings and other events meant to symbolize such feelings do. I would argue that Chiang’s story is an exercise in becoming aware of chronogeopolitics but does not radically reject it, Louise ultimately choosing to still embrace acting out the timeline set for her, even though she is aware of its artifice. Nevertheless, **when the project of unmooring oneself from chronogeopolitics ties itself to a queer culture as opposed to the dominant straight one which chrononormativity promotes, then becoming unstuck in time can become a far more radical act. Queer time machines are built out of community, and out of the legacy that communities leave for each other across time, regardless of the limitations that timelines of the state would attempt to impose** **Queer time travel is an act not of productivity and forward momentum, but of connection with a past and future that are still, in many ways, present.** Here I return to K.I.P, Freeman’s primary example of queer art as a rejection of our chronogeopolitical landscape. Freeman describes K.I.P. as a “Queer hauntology exercise” (13). Hauntology was a term coined in Jacques Derrida’s work Specters of Marx, an extrapolation of the idea that Karl Marx’s theories argue for “an ethics of responsibility towards the other across time” (9). **Hauntology exists in a space where history continues to interact with the present, the figure of the ghost or the dead are not removed from us, but still present in our social and cultural consciousness, even though we cannot reach through time to act on this responsibility. The dead call for a “different future” (9) than the one we can deliver to them, for possibilities now lost**. K.I.P. exposes a **queerness** to viewers that **“jam[s] historical sequence”** (13). We see the artist Nguyen pasting their own image onto a historical moment that they “never experienced but nevertheless clearly mourns for” (13). In this film, we are watching many historical moments blend and interact in a “community of past and present viewers” (13). There is the actual pornography, its male performers unknowingly documenting the freeness of queer identity as it existed before the devastation of the AIDS epidemic. Then are the original viewers of the erotica, both pre- and post- aids, then there is Nguyen, reaching across decades to touch a moment of queer identity in the 1970s with a queer identity of the 21st century. There is Freeman, present by analysis, and there is us, the spectators watching from the ever-retreating goalpost of modernity. In Slaughterhouse-Five, time for Vonnegut’s protagonist Billy Pilgrim is once again experienced out of sequence in a chaotic restructuring of subjectivity, where Billy can go “to sleep a senile widower and awaken on his wedding day” (23), forcing another disintegration of the walls between the productive identities of chronogeopolitics. Billy must reconcile identities like widower and bachelor, soldier and veteran, child and elder, not as separate sequential identities, but as a single simultaneous form. Here, like in K.I.P., time is structured not by signification but trauma. Time for Billy splintered into a similar before and after of trauma centred on the Allied bombing of the German city of Dresden, an event experienced by Billy and Vonnegut himself as prisoners of war. Vonnegut creates another performance of hauntology, forcing Billy Pilgrim to watch a documentary on the firebombing “backwards then forwards” (75) so that he can see bomber planes suck “bullets and shell fragments” (75) back into their machine guns and the fires back into their bombs, until “the American fliers turned in their uniforms and became high school kids. And Hitler turned into a baby” (75), and then is forced to watch history and its trauma and violence play out again. It is also worth noting that, like in Arrival, the subjectivity of Vonnegut’s human character is changed, in part, by interaction with aliens. **Hauntology takes a “collective past” (Freeman 14) and brings it into both the collective and personal present. When we experience hauntology, we are not trying to “write a lost object into the present” (14) but experiencing the past as something still directly happening and affecting us. Through hauntology, we experience “the present itself as a hybrid” (14) of collective pasts and futures**. While in Vonnegut’s case, the hauntology creates a hybrid from the experiences of war**, queer hauntology is a broader experiment, a haunting of the past that is intergenerational and ever-evolving. This experiment in queer hauntology presents what Freeman describes as a “queer becoming-collective across-time”** (11). In K.I.P., we can separate past from present only by noting how the different **moments of queerness are “split by prior violence and future possibility” (9) and not merely the chrononormative classifications of time separated by the signification of sequences and cycles that the chrononormative cycle demands.** We, through Nguyen and Freeman, are subjected to **a description of queer culture that belongs simultaneously to many different moments of queer history, and all of them, pre and post aids crisis.** For the queer observer, K.I.P’s haunting might not present itself as only a historical note, but as **an ever-present encounter, the power of the erotic and the power of longing not at all being a separate country but a present happening.** In drawing her literary examples of queer hauntology and chrononormativity, Freeman turns to Shakespeare, and particularly to Hamlet – a story that resists chrononormativity and invites hauntings through both the structure of the play and its content in equal measure. Hamlet is a play of overlapping bodies. There are the bodies of the dead, the living, the legislative body of the court of Denmark, the body of the prince himself, the body of players within the play, the non-corporeal body of the dead returned, and the play itself existing as its kind of stationary body. In Hamlet, like perhaps in K.I.P, the body becomes a metaphor for “the means for and effect of convoluting time” (Freeman 14), and in turn the narrative timelines that are present in the two primary forms of most of Shakespeare’s own other narratives – namely the marriage plot of the comedy, and the revenge plot of the tragedy. Hamlet both stops and confuses these narratives, the wedding being the beginning of the play instead of the end, the prince unable to ever truly enact his revenge. When Freeman suggests that Hamlet is a story yearning for a “lost Eden [from an] era prior to the establishment of the catholic church” (Freeman 16), this presents itself both through Hamlet’s seeming homoeroticism, and also the very fact that the timeline of the church constrains the play. Unlike many other Shakespearean revenges, Hamlet is frozen by the timeline of a Christian universe, literally unable to kill his uncle while in prayer without also giving his uncle the implicit victory that a Christian timeline demands “A villain kills my father, and for that I, his sole son, do send this same villain to heaven” (Hamlet III.3 76-77). Hamlet stands in stark contrast to, for example, Titus Andronicus, where the timeline of the state declares death to be an absolute end. In Freeman’s queer reading of Hamlet, this frozen nature of the narrative and its prince also spill out in his inability to pursue Laertes instead of Ophelia, trapped in a world and a time where “love between men is, indeed, out of joint” (Freeman 16), present but unreachable. If anything the “fantasia of corporeal disfigurement and fragmentation” (15) of Hamlet is only heightened in Tom Stoppard’s Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead (1967), itself a 20th century hauntology experiment within the Hamlet Narrative, cyclically taking place before, during, and after the events of the original play, always experiencing the present as that aforementioned hybrid. Here Stoppard’s two protagonists only amplify those themes of homo-erotic desire, becoming both inseparable and intermingled in their identities, as well as carrying the fragmentation of timeline to its extreme, living a life-after-death that refuses to fade, experiencing “death, and then eternity (Stoppard 2.228). I reference Stoppard not to pull away from Freeman’s analysis of Shakespeare, but to illustrate how ripe Shakespeare’s body of work is for such queer readings and instances of hauntology, and how older works can become queered and unstuck from a time when a modern setting applies pressure. Stoppard’s play is a hybrid of his work and Shakespeare, of timelines and the sensibilities of modernity and antiquity. As Freeman applies her queer reading to the appearance of The Ghost in Hamlet, I could also argue for a queering of the haunting that occurs near the end of Richard the Third, where the ghosts of the tyrants victims return as the “thousand several tongues, And every tongue brings in a several tale, and every tale condemns me for a villain.” (Richard III V.3.194-195), each body of the dead returning to press themselves onto Richard in the present, to declare “despair and die” (V.3.125) to their murderer. Though Richard III is actually guilty of his crimes, I think a queer reading can link this experience of haunting to the sense of guilt and grief mapped onto queer hauntology’s such as K.I.P. as a result of the split between pre and post aids crisis. It is hard not to read the title K.I.P. as Freeman does, with K.I.P. laced with the suggestion of “rest in peace,’ indicating both the desire to enliven the dead and the understanding that this is never wholly possible.” (Freeman 13) Freeman spills out from Hamlet into Midsummer Night’s Dream as a better erotic companion for K.I.P. than the bard’s other works, mapping how the sexual timelines of both the mortal and fairy world “move in tandem with one another” (Freeman 17), and with the character of Puck (who is notably undefined by normative gender throughout the history of the character and their performances) acting as the agent of unmooring for the normative sexual timeline of the other characters, both altering the Fairy Queens plans for love, and overriding the sexual agency and timelines of the four human characters that wander into the fairy domain. Freeman also touches on the queerness of the Rude Mechanicals of Midsummer Night’s Dream. Like in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead, and Hamlet, the players within the play exist as a performance of hauntology. The present is a hybrid, players performing histories as tangible and still happening through the device of the story within the story– with the narrative of Hamlet echoed and repeated by both the players in Hamlet and Stoppard’s addition, and the Mechanicals imprinting and queering the story of Romeo and Juliet through the farce of Pyramus and Thisbe (where the two heteronormative lovers are both played by male actors) The players in all these cases, which exist so utterly outside the capitalist and heteronormative timelines of productivity, Freeman argues, represent a “queerness [that] consists of a bodily difference” (18). In that way, I can return to my earlier examples, and point to a similar queerness in the aliens that cause the unmooring of time in the science fiction stories of Vonnegut and Chiang, and the queerness of bodily and sexual difference that is the queerness found in K.I.P., a queerness that has been forever altered through time and trauma, and can never be fully regained. Watching the players, or aliens, bring a **performance of queerness, and queer longing exposes us to subjectivities that have found space outside of chrononormativity, outside of the rigorous heteronormativity that is demanded by the productivity of capitalism. Freeman describes queerness as a culture and community where its members are “of times out of joint […] a subjugated class” (Freeman 18). If queerness is forever at odds with a chrononormative timelines because queerness and queer culture do not abide by those timelines, then Queerness comes into being as a rejection of the state’s timelines, as a rejection of the call for reproductive and monetary productivity that those timelines demand. When faced queer performances**, such as K.I.P., **we face a sense of lust and longing and desire, for emotion and connection that is unstuck and unmoored from how we have come to read and signify time.** We become Nguyen, and Hamlet, and the players, and Stoppard, and Billy Pilgrim, and Louise, the face pressed on top of a scene and a moment that never included us, but always includes us, our bodies separated by chronology but joined by longing**. Through its performance, its hauntology, its existence, and its art, queerness becomes a rebellious time machine.**

**2AC -- Queer Spectrality**

**The alternative is a queer spectrality. That disrupts ontological assumptions and opens new lines of deviation. Break the assumed objective reality.**

J. R. **Faust 19**, teaching staff at University of Memphis, Department of Philosophy, “Exorcising the Present : Queer Phenomenology , Hauntology , and Pragmatic Deconstruction”, <https://www.memphis.edu/philosophy/opo2019/pdfs/faust-reese.pdf> //lenox

In her Queer Phenomenology, Sara Ahmed argues that a “**queer” orientation** toward the world allows for staging a politics **uncommitted** to the presumption that “lives have to follow certain lines in order to count as lives, rather than being a commitment to a **line of deviation**.” (Ahmed 178) Key to her argument is a notion of “**disorientation**,” described as “the ‘**becoming oblique’ of the world**, a becoming that is at once interior and exterior, as that which is given, or as that which gives what is given its new angle.” (Ahmed 162) Although she does not claim to be utilizing Derrida’s schema from Specters of Marx, Ahmed’s contention that the materiality of objects is revelatory due to a subject’s orientation, nonetheless captures Derridea’s claim that “**haunting**” describes the “**staging of an event**”, which I take to be inclusive of both bodies and objects. Because such staging allows for the appearance of past histories, I argue that Ahmed’s embodied phenomenology materializes Derrida’s notion of **hauntology**. This notion pervades Ahmed’s reflections on how (dis)orientation is revelatory through the **spectral histories** embedded within their materiality. Hence, queer phenomenology **becomes a hauntology** that enables thinking the **radical malleability** of sociality given its multi-textured materiality. For Ahmed, taking a queer phenomenological orientation toward objects reveals phenomena **less clearly captured** by the classic phenomenological model. This objective history of an object’s givenness remains, even if not immediately present as pure appearance of direct experience, without reducing to a mere representation of a purported image. Ahmed’s phenomenological account is a reading that “summons forth” **prior histories** of the object that presently affect one’s experience of (and orientation toward) the object. Two of her footnotes suggest this: she reformulates the Heideggerian and Gadamerian critiques of the suspension of the natural attitude as an irreducibly hermeneutic move (Ahmed 33 [n 5]; 184); and she references the material culture of matters that are “entangled” in the social relations and **productions of signs**. (Ahmed 42 [n 12]; 187) An object’s contours present as a surface, but its past exceeds its present(ed) givenness, constituting the object as an artifact of socio-cultural (and thus politico-economic) production and thus allowing disorientation to occur. For Ahmed, “disorientation” can be understood as an “**opening-up**” of what appearance presents as real, or simply overlooks as something that can be ignored along the preferential pathways laid out in normative discourse and practice. Such moments of disorientation allow these histories to emerge more fully than in everyday perception, which I claim is a **Derridean “hauntology**”. For Derrida, the logic of the ghost “points toward a thinking of the event that necessarily **exceeds** a binary or dialectical logic, the logic that distinguishes or opposes effectivity or actuality (either present, empirical, living—or not) and ideality (regulating or absolute nonpresence).” (Derrida 2006: 78) The ghost goes beyond mere present comparatives, toward what remains real in its **non-actualized presence** – i.e., the various histories that subsist, even if not consciously perceived, within these objects. Commenting on Marxism, one such spirit that Derrida claims he will “never be able to renounce” is “a certain emancipatory and messianic affirmation, a certain experience of the promise that one can try to liberate from any dogmatics and even from any metaphysico-religious determination, from any messianism.” (Derrida 2006: 111) Without distancing too much from Derrida’s specific concern, this seems to commit him to obscuring simple perception: To haunt does **not** mean to be present, and it is necessary to introduce haunting into the very construction of a concept. Of every concept, beginning with the concepts of being and time. That is what we would be calling here a hauntology. Ontology opposes it only in a **movement of exorcism**. Ontology is a **conjuration**. (Derrida 2006: 202) To use Ahmed’s language, Derrida recognizes the queerness of Marx in the radical heterogeneity of Marxism, by accepting the heterogeneity inherited across its lineage. In this sense, “ontology” as a “conjuration” refers to a particular inherited lineage (and thus, **history**) that has been privileged as “the History”, as a particular description called forth as more definitive against others. Against ontology, **hauntology is prior**, anterior in its openness. Ahmed doesn't explicitly take this step of radical heterogeneity alongside Derrida. However, her argument consists in **blurring the contours** of mere presence in order to render the materiality of the object as a touchstone rather than a firmament – resisting objectivity as the being-there of brute facticity, rendering it instead as the reference point for instantiations of being-such that might occur. With her procedure, the “thisness” of the object – the aim of a more traditional ontology – is not as clearly apprehensible as Husserlian phenomenology wishes it to be, so the spectral aspects of the object – that which consists in the unseen back that grounds the present, which is itself rendered “**ghostly**” – takes that which is “objective” to be **less absolute** than what it pretends or portends to be. While not a complete break with Husserl, Ahmed nonetheless presents a much fuzzier perception of objects: queer phenomenology goes beyond a Husserlian eidetic approach by assuming the persistence and presence of a contextual history for (re-) interpretation to occur. In a moment of disorientation, Ahmed claims, every possible objective present is revealed in an object alongside their situational arrangements, from which Ahmed maintains one may reorient. This notion of phenomenology disrupts ontologizing the objective: “mere givenness” is rejected by Ahmed as a socio-cultural (and thus, political) effect of normalizing states of affairs through the naturalization of the preferred orientation toward an object. Disrupting the clarity of a perceived object, negating the static object as but one moment that appears as preferred or privileged – or conveniently left alone – **disrupts** the **fundamental ontological assumptions** that normally orient the subject. If, for Derrida, ontology is the conjuring that one performs at the moment of exorcism, then Ahmed’s phenomenology effects a conjuring of occluded ontologies that **ground** queer orientations, in the phenomenological experience of disorientation. Keeping the aforementioned Derridean reading of queerness as accepting the radical heterogeneities that emerge across a lineage, consider the following: If a mixed genealogy takes us back to a time before our arrival, then it reminds us how orientations involve secrets: what we cannot uncover or recover about the histories that allow objects to gather in the way that they do. [...] Such acts of conjuring involve not only what we perceive in the present, but also the histories out of which objects **emerge** we might even conjure what is behind them. Such histories are **spectral** in the sense that the objects we perceive are traces of such histories, and even keep those histories alive, but the histories cannot simply be **perceived**. Indeed, such histories may be alive insofar as they resist being converted into something that is available, like the side that is revealed by our viewing point." (Ahmed 152-3) Ontological conjuring occurs, for Ahmed, in a resuscitation of the occluded histories that remain “amidst” or “within” (if not present or actualized) objects, reviving historical possibilities still embedded in them. Selecting a particular history presages a future and dictates how that future plays out: conjuring entails a conscientious covering-over of alternatives. Key to this conjuring is that the history must exceed the present(ation) of the object; compare Derrida’s claim that the ghost emerges precisely when it seems that there is no future (Derrida 2006: xviii): a **teleological suspension** of the objective that allows **new orientations** to emerge. How does this cash out in terms of a queer politics? Human bodies occupy the unique situation as both agentic subjects and affected objects. The situatedness of a particular body within its social, political, and cultural arena reflects the placement of a particular being’s regard within such circumstances: “if orientation is about making the strange familiar through the extension of bodies into space, then disorientation occurs when that extension fails.” (Ahmed 11). Citing Fanon, Ahmed notes that the corporeal schema cannot be navigated without reference to the grid of historico-racial interpretation: such institutions delineate our lines of motility. Pace phenomenology, when we move and experience the (objective) world, our corporeal schema necessarily takes the body as a part-object in a field of objects that are situated in the field before it, within which one can(not) act or move toward. For Ahmed, the revelatory “**twisting**” that a queer phenomenology effects, serves to orient a subject toward possible futures by revealing the secret of the normative, as dependent on the homogeneity of the **hetero (normative**), as opposed to the heterogeneity within the queer. Despite its pretensions, the hetero depends on the queer by occluding its necessity in the generation of difference: queerness is the **difference** from which the norm is selected before being elevated as such. Hence Ahmed’s interest in “mixed” genealogies: such a lineage disrupts the notions of **purity** that undergird much ontologizing that occurs within the socio-cultural sphere. In this sense, one does not have a greater claim to a primordial truth or state of affairs by virtue of the straightest line. **Mixing functions as a hauntology**, wherein plural ontologies that undergird and prefigure moments of disorientation, such that alternative lineages might be conjured into **queer expression**. This mixed genealogy opens up **different possible future paths** to be taken for the subject understood as an embodied spectral object, as the multiple lineages contained within mixtures offer different trajectories that can be taken from the moment of disorientation. For Ahmed, an object’s spectral histories are rendered in terms of the future orientations that one can effect, coordinate, and embody in terms of the effect that these indeterminately perceived objective ghosts have. She effectively materializes the Derridean hauntological notion of the “to come”: “At bottom, **the specter is the future**, it is always to come, it presents itself only as that which could come or come back.” (Derrida 2006: 48) The political imprimatur thus emerges: the embodied phenomenological subject, as an inheritor of histories and an agent of history, serves as its own spectral object; one that can affect/effect the arrival of a future undetermined by the **putatively objective**, via how one **orients** oneself toward various **histories** presaging arrival.

**2AC -- Liminal Spaces**

**The alternative is to exist in the liminal space. This embracing of paradoxicality challenges the depoliticization of sexuality and resists the regimes of intelligibility.**

Harry **Gould 17**, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations at Florida International University, “Queering IR Constructivism”, *The art of world-making : Nicholas Greenwood Onuf and his critics*, <https://www.worldcat.org/title/art-of-world-making-nicholas-greenwood-onuf-and-his-critics/oclc/988278516>, //lenox

Queering IR As Cynthia Weber (2014, 598) suggests, “queer IR scholars recognize that knowledge and ignorance in and about international relations are intricately bound up with sexual knowledge and **sexual ignorance**.” Queer research in IR tends to “track when **queer figurations** emerge and how they are normalized and/or perverted” (Weber 2014, 598). Accordingly, queer IR has come to **challenge** “the normalizing mechanisms of state power to **name** its sexual subjects” . . . [to] take account of how “queer” is sometimes claimed in the name of **normalizing** and **depoliticizing** understandings of sex, gender, and sexuality . . . [and to consider] what being a Queer IR scholar and doing Queer IR scholarship does specifically in and to the discipline. ( Weber 2014, 599, citing Eng, Halberstam, and Munoz 2005, 1) “Queering” IR, then, is a combination of attention to “‘the intimate’ of sex/**affective relations**, marriage, kinship, and family/household formations” and the ways in which that intimate is “troubled, made strange, [and] **destabilized**” (Peterson 2014, 605). As Lauren Wilcox (2014, 612) describes, “projects of queering IR are not about making IR queer as if it weren’t already, but they are about how sexualities, affiliations, and affects are produced and **regulated** within existing practices of IR.” Wilcox (2014, 612) explains “the ‘queer’ of queer theory is necessarily an interpellation that is open-ended toward constant self-critique and different political projects.” Among these political projects is the idea of “‘inhabiting the **practices of rearticulation’** which can be done by recognizing the ambivalence, indeed ‘drag’ of not only homosexuality but gender generally” (Sjoberg 2014, 609, citing Butler 1993, 185). This short exposition shows a couple of important points about the project of “queering” IR. First, “queer” IR cannot be singularly defined or stabilized as a referent from which to plan a vision of “IR.” Second, queer IR is concerned with the role of sex and sexuality in constructing both social and political life and knowledge of it. Third, queer IR cannot be reduced to the study of sexuality, but instead includes understanding the queerness in global politics: the both/and (Weber 1999) of how processes in global politics works. This is reflected in a research program that Weber (2015) calls “global queer studies,”1 has involved both “thinking about sex, sexuality, and their performances on a personal, institutional, or national scale” and using what is learned there about social dynamics both directly and as a metaphor for the analysis of many other aspects of global social and political life. Relatedly, fourth, queering IR “challenges the **heteronormative assumptions** in IR theory by arguing that certain **actors** in global politics can be **read as ‘queer**,’” which includes but is not limited to the ability to “defy binary classifications and **embrace paradox**” (Wilcox 2014, 613). These four moves can be seen in the two engagements with IR Constructivism below. Both destabilization and interrogating binary classifications are involved in rethinking the **stability** of rule and rule, and considering **liminality** in global politics. Thinking about the role of sex and sexuality as well as the inherent queerness of global politics, both straightforwardly and metaphorically, underlie the proposition that the social be thought of as seductive. Destabilizing (gender) rules and rule In Onuf’s (1998, 59) account of Constructivism, “social rules . . . make the process by which people and society constitute each other continuous and reciprocal.” Rules, then “**given agents choices**” and agents in turn “act in society to **achieve** goals” (Onuf 1998, 60). Stable patterns of rules “give society a structure,” which constitutes “a condition of rule” that is “a stable pattern of relations,” “a condition in which some agents use rules to exercise control and obtain advantage” (Onuf 1998, 62–63). In this view, rules and agents are co-constitutive, and rules yield a state of rule (Onuf 1998, 64, 74). In this context, “rule is something that happens to agents when they follow rules or when they suffer the consequences of not following rules” (Onuf 1998, 75). What Onuf describes there can be homologized to what queer theorists often call the process of normalization. Queer theorists (e.g., Duggan 2002; Jackson 2006) have recognized a phenomenon called heteronormativity – “the normalization of exclusively heterosexual desire, intimacy, and family life” (Peterson 1999, 40). In other words, it is the structuring of social life around values, lifestyles, and family/social structures associated with heterosexuality. The incorporation (and co-optation) of the homosexual into this heteronormative matrix has been identified as “homonormativity,” where the values, lifestyles, and family/social structures expected of the hetero- are normalized into homosexuality as well, and homosexuality is incorporated into late-capitalist, late-modern social structures without the alteration of the latter (Duggan 2002, 175, calling it a “sexual politics of neoliberalism”). Sarah Ahmed (2006) has suggested that the “normalization of heterosexuality” has produced a **requirement** to “follow a straight line” and a tendency to “conflate this straight line with what is right, good, or normal.” This creates (in Foucault’s [1997] words) a “society of normalization” where “**regimes of the norm**al” (Eng et al. 2005, 3) are built around a norm of straightness, even for the non-straight. As Michael Warner (1999, 56, 60, 62) explains, in these terms, “normal means certified, approved, as meeting a set of normative standards,” where “increasingly, the answer is to have dignity gay people must be seen as normal” and a claim to the normal is a claim to “legitimating oneself.” The heterosexual norm becomes the key to “**regimes of intelligibility**” that create “**normalizing violence** that determines the **subjectivity**, **survival**, and **livability**” of subjects (Butler 2013). This is why queer theorists (e.g., Halberstam 2012) are interested in “the end of normal” even in places where we assume that “normal is most stable.” Lee Edelman (2004) suggested that queerness is “irreducibly linked to the ‘aberrant or **atypical**,’ to what chafes against normalization,” which motivates queer theorists to look to “unsettle the normalizing powers of both law and kinship as always and already heteronormative” and “regulate the distribution of vulnerability” among people (Butler 2013). It would be easy to see heteronormativity and homonormativity as rules that contribute to a state of rule in local, national, and global politics. Spike Peterson’s (2014, 604) description suggests that queer theory is in part to “contest normativities and orthodoxies (Brown 2006, 886) in part by exposing ‘**regimes of the normal’** (Eng et al. 2005, 3) as historically contingent and power-laden social constructions” – in a vocabulary very similar to Onuf’s (1998) description of rules among people with uneven power. In this view, those who fall outside of normalized understandings of sexuality (and therefore sociality) are breaking rules and distributed consequences by a system of rule. Looking at queer theorizing about the process of normalization that produces those normativities, however, produces two interventions into the Onufian Constructivist understanding of the construction of rules and the state of rule. The first is the violence of inclusion. Onuf suggests that, with the existence of rules and the state of rule, **consequences** come from **rule-breaking**. Queer theorists’ observations about the insidious consequences of rule-following suggest that being “in” the “normalized” notions of sexuality can be as harmful as (if not more harmful than) being “out.” For example, regimes of intelligibility of sexuality often react to those who are “out” (e.g., the trans-) by adding extra categories to those regimes of intelligibility, rather than by recognizing the fundamental instability of those categories (e.g., Stryker 2008, 148). This is an exercise of fixing identity, and perpetuating the myth that categories of sex and gender identities are relatively independent and unchanging with clear boundaries – it is just necessary to normalize more of them to include all the people who fall in all possible categories. Often, critical Constructivists make similar suggestions: now that “we” “know” how insidious rules work and become institutionalized, “we” can use that knowledge to “**change**” the **shape of the state** of rule, often with an emancipatory politics (e.g., Debrix 2002; Smith 2002; Duvall and Varadarajan 2003; Smith 2004; Price 2008). Queer theorizing about normalization has suggested, however, that there is significant enough violence in the process of normalized inclusion that its use by advocates for oppressed people should be reconsidered (e.g., Agathangelou 2013; Dutta 2013; Haritaworn, Kuntsman, and Posocco 2013; Lind and Keating 2013). Analysis of queer experiences with normalization suggests that the violence is of the system of rules and rule, rather than within the system – which suggests that, rather than simply being a “way of studying social relations” (Onuf 1998, 58), a Constructivist lens can be a **tool** of oppressive social relations. Second, and relatedly, this understanding of normalization provides insight into the disciplinary power of thinking about rules and rule to make liminality invisible. If social and political life is structured by a complicated set of rules that create a state of rule, which, to varying degrees, one either falls inside of or outside of (either categorically or behaviorally), the both/and (Weber 1999) or neither/nor (Heyes 2007) becomes a sort of shade of gray rather than a different categorization. Butler (2013) discusses “a politics of disposability” that “can be traced in various histories of **human liminality**.” In Captive Genders, Steve Dillon (2011, 179) describes the unique positionality of “writing from within a liminal space – between **life** and **death**; freedom and subjection; known and unknown; the happened and the did not happen.” In this view, the liminal is neither inside nor outside, but unrecognizable to both – whether that liminality is gender liminality (e.g., Salamon 2010) or other liminalities made recognizable by gender liminalities (Stanley and Smith 2011). Liminalities “suggest borderlands that **defy fixed homeplaces**” (Sylvester 2002, 255). Again, at first glance, this could “fit” into an Onufian Constructivist framework, showing the flexibility of rules and the state of rule that they create, and the agential intent within that flexibility (e.g., Onuf 1998, 59). I think that would be a misreading, since liminality is not a show of flexibility but a state that creates and signifies “different subjectivities . . . which we can think of as mobile, rather than fixed, criss-crossing borderlands” (Sylvester 2002, 255). In other words, not only is liminality both/and and neither/nor in practice, the substance of the both/ and and neither/nor – the **queered positionality of liminality** – suggests the falseness of the dichotomy that creates the possibility of “both.” In gender terms, it is not that additional categories need to be added to the “male” and “female” to accommodate the “others” – it is that the liminality of the “others” shows not only the violence but the inauthenticity of both the categories of “male” and “female” and the project of sex/gender categorization. In Constructivist terms, those that are both/and/ neither/nor to any given rule or state of rule show that it is not that the rules and their rule should be interpreted as more complex or more flexible, but instead, that an understanding of rules/rule that does not account for both the liminal and the normalization that **erases its subjectivity** must by definition be incomplete.

**2AC -- Queer Fugitivity**

**We’re here, we’re queer, get used to it!**

**Chávez 17 (Karma R. Chávez -** associate professor in the Department of Mexican American and Latina/o Studies at the University of Texas at Austin, “From Sanctuary to a Queer Politics of Fugitivity”, Michigan State University Press, 2017, <https://www.academia.edu/37574705/From_Sanctuary_to_a_Queer_Politics_of_Fugitivity>, MG)

Toward a Queer Politics of Fugitivity

As stated at the beginning, many university presidents and chancellors have come out in tepid support of vulnerable students, and for those at the helm of public institutions, their support comes in part because of the mission of the public university: to educate the public, regardless of that public’s citizenship status. But for those of us teaching at public institutions, we need to take the public mission in a slightly different direction, that is, we need to be public about what that work of support will entail. We need collective, public visibility that in the tradition of queer politics insists both, “aqui, estamos, y no nos vamos” and “**we’re here, we’re queer, get used to it!”** I call on queerness both as a **statement of queer identity**, and a signal to most all leadership of the undocumented student movement, but also an indication of an **in-your-face politics**. This politics **must not prioritize legal remedies**, collude with police, or offer tepid forms of support. About those things, we must be forthright. But that queer politics must also be coupled with a commitment to what I can only think of as “**fugitivity**.” A long tradition of theorizing the concept of fugitivity among radical and feminist black intellectuals traces this line of thinking directly to Frederick Douglass and fugitive slaves. It is important not to sever theorizing of fugitivity from its place in black life or to make fugitivity a purely metaphorical endeavor. But understanding fugitivity, as Christina Sharpe puts it, as “a powerful way to imagine black life that persists in and in spite of,”8 offers important resources for all criminalized people and their accomplices to learn to maneuver. For people like me, people whose lives are not constituted by being criminalized, understanding such features of black and undocumented, and undocublack life will inform how we listen to, transport, harbor, protect, and collude with those rendered fugitive by unjust laws, and therefore participate in fugitivity ourselves. I want to direct attention to two conceptualizations of fugitivity that point us in the kind of directions we may want to consider as we undertake various forms of sanctuary and support. First, Keguro Macharia writes, “**Fugitivity is seeing around corners, stockpiling in crevices, knowing the “unrules,” being unruly, because the rules are never enough, and not even close.**”9 Many undocumented folks, perhaps especially undocublack folks, undoubtedly live in and through this pedagogy. As Opal Tometi, executive director of the Black Alliance for Just Immigration and cofounder of Black Lives Matter points out, because of changes to immigration law in 1996 that broadened the range of deportable offenses and allowed for retroactive deportations, black immigrants, who like their citizen counterparts are more likely to be profiled by police than other groups, have suffered the most dire consequences. Tometi explains, “Even though black immigrants make up only 7% of the total immigrant population, 20% of all immigrants in deportation proceedings due to criminal convictions are black.”10 Black folks are most likely to suffer criminalization and therefore have had to discover means to know the unrules, to see around corners and survive. This is not to say that the perspective of fugitivity does not constitute all undocumented experience. All lessons of fugitivity are more vital than ever. This moment requires accomplices to learn concretely what fugitivity means by listening carefully to undocumented folks about how to support this way of living and how to live in this way. Second, as Jack Halberstam noted in the introduction to Harney and Moten’s The Undercommons, “**Fugitivity is not only escape**, ‘exit’ as Paolo Virno might put it, or ‘exodus’ in the terms offered by Hardt and Negri, fugitivity is being separate from settling. **It is a being in motion that has learned that ‘organizations are obstacles to organising** ourselves’ (The Invisible Committee in The Coming Insurrection) and that there are spaces and modalities that exist separate from the logical, logistical, the housed and the positioned.”11 Although there is one way to read this as an anti-institutional argument, another way to read this idea is to remember that the undercommons is neither about being for nor against the university. It is about being in but not of it. And therefore, **separating ourselves** from particular kinds of positions and positionings, ways of engaging that become predictable to institutions and **developing new kinds of extraorganizational logics** are essential to the practice of fugitivity I am suggesting we need. Stealing from the university’s resources, relying on it for meeting space to come together to build other structures, while actively refusing its norms of decorum. Making photocopies after hours, using our offices to harbor the criminalized, and our libraries to study resistance. Teaching to transgress, testing the limits of our academic freedom, collaborating with the revolutionary fringe on teach-ins and actions. These are some of the basic practices of fugitivity that this moment demands. And these must be coupled with concrete and material plans and steps of support, always developed from the perspectives of those most impacted. I recognize that publicly insisting that we will resist anti-immigrant laws and that we will protect our students by virtually any means necessary is scary. It would be a lot easier to do what we are comfortable with—asking police to do the right thing, relying on provisions like FERPA (Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act) to protect student records, and as**king administrators to take stronger stances.** But as what Anzaldúa calls nepantleras, those who reside in spaces of tension and struggle to imagine, transform, and heal, **we have a duty to imagine bigger**. One way to do this is to reimagine sanctuary as a queer politics of fugitivity, and then collectively imagine together what that can be.

**2AC -- Ontology**

**Since the dawn of colonialism, queerness has existed as the antithesis to Western Empire. Heteronormativity and reproductive futurity structures history and rationalizes the takeover of an effeminate, queer third world. This continues to modernity with the birth of queer liberalism. Representations of eastern threats through discursive practices are not neutral but reinforce the Western fantasy of exorcising the Queer Third World.**

Ilan **Kapoor 15**, professor of Critical Development Studies at the Faculty of Environmental and Urban Change at York University, “The queer Third World”, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2015.1058148?journalCode=ctwq20>, //lenox

Queerness and the West According to Foucault, homosexuality is a Western construct of the 19th century, at which time it became a site of systematic legal, religious and medical investigation.2 Before that period ‘sodomy’ and same-sex relations did of course happen; but, though considered ‘**sinful’** and always at risk of being **suppressed** and harshly punished, such sexually ‘deviant’ practices also had a certain degree of social acceptance, with even a few instances of flourishing in urban subcultures. It was only in the late 19th century that ‘sexual perversion’ began to be scrutinised, classified and pathologised (as a **disease**), giving way to the modern notion of homosexuality. ‘The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a **species’**, writes Foucault.3 But whether in pre-modern or modern times, queerness has a history of marginalisation and oppression. **Hetero-normativity** – the social ordering that privileges heterosexuality and accepts as normal and natural the complementarity between the sexes — has meant the simultaneous production of sexual minorities as ‘queer’, abnormal, unnatural, defective. Lee Edelman calls this ‘**reproductive futurism’**: Western society **sustains** itself on the promise of a harmonious future by upholding the **image of the innocent child** to buttress social reproduction and the ‘absolute **privilege of heteronormativity’**. 4 **Generational succession is ensured**, then, through a forward-looking reproductive politics of hope. And, according to such a politics, to the extent that queers do not procreate (at least not until the advent of in vitro fertilisation), they do not **reproduce the social**. Indeed, they are often seen as **threatening** key social institutions: their lack of family orientation compromises such things as community and civil society, while their ‘sterile’ and non-reproductive ‘lifestyle’ **endangers** capitalism, which so depends on labour and wealth accumulation. No wonder, as a consequence, that queers in the West have been subjected to torment through the ages. One thinks here of the castration of ‘effeminate’ young boys in the Middle Ages, the vilification and persecution of homosexuals (as well as women, witches, Muslims, Jews and the poor) during the Crusades and Inquisition, and the execution of ‘sodomites’ under the 16th-century English Buggery Act.5 More recent, often right-wing and conservative attacks against queers include the Nazi persecution of gay men (alongside Jews and Gypsies), anti-homosexual discrimination during McCarthy’s anti-communist purge in the USA, and the Anita Bryant ‘Save Our Children’ crusade against gay rights in the late-1970s. All speak to attempts at preserving the social fabric, and hence reforming or eliminating queers as an embodiment of the threat to **reproductive futurism**. Of late, a much more **liberal** approach to queerness has **taken hold** in the West (and other parts of the world, too). Contemporary liberalism now treats homosexuality as a **sexual expression**, lifestyle and identity, granting sexual minorities legal rights and protections, including gay marriage. This mainstreaming of LGBTI identities is reflected in liberal political economy as well, with queers **targeted by mass-media** and lifestyle marketing. ‘**Out is In’**, or so the slogan goes. Rather than being treated as a limit or threat to the social, the queer non-reproductive lifestyle is now a **marketing** and consumer opportunity. But, as several queer theorists have been quick to point out,6 such ‘**queer liberalism’** tends to **leave hetero-normativity intact**. It deals with sex as a personal or civil rights issue, thus **avoiding** broader **structural change**. In fact, far from posing a threat to the social order, queer liberalism helps **reinforce** it: it continues to uphold reproductive futurism by buttressing the **institutions** of marriage, family, domesticity and nation, while also strengthening and promoting hetero-patriarchal global capitalism through niche marketing and consumerism. Queering the Third World It should come as no surprise that, before decolonisation, the discursive representations of queerness in the West found their way into European colonial representations of the **Third World**. Indeed, as several postcolonial analysts have argued,7 **colonial domination** was often justified and exercised through various forms of **homophobia** (as well as sexism and racism). Queering the Third World enabled the coloniser to distinguish himself from the colonised, buttressing his **masculinity** and **social respectability** and, as a result, rationalising both his ‘civilising mission’ and denigration of local culture. Thus, early colonial reports represented Amerindians in Colombia as **sexual deviants** and degenerates, engaging in ‘bestiality, sodomy, incest, and other unnatural practices’. 8 Similarly 16th and 17th century European travel journals referred to Africans as ‘hot-tempered’ and ‘**lascivious’**, 9 with historian and colonial administrator, Edward Long, describing African women as ‘libidinous...monkeys’. 10 Black men and women were frequently reduced to their bodies (or to animality), lacking cognitive abilities or self-control, and invariably depicted as unintelligible, deceptive and dishonest.11 In this regard, Eve Sedgwick, writing about the ‘closet’ in modern Western culture, claims that the hetero/homo **binary** was often **intertwined** with the knowledge/ignorance binary, so that secrecy, opacity and deceitfulness were **associated** with homosexuality.12 Such associations, it seems, circulated well in the **racialised colonial context**, too. It was not uncommon for the sexualisation of the Third World to resort to various forms of misogyny (as evidenced by the Edward Long quote above). Anne McClintock coins the term ‘**porno-tropics’** to describe how colonised lands were labelled ‘**virgin territories’** to rationalise their take-over (or their ‘penetration’ or ‘rape’), while at the same time representing their inhabitants, and especially native women, as **sexually promiscuous** and voracious.13 Native men, for their part, if they were not being directly portrayed as ‘sodomites’, were often symbolically castrated by being labelled ‘**effeminate’**. 14 Mrinalini Sinha shows, in this regard, how the stereotype of the effeminate Bengali helped **secure the British self-image** of masculinity and justify the continued British presence in India in the late 19th-century, for example by helping rebuff (emasculate?) Indian demands for greater access to power.15 The theme of **sexual perversity** and the myth of the ‘**erotic East’** are repeated in a plethora of **writings** about the Orient by European adventurers, travellers, geographers, anthropologists and administrators.16 Often it is Arab and Muslim cultures that are depicted as sexually promiscuous, with much of the writing presenting them as tolerating and even propagating such ‘aberrant’ practices as sodomy.17 Of particular note is the work of late 19th-century adventurer explorer Richard Burton, who hypothesised that there is a ‘**Sotadic Zone’** stretching from Southern Europe, the Middle East and Africa to Asia-Pacific and the Southern ‘New World’, where **sexual perversion** is **endemic** thanks to the warm climate. He claimed that this Sotadic Zone was rife with ‘debaucherie’ and ‘erotic perversion’, and that pederasty (referred to as ‘Le Vice contre nature’) was practised alongside bestiality, cannibalism, infanticide and prostitution.18 Of course, representations such as Burton’s amounted not simply to naive orientalist exoticism; as suggested above, homophobia, misogyny and racism served as important **technologies** to support and **advance colonial power**. In this connection Anne Stoler talks about racialised sexual hierarchies established in the Dutch Indies between colonialists and natives – how strict laws were constructed to distinguish all-white from mixed couples, and ‘pure breeds’ from the progeny of mixed marriages or cohabitation.19 According to Richard Philips, such sexual control was also present in the British Empire during the Victorian period, with carefully thought-out rules regulating sexual relationships among and between Britishers and locals. These covered everything from marriage, cohabitation and consensual sex to prostitution, ‘buggery’ and sexual diseases, all aimed at ensuring ‘moral’ and **social order**.20 In a similar vein Glen Elder argues in the South African context that colonial domination reflected pervasive anxieties about homosexual relations among and between Whites and Blacks. Such anxieties were visible, for example, in the geographic ordering of apartheid, with **clearly demarcated** and strictly enforced spatial and discursive divisions (eg between Black miners’ dormitories and White family residential estates, or between the ethnicised Bantustans or Black township ghettos and the White inner city neighbourhoods).21 The sexualisation and queering of the Third World thus helped **discursively construct** the Third World. This is what Edward Said famously called Orientalism. On the one hand, as Said points out, such a construction had ‘less to do with the Orient than it [did] with “**our” [Western] world’**. 22 To be sure, the colonisers were acting out their own European homophobic (and other) prejudices and representations in the colonies. The Third World served, in this sense, as a screen onto which **Western colonial sexual fantasies**, desires and **anxieties** were being **projected** or transferred.23 But, on the other hand, these were not **neutral** prejudices and **representations**; they had material and institutional consequences. Racist homophobia resulted in physical violence against the colonised,24 while colonial sexual control, as we saw above, yielded enforceable laws, **social hierarchies** and geographic demarcations. The **Third World was thus produced as queer**: not in the sense of the West imposing homosexuality on the colonies (quite the opposite), but in the Saidian sense of Orientalism as the ‘enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient’. 25 Regardless of whether the Third World actually was ‘queer’, it was **represented**, regulated and disciplined as such. Given these material and institutional impacts, it is little wonder that the colonial queering of the Third World has had **enduring legacies**. This is evident perhaps no more so than in the field of **international development**. For example, the very notion of development stages ‘traditional’ societies as pathological, that is, deviating from what is taken as the natural progression towards (Western) capitalist modernity. What is remarkable about the ‘trad/mod’ binary that undergirds this discourse is how queer the Third World is made out to be – unnatural, abnormal, effete, passive (read: effeminate), strange, backward, underdeveloped, **threatening**. This is particularly true in relation to **economic performance**, assessments of which tend to be nothing less than emasculating: growth is invariably shown to be limping, if not falling short, the result of incompetence, corruption and weak entrepreneurialism, which render the typical Third World economy **incapable** of competing against aggressive, win-or-die global business. The solution to such feebleness and failure is usually structural adjustment and debt relief, which many countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, have been coerced into accepting. These frequently entail severe ‘austerity’ measures (fiscal ‘discipline’, budget slashing, privatisation, market liberalisation) and a heavy dose of browbeating (the need for economic ‘correctness’ and sound policy, ‘good’ governance, and greater transparency and anti-corruption rules). Through a queer lens this all looks like an exercise in economic **straight-ening**, aimed at disciplining, **punishing** and exorcising the Third-World-as-queer. The **recent global security discourse continues** in this vein. As Mark Duffield contends, this discourse constructs the ‘**borderlands’** (ie the Third World) as an imagined geographic space of instability, excess and **social breakdown**, thus posing a **threat** to the West.26 The Third World is typically seen as **violent and unpredictable**, or at least a potential **danger**; it is the source of many of the problems seen to plague global **security**, including drug trafficking, **terrorism**, rapid population growth, refugee flows, weak, **corrupt** or **rogue states** and, more recently, **infectious disease**.

**2AC -- Queer IR**

**The figuration of the homosexual serves as a driving force of normative international relations – the sexualization of national subjectivity prefigures statecraft through the rhetoric of queerphobia.**

**Weber ’16** -- (Cynthia Weber, 2-18-2016, "Queer Intellectual Curiosity as International Relations Method: Developing Queer International Relations Theoretical and Methodological Frameworks \*," OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/60/1/11/2357554, accessed 7-25-2022) -- nikki

These three very different figurations of “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” matter not simply because they mark major historical shifts in dominant Western perspective on “the homosexual” and “homosexuality.” They also illustrate how specific figurations of “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” make it (im)possible for Western “experts” to categorize people and geopolitical spaces as normal or pathological—and to react to them accordingly. Indeed, specific figurations of “homosexuality” and of “the homosexual” enable and contest specific modes of organization and regulation of national, regional, and international politics. For example, figurations of “the savage, the primitive, the colonized” (Stoler 1995:7) and “the underdeveloped” (Hoad 2000) all appear in Victorian colonial discourse as sexualized and racialized degenerate and/or deviant “perverse homosexuals.” These figurations played a role in licensing Victorian sovereign states to subject entire colonialized populations to imperial rule, as Stoler’s (1995) analysis of colonial educational practices illustrates. Traces of these figurations linger in contemporary Western figurations of “the unwanted im/migrant” and “the terrorist,” which inform policies on immigration and security (Puar and Rai 2002; Puar 2007; Luibhe´id 2008). Figurations of “the homosexual” as “the LGBT” justified the Obama administration’s global support for gay rights as human rights. This support both promised to extend human rights to all “LGBT populations” (Langlois 2015:28, 34) and justified the Obama administration’s monitoring of how some states performed against US standards of tolerance toward “the LGBT” (Rao 2012). Finally, figurations of “the homosexual” as normal and/or perverse sparked debate in contemporary Europe about how the (dis)ordering of sex, gender, and sexuality in traditional binary terms might progress or imperil Europe “itself.” In these debates, European leaders “weaponized” Neuwirth/Wurst (Black 2014) by deploying some elements of Neuwirth/Wurst’s “unstoppable unity” to enable or disable specific renderings of European integration and of Europe “itself.” Yet because there were at least three legitimate readings of Neuwirth/ Wurst circulating in debates about Europe—Neuwirth/ Wurst as normal, Neuwirth/Wurst as perverse, and Neuwirth/Wurst as normal and/or perverse—attempts to use Neuwirth/Wurst to anchor any singular vision of an integrated Europe did as much to disorder (knowledge about) European integration as they did to order it/them. Because policymakers occasionally employ these figurations to construct and legitimate how they order international politics and tame anarchy, figurations of “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” participate in constructing “sexualized orders of international relations”— international orders that are necessarily produced through various codings of sex, gender, and sexuality. Such encodings carry with them practical empirical consequences for individuals, populations, nation-states, and the conduct of foreign policy. Viewed through queer intellectual curiosity, a plethora of sexualized and queered IR figurations, as well as their stakes for IR, comes into focus. These include how figurations of Thai “ladyboys” function in international sex trafficking and “the asexual Japanese couple” inform domestic and international scenarios that link sexual and economic (re)production. But less familiar to IR audiences might be the growing body of Queer IR scholarship that analyzes less obviously sexualized and queered IR figurations: “the terrorist” (Puar and Rai 2002; Weber 2002; Puar 2007), “the torturer” (Richter-Montpetit 2014), “the slave” (Agathangelou 2014), “the nationally bordered body” (Weber 1998a,b; Sjoberg 2014; Peterson 2014), “the human rights holder” (Rao 2014; Wilkinson and Langlois 2014; Picq and Thiel 2015), “the revolutionary state and citizen” (Weber 1999; Lind and Keating 2013), and “the homosexual” more generally (Weiss and Bosia 2014). Together, these analyses demonstrate how, for example, (inter)national conjunctures of homophobia (fearing “the homosexual”) and “homoprotectionism” (protecting “the homosexual;” Lind and Keating 2014) complicate IR theories and practices about/of war and peace, state and nation formation, and international political economy. Available space prevents a discussion of each sexualized and queer IR figuration and its importance in IR. Thus, I limit my analysis to the three illustrations that open this article: Victorian colonial practices, Obama administration foreign policy leveraging of gay rights as human rights, and EU Euro-vision debates about Neuwirth/ Wurst. I do so for three reasons. First, each illustrates a different alignment of “homosexuality” with (ab)normality, producing three distinct sexualized figurations of “the homosexual” for analysis—the perverse Victorian “homosexual,” the normal Obama administration “homosexual,” and the normal and/or perverse Euro-visioned “homosexual.” Second, separately and together these examples demonstrate that by placing a queer intellectual curiosity about figurations of “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” at its methodological core, this particular Queer IR method does more than just “add (homo)sexuality” to IR. It offers ways to map phenomena as diverse as colonialism, human rights, and the formation of states and international communities that provide vastly different renderings of international politics than those that emerge when we include a “sexuality variable” in our survey research instruments, for example. In this article, I develop two theoretical and methodological approaches that put a queer intellectual curiosity about “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” at the core of their investigations of IR. I develop one such approach by mining classic texts in Queer Theory, Feminist Technoscience Studies, Poststructuralist International Relations, and Queer International Relations for theoretical concepts and methodological procedures. Specifically, I use Michel Foucault’s The History of Sexuality, Volume 1 (1980) to recover three specific elements from his analysis: putting sex into discourse, productive power, and networks of power/knowledge/pleasure. I suggest that these elements—together with Feminist Technoscience Studies scholar Donna Haraway’s conceptualization of “figuration” as the distillation of shared meanings in forms or images (1997),3 Feminist and Queer Theory scholar Judith Butler’s theory of performativity (1999), and Poststructuralist IR scholar Richard Ashley’s arguments about “statecraft as mancraft” (1989)—provide the necessary concepts and devices to analyze figurations of “the homosexual” and sexualized orders of IR that are inscribed in international discourse and practice as either normal or perverse. These theories in combination generate important research questions, but they neglect to analyze plural figures like Neuwirth/Wurst that defy categorization as either normal or perverse. They therefore lack the tools to assess the sexualized (dis)orders of IR to which such categorizations give rise. In a second reading of these theories—especially Ashley’s statecraft as mancraft—I attempt to correct this oversight by turning to Roland Barthes’ logic of a pluralized and/or (1974, 1976). Barthes offers instructions for reading plural figures and logics that signify as normal and/or perverse through what can be vast matrices of sexes, genders, and sexualities. I view those plural figures and logics that are constructed in relation to—but not necessarily exclusively through—sexes, genders, and sexualities as queer. In doing so, I follow Eve Sedgwick’s description of queer as “the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses, and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of anyone’s gender, of anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithically” (1993:8). Reading Ashley’s statecraft as mancraft with Barthes’ queer logic of a pluralized and/or, I propose an additional lens through which to investigate figurations of “the homosexual,” sovereign man, sovereign states, and sexualized orders of IR—what I call “queer logics of statecraft.” Some may view these Queer IR methods as additional instruments in IR’s conceptual toolbox “for organizing empirical material and practical research designs” (Aradau and Huysmans 2013:2; also see Jackson 2011). Others may see them as lacking the status of proper or unique methods. They might understand them as a queer lens attached primarily to feminist and poststructuralist techniques (Plummer 2003:520). Still others may understand them as performative devices “experimentally connecting and assembling fragments of ontology, epistemology, theories, techniques and data” through which “substantive worlds” are called into being and are acted upon (Aradau and Huysmans 2013:3, 18). Regardless, engagement with Queer IR methods enriches how we analyze core IR concerns like hierarchy and anarchy (Lake 2009; Bially Mattern forthcoming). Queer IR methods broaden our thinking about how to study a wide array of IR mobilizations of normality, perversion, and stigma (Towns 2010; Zarakol 2011; Adler-Nissen 2014). Scholars might consider how “the homosexual”— like “the woman”—becomes another “standard of civilization” (Hoad 2000; Puar 2007; Rao 2014; Towns 2014). They might challenge the incorporation of “homosexuality” into IR as primarily “a sexuality variable” (Weber 1998a). Or they might ponder the intellectual and political effects of employing critical methods in IR and in international politics (Aradau and Huysmans 2013). In my view, these Queer IR methods make especially plural figures and plural logics easier to identify and analyze. They thereby highlight the roles of plural figures and plural logics in the organization, regulation, and conduct of international politics. Queer IR methods hold the potential to disrupt intellectual practices that either exclude or a priori fix understandings of “the homosexual” and other plural figures—from “the woman” (Enloe 2004; Towns 2014) to “the human rights holder” (Wilkinson and Langlois 2014) to variously normalized and/or stigmatized subjectivities (Zarakol 2011; Adler-Nissen 2014)—as a condition for the conduct of research.

**Queerness is always already imbricated in international politics – legal institutions produce the categories of sexual deviance as the unproductive underside of normative sexual regimes.**

**Weber ’16** -- (Cynthia Weber, 2-18-2016, "Queer Intellectual Curiosity as International Relations Method: Developing Queer International Relations Theoretical and Methodological Frameworks \*," OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/60/1/11/2357554, accessed 7-25-2022) -- nikki

Developing Queer IR Methods Discourse, Productive Power, and Networks of Power/Knowledge/ Pleasure Michel Foucault’s The History of Sexuality Volume 1 (hereafter HoS) instructs its readers how to analyze modern sexuality by offering four primary recommendations: 1. Analyze how sex is put into discourse; 2. Analyze the functions and effects of productive power; 3. Understand productive power as working through networks of power/knowledge/pleasure; and 4. Analyze how understandings of “the normal” and “the perverse” are frozen, without assuming they are either true or forever fixed. In this section, I offer a reading of HoS that draws out these instructions. All of these instructions follow from Foucault’s central claim in HoS that the organizing principle of sexuality from 18th-century Europe to “the contemporary West” is how “sex is ‘put into discourse’” (Foucault 1980:11), for example, how specific meanings of sexualities and sexual subjectivities are produced through specific—even repressive—discursive formulations that bring sexualities like “homosexuality” and sexual subjectivities like “the homosexual” into being. For while Victorian institutions from law to medicine certainly repressed “deviant” sexual practices and sexuality, in so doing they also discursively invented both sexual norms and the “sexual deviants” who defied them. Foucault’s “Instruction 1” follows from this observation—analyze how sex is put into discourse. How specifically did Victorians put sex into discourse? Foucault’s answer is through scientific discourses about sexuality—a “scientia sexualis” including biology, physiology, and psychology—that sought to make “the homosexual body” confess its scientific truth. “Scientia sexualis,” Foucault claims, functioned as a kind of productive power to invent “the homosexual” and other sexual figurations like “the hysterical woman” and “the masturbating child” during the Victorian era. This is why Foucault offers us “Instruction 2”—analyze the functions and effects of productive power. How specifically did productive power work to figure “the homosexual”? Working on every surface of “the homosexual body” and penetrating deep into “the homosexual soul,” theologians, doctors, and psychiatrists medicalized, surveilled, and managed “the homosexual.” Their biopolitical apparatuses produced “the alien strain” of “the homosexual” as scientific fact (Foucault 1980:42– 44, 53–73). “The homosexual,” then, was not a discovery whose empirical reality Victorian scientists examined. Rather, it was through the scientific examination of his “sexual deviance” and the therapeutic correction he was subjected to that Victorian society brought “the homosexual” into being. This scientifically produced “homosexual” was prescribed a regimen of normalization, presumably to make possible his sexual reconstitution from one who desired perverse sex4 to one who desired normal sex, where normal sex was represented by the presumptively white, Christian, bourgeois, able-bodied, cis-gendered, procreative heterosexual “Malthusian couple.” But what this regime of normalization also did was subject “the homosexual” to constant surveillance, management, and correction. This is how “the homosexual” was located in a complex nexus of what Foucault calls the system of power/knowledge/pleasure. This brings us to Foucault’s “Instruction 3”—understand productive power as working through networks of power/knowledge/pleasure. Why did Victorian society invent “the homosexual,” diagnose individuals as afflicted with “homosexuality,” and subject them to processes of normalization? Foucault offers several reasons. One reason is that “the homosexual” (like other perverse Victorian figures) made it possible to identify normal sexual behavior, discursively implant normality in the procreative heterosexual Malthusian couple, and circulate social understandings of this couple as exemplary of normal, healthy, moral Victorian sexuality. Thus, a perverse/normal dichotomy produced all manner of Victorian sexual subjectivities and organized them socially, scientifically, and morally in ways that made the “normal,” privileged heterosexual procreative couple appear to be coherent and whole. It is only by abandoning what Foucault calls “the repressive hypothesis”—“the hypothesis that modern industrial societies ushered in an age of increased sexual repression” (Foucault 1980:49)—that we can appreciate how systems of power/knowledge/pleasure actually function. “Pleasure and power do not cancel or turn back against one another; they seek out, overlap, and reinforce one another. They are linked together by complex mechanisms and devices of excitation and incitement” (Foucault 1980:48). What they make possible are figurations of sexualized subjects like “the homosexual” as well as “institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that make [normative sexualities like] heterosexuality seem not only coherent—that is, organized as a sexuality—but also privileged” (Berlant and Warner 1998:548, footnote 2; my brackets).5 Foucault takes seriously the question “who is ‘the homosexual’?”, then, not so he can get to “the truth” about “the homosexual” but to understand how systems of power/ knowledge/pleasure function to produce the “perverse homosexual” and his “opposite,” “normal” Malthusian couple. This makes possible exploration of the circulation of these apparent representations in intimate as well as national, regional, and international contexts. For example, we can explore how our knowledge of “the underdeveloped” as perverse and “the LGBT” as normal is in part produced by/through some of the same scientific systems of power/knowledge/pleasure that produce “the perverse homosexual” and “the normal homosexual,” respectively. In IR, we see this in how Modernization and Development Theory draws upon Talcott Parson’s structural-functionalist evolutionary sociology to mark “the underdeveloped” as “the perverse homosexual” who is the deviant, dysfunctional remainder of social, biological, and political development (Weber 2016). This is in contrast to how Hilary Clinton extends “the normal” to include “the LGBT couple” that is reproductive for their nation-state, to refigure “the perverse homosexual” as “the normal homosexual” (Clinton 2011; also see Peterson 2014). What disconcerts many scholars and statespeople is how Neuwirth/Wurst combines aspects “the perverse, underdeveloped homosexual” (for example, as the rural Colombian Conchita Wurst) and “the normal, developed homosexual” (for example, as the European “LGBT”) at the same time. Foucault’s “Instruction 4”—analyze how understandings of “the normal” and “the perverse” are frozen, without assuming they are either true or forever fixed—exposes figurations of “the homosexual” as “the underdeveloped,” “the LGBT,” and “the Euro-visioned bearded drag queen” not as true or false but as powerful apparent representations whose meanings and functions vary radically throughout history and across the globe. Foucault’s genealogical method highlights the changeable nature of figurations of “the homosexual,” by focusing on different historical representations of “the homosexual” and asking “How did these very different understandings of ‘the homosexual’ as, for example, the Victorian sexual and developmental ‘primitive’ or ‘underdeveloped’ and the Obama administration’s normal ‘LGBT’ come about?” Yet because Foucault’s instructions about analyzing modern sexuality and sexual subjectivities are very sweeping, it is useful to look to additional theorists to provide more precise concepts and devices. In this vein, I turn to Donna Haraway’s Butlerian theorization of figuration.

**Homosexuality is a signifier of worldmaking that overdetermines modernity’s operationalization of racializations and colonialism**

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What exactly might we look for when we examine figurations of “the homosexual”? Writing in a very different context to Foucault’s,6 Donna Haraway discusses some specific techniques of “figuration” that allow us to employ figuration as a critical conceptual devise (Kuntsman 2009:29). Haraway’s conceptualization of figuration— which is compatible with Foucault’s analysis and builds upon Butler’s notion of performativity—can help us explore in more detail the figure of “the homosexual.” Figurations are distillations of shared meanings in forms or images. They do not (mis)represent the world, for to do so implies the world as a signified preexists them. Rather, figurations emerge out of discursive and material semiotic assemblages that condense diffuse imaginaries about the world into specific forms or images that bring specific worlds into being. This makes figurations powerful signifiers that approximate but never properly represent seemingly signified worlds, even though figurations are evoked as if they did represent preexisting worlds. It is this latter move that reifies figurations and the worlds they create, making both potentially “flat, unproductive, stifling and destructive” (Grau 2004:12; McNeil 2007). This is why we need techniques like Haraway’s to analyze precisely how figurations are crafted and employed. Haraway explains figuration as the employment of semiotic tropes that combine knowledge, practices, and power to (in)form how we map our worlds and understand the actual things in those worlds (1997).7 Unpacking Haraway’s description, we are left with four key elements through which figurations take specific forms: tropes, temporalities, performativities, and worldings (1997:11). Tropes are material and semiotic expressions of actual things that express how we understand those actual things. Tropes are figures of speech that are not “literal or self-identical” to what they describe (Haraway 1997:11). Figures of speech enable us to express what something or someone is like while (potentially) at the same time grasping that the figuration is not identical to the figure of speech we have employed. This is what makes figuration something that both makes representation appear to be possible and interrupts representation in any literal sense. Haraway argues that language necessitates deployment of figuration and its inability to achieve literal representations. This is because all types of language—whether textual, visual, artistic—involve “at least some kind of displacement that can trouble identifications and certainties” (Haraway 1997:11) between a figure and an actual thing. Investigating figurations of “the homosexual” as “an alien species” to the Victorians as opposed to “the homosexual,” as “the LGBT rights holder” to the Obama administration, and as both “an alien species” and “the normal LGBT rights holder” in the figure of Neuwirth/ Wurst allows analysis of what makes these figurations possible but also what keeps them from referring to specific material bodies engaged in specific forms of sexual practices, specific forms of loving, or specific forms of (singular) being. Haraway’s second element of figuration is temporalities. Temporality expresses a relationship to time. Haraway notes that figurations are historically rooted in progressive, eschatological temporality because they are embedded within “the semiotics of Western Christian realism.” Because Western Christian figures hold the promise of salvation in the afterlife, they embody this progressive temporality (Haraway 1997:9). This medieval notion of developmental temporality persists as a vital aspect of (some) contemporary figurations, even when contemporary figures take secular forms (for example, when it is science, not God, that promises to deliver us from evil through technological innovation; Haraway 1997:10). But this developmental time may not be applied to every figuration in the same way. For example, because the Victorian “homosexual” was figured not only through European scientific discourses but also through discourses of race and colonialism (Stoler 1995), how “the homosexual” was related to developmental temporalities depended very much on who it was (colonizer vs. savage) and where it was (Europe vs. the colonies). It was in part thanks to how developmental temporalities were racialized (Stoler 1995) and spatialized (Hoad 2000) that it was possible for the white Western European “homosexual” to be put on a course of progressive correction so he could live within Victorian society, while figurations of whole populations of racially darkened colonial subjects endlessly oscillated between the irredeemable “non-progressive homosexual” and the redeemable “morally perfectible homosexual” (Bhabha 1994:118), both of whom must live under Victorian imperial rule. Centuries later, these racialized and colonial legacies of “the homosexual” live on, but in ways that appear to be completely different from those of their Victorian predecessors. For example, Clinton’s “LGBT rights holder” is not cast as progressing. Rather, “the LGBT” is a temporally static figure articulated in universal moral terms. By definition, this figure always was and always will be a human being like every other human being. This is what empowers “the LGBT” to claim gay rights as human rights, as every human being has a claim to human rights. This does not mean that a developmental temporality is absent from Obama administration discourse on “the LGBT.” Rather, developmental temporality is central to Obama administration discourse, albeit differently than it was to the Victorians. This is because developmental temporality is not implanted in the figure of “the LGBT” itself. Instead, it is located in relations between sovereign nation-states, where the Obama administration uses a state’s progress toward their appreciation of gay rights as human rights as their measure of development. This is evident in US policies toward Uganda and Russia, for example (Rao 2015; Wilkinson and Langlois 2014). Striving toward this specific kind of development is what it means to the Obama administration “to be on the right side of history” (Clinton 2011; also see Rao 2012). It is, somewhat surprisingly, Tom Neuwirth’s Euro-pop bearded drag queen Conchita Wurst that most closely engages with Western Christian realism and its progressive, eschatological temporality as described by Haraway. While Neuwirth/Wurst’s declaration, “We’re unstoppable,” aligns Neuwirth/Wurst with a modern progressive developmental temporality, as a cis-male styled with long flowing hair and a beard while wearing a gown and singing “Rise like a Phoenix,” Neuwirth/Wurst has been read as a resurrected Christ-like figure (Ring 2014). This has led some European political and religious leaders to debate whether Neuwirth/ Wurst is a developmental vision of salvation or sacrilege for contemporary Europe (Weber 2016). These differences in how figurations of “the homosexual” relate to temporalities underscore the importance of Haraway’s third element—performativities. Coined by Judith Butler to explain how sexes, genders, and sexualities appear to be normal, natural, and true, the term performativity expresses how repeated iterations of acts constitute the subjects who are said to be performing them (Butler 1999:xv). Applying Nietzsche’s idea that there is no doer behind the deed and that the deed is everything (1999:33) to an analysis of sexes, genders, and sexualities, Butler argues that enactments of gender make it appear as if sex—which Butler understands as a social construct—is natural and normal, and as if particular sexed bodies map “naturally” onto particular genders. It is through the everyday inhabiting of these various sexes, genders, and sexualities by everyday people who performatively enact them that the subjectivities of these doers of sex, gender, and sexuality appear to come into being. This does not mean that—once enacted—performativities freeze sexed, gendered, and sexualized subjectivities and the networks of power and pleasure which are productive of them. Rather, because each enactment is itself particular, it holds the possibility of reworking, rewiring, and resisting both “frozen” notions of sex, gender, and sexuality and their institutionalized organizations of power. Following Butler, Haraway argues that “[f]igurations are performative images that can be inhabited” (Haraway 1997:11). In the case of the Victorian “homosexual,” “the LGBT rights holder,” and “the Euro-pop bearded drag queen,” this means these figurations—these figures of speech—through their repetition under specific conditions come to be understood as inhabitable images of oneself (or, for example, one’s vision of Europe) or of others. “The homosexual” may choose to performatively inhabit these figurations, or this inhabiting might be imposed upon “the homosexual.” For example, it is hard to imagine the Victorian “homosexual” willingly embracing himself as “perverse.” It is even harder to imagine colonial subjects embracing their figuration by Victorians as akin to the “homosexual” in their perversion while distinct from the “homosexual” because their racialization and “primitiveness” designate them as incapable of progression or slow to progress. In contrast, the contemporary figuration of “the homosexual” as “the LGBT” may seem to be uncontroversially positive. Many “homosexuals” welcome the opportunity to inhabit the image of “the LGBT rights holder” because of how it appears to signify both normality and progress. At the same time, other contemporary “homosexuals” find the image of “the LGBT rights holder” too constraining. Their objections center on how “the LGBT” is produced by and is productive of institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that value only hetero/homonormative ways of being “homosexual” (in marriage, the military, and consumption) and devalue queer ways of inhabiting one’s sexuality (Duggan 2003:50), illustrating a tension between IR conceptualizations of norms as uniformly beneficial (for example, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) and queer critiques of norms/normalization. As for Neuwirth/Wurst, by both embracing and exceeding hetero/homonormativities, his/her/their performative figuration complicates both “the LGBT” and a hetero/ homonormative vs. queer dichotomy. These illustrations suggest figurations are never stable. For every performance of a figuration depends upon innumerable particularities, including historical circumstances, geopolitical context, spatial location, social/ psychic/affective/political dispositions as well as perceived/attributed traits (racial, sexual, classed, gendered, [dis]abled) of individuals in relation to the figurations they are presumed to inhabit, an individual’s success, failure, or jamming of their assigned/assumed figuration as they performatively enact it, and how these performativities are received and read by others. Because no two performative enactments are ever identical (Butler 1999), every repetition and inhabitation introduces some, even tiny, amount of difference. What this means for figurations of “the homosexual” is they are never completely frozen, for they are always only distilled forms or images that change—even in small ways—through their every iteration and inhabitation. Therefore, institutional arrangements of power/knowledge/pleasure—be they heteronormativities and/or homonormativities—are likewise less stable than they appear to be. All of these aspects of performativity—in combination with how tropes and temporalities are deployed—combine to produce the final element of figuration—worlding (in IR, see Agathangelou and Ling 2004). Worlding “map[s] universes of knowledge, practice, and power” (Haraway 1997:11). In the cases of the Victorian “homosexual,” the Obama administration’s “LGBT rights holder,” and European debates over Neuwirth/Wurst, knowledge about these figurations, the way they are performatively put into practice, and the power relations running through them combine so differently in each case that it is sometimes difficult to remember that we are speaking about the same general figure—“the homosexual.” The sometimes extreme differences in how the figure of “the homosexual” is worlded emphasizes another of Haraway’s points—the maps produced by worlding practices are as contestable as the figurations to which they give specific form (1997:11). In Foucault’s terms, this means neither understandings of “the homosexual” nor the networks of power/knowledge/pleasure that produce this figure are ever frozen. Rather, they are products “of the encroachment of a type of power on bodies and their pleasures... [that define] new rules for the game of powers and pleasures” (Foucault 1980:48). These games are played not only in intimate relations but also in national, regional, and international relations.

**Statecraft is a process of signification in which the sovereign “modern man” enacts his will upon the wirld through the elimination of queerness.**

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Statecraft as Mancraft Combining Foucault’s insights about discourse and productive power with Haraway’s Butlerian unpacking of figuration makes it possible to offer a more nuanced account of the figuration of “the homosexual.” By layering this analysis with Richard Ashley’s “statecraft as mancraft,” what comes into sharper focus is how states (and other political communities) attempt to freeze meanings of “the homosexual” when they enter international games “of powers and pleasures” (Foucault 1980:48). Ashley argues it is impossible to understand the formation of modern sovereign states and international orders without understanding how a particular version of “sovereign man” is inscribed as the necessary foundation of a sovereign state and how this procedure of “statecraft as mancraft” produces a specific ordering of IR.8 I unpack Ashley’s argument by making two moves. I illustrate Ashley’s argument with reference to “the homosexual” in Victorian and in Obama administration discourse. I use the analyses above of Foucault, Haraway, and Butler to argue that Ashley’s “statecraft as mancraft” both furthers understandings of figurations of “the homosexual” generally and provides specific IR research questions for analyzing figurations of “the homosexual” in sexualized orders of IR. Writing about IR from a poststructuralist perspective, Ashley’s arguments build upon Foucault’s analysis of the constitution and problematization of subjectivities. Yet Ashley adds Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive critique of logocentrism to this analysis, based upon his reading of Derrida’s texts from the 1970s and 1980s (for example, 1977, 1981). Logocentrism refers to how “the word”—a singular, specific word signifying a specific presence—grounds all meaning in a linguistic system because of how it is positioned as a universal referent that is located outside of history. In the classical age, “God” was the most common example of a “logos” in a logocentric system. In the modern age, as Nietzsche argued, “man” displaced “God” from this logocentric position. Understood as “a pure and originary presence—an unproblematic, extrahistorical identity, in need of no critical accounting” (Ashley 1989:261), it is now “modern man” who functions in modern discourse as “an origin, an identical voice that is regarded as the sovereign source of truth and meaning” (Ashley 1989:261). Derrida argues that by identifying one word, one being, one presence as an originary “logos” from which all other meanings flow, logocentric systems create conditions of possibility for both hierarchies in linguistic systems and specific narratives of history. Applying Derrida’s ideas to modern renderings of international politics and international theory (especially to Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist theory), Ashley explains how “the logos” is the “sovereign source of truth and meaning” in the manifestation and analysis of the modern nation-state and in specific renderings of domestic and international orders. Specifically, Ashley argues that in IR theory and practice, “modern man” as sovereign man functions not only as “the logos” of modernity in general but also as the foundation of the sovereign nation-state. This is because since the move from monarchical to popular sovereignty, “modern man” has given the modern nation-state its sovereign authority. The state’s sovereign authority that had previously been vested in the monarch—as transcendental, as reasonable, as the interpreter of meaning—is now vested instead in “modern man.” To be sovereign, then, every sovereign nation-state inscribes a particular sovereign man as an always already existing domestic presence as the foundation of its authority domestically and internationally. What emerges from Ashley’s analysis are three key points that I illustrate with reference to the Victorian “homosexual” and to Clinton’s gay right’s holding “homosexual.” First, because the modern sovereign nation-state is intimately tied to “modern man,” the sovereign inscription of the modern state is intimately tied to the sovereign inscription of “modern man.” To put it in Ashley’s terms, “Modern statecraft is modern mancraft. It is an art of domesticating the meaning of man by constructing his problems, his dangers, his fears” (1989:303; italics in original). These are projected into the dangerous realm of international anarchy that sovereign man with his foreign policies attempts to tame. For example, Victorian modern man as “imperial man” required the dangerous, unruly, racially darkened, and sexualized “savage” as his “colonial (perverse homosexual) subject” to justify both the reasonableness of Victorian “sovereign man” and his imperial rule. In contrast, some have argued (Rao 2012) that the Obama administration’s modern man as “neo-imperial man” requires the dangerous, unruly, racially darkened, and sexualized “post-colonial (perverse homosexual) state” to justify both the reasonableness of an enlightened US “sovereign man” who internationally proclaims gay rights as human rights to legitimize his neo-imperial rule. These examples illustrate why “paradigms of man are themselves tools of power” (Ashley 1989:300). Second, this has implications for understanding how IR are ordered. For, as Ashley argues, “modern mancraft” does not just give rise to the modern sovereign state; it also gives rise to modern understandings of international order. For just as the “logos” in Derrida’s logocentric system makes it possible to establish hierarchies, the “logos” of “modern man” as the “logos” of the modern state organizes IR according to hierarchies as well. These include reasonable man/pure danger, civilized/ barbaric, security/danger, peace/war, domestic/international, and order/anarchy. In this logocentric system, whatever can be narrated from the point of view of “the logos” and made to “speak from a sovereign voice” is what is valued and protected; what cannot be made to speak from a sovereign voice (for example, anarchy and terror) must be violently opposed (Ashley 1989:284). Specifying “modern man” in “the Malthusian couple” as their civilized, secure, domestic logos, Victorians narrated the deviant “homosexual” as an intimate, national, and international source of barbarism, danger, and instability to “modern man” (Stoler 1995). Expanding hetero/ homonormative figurations of “the normal couple” to include “the LGBT couple,” the Obama administration in contrast narrated those unreasonable states that do not recognize the gay rights of “the LGBT” as sources of barbarism, danger, and instability to “modern man,” established neocolonial education policies to enlighten unreasonable state’s leaders (for example, by distributing “LGBT” human rights tool kits to foreign embassies), and imposed sanctions on some states that failed to embrace gay rights as human rights (Clinton 2011). This is how “modern man” as sovereign man authorizes the potential use of violence by the sovereign state on behalf of his presumed transcendental reason (Ashley 1989:268). Third, Ashley argues that none of these figurations—of “modern man,” of the modern state, or of international orders that we in IR understand as variations of order vs. anarchy—are stable or ahistorical. For the reasonableness of “modern man” can always be shown to be unreasonable, just as the order of domestic politics can always be shown to contain aspects of anarchy. To put it in Derrida’s terms, the binaries that order domestic and international relations constantly deconstruct themselves, making them both unstable and (because unstable) unreliable. What this means is that various invested actors— from citizens to states to formal international institutions—constantly attempt to stabilize these unreliable hierarchies and the figurations that authorize them so they appear to be ahistorical, given, and true so that they might more reliably function in domestic and international politics. The anxious labor that both the Victorians and the Obama administration employ(ed) to construct their opposed figurations of “the homosexual”—often in the face of international resistances by colonial states (in the case of the Victorians; Stoler 1995) and by postcolonial and postcommunist states (in the case of the Obama administration; Rao 2012; Wilkinson and Langlois 2014)—are cases in point. This in part explains why international politics is inscribed as dangerous by sovereign nation-states (Ashley 1989:304). For by not ceding to the will of a particular national sovereign man, international politics (anarchy) always threatens to expose sovereign man and the sovereign order he guarantees as historical and contingent. That explains why the order/anarchy boundary is so highly policed, both in international practice and in international theory. Ashley’s Derridian analysis, like Foucault’s and Haraway’s analyses, suggests contemplating how figurations and the orders (and anarchies) they produce and that are produced by them are fixed and frozen as well as unfixed and unfrozen. But because Ashley’s analysis is IRfocused, it additionally provides specific IR research questions that allow analysis of both how “modern man” is figured as sovereign man on behalf of sovereign nationstates and how specific figurations of “modern man” as sovereign man participate in the production of domestic and international orders. These research questions are: • How does speaking “the truth” about “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” participate in the organization and regulation of IR? • What ordering principles of sexuality generate and sustain—and are generated and sustained by— figurations of “the homosexual,” and how do they function in IR? • How do figurations of “the homosexual” function as instances of “statecraft as mancraft,” and how specifically is his normality or perversion figured as “the logos” of or against “sovereign man”? • How do these ordering principles of sexuality and figurations of “the homosexual” as or against “sovereign man” work together to order IR? • What do various practices of statecraft as mancraft make possible in world politics, and what contingencies are rendered necessary by and through these practices (Ashley 1989; also see Hopf 2010)?

**Statecraft is not purely gendered but also queered – it operates through a plurality of logocentric matrices via which the “modern man” imposes both homonormative and heteronormative sexualities in service of imperial sovereignty.**

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From Statecraft as Mancraft to Queer Logics of Statecraft The above research questions go some way toward elaborating Queer IR research programs informed by a queer intellectual curiosity. Yet I suggest here that they are limited by Derrida’s initial understanding of deconstruction and its relationship to “the logos” and “the plural.” In the texts Ashley consults, Derrida argues deconstruction is not something we bring to a text; rather, it is something that is inherent in a text. This is because meanings in a text (or, in Foucault’s broader terms, a discourse) are always already plural. The logocentric procedure that tries to impose a singular meaning upon a text or a discourse, then, is always as political as it is impossible. This explains why politics—like the politics of statecraft as mancraft— endlessly loops through circuits in which states (or other political communities) attempt to impose order onto anarchy. By critiquing the logocentric procedure as it functions in domestic and especially international politics, Ashley’s analysis takes us some way toward understanding how “paradigms of man are themselves tools of power” (Ashley 1989:300), not just in specific times and places (as in, for example, Puar and Rai 2002; Puar 2007; Kuntsman 2009) but more generally. For Ashley explains how these impossibly singular normal or perverse paradigms of sovereign man attempt to figure impossibly singular normal or perverse international orders in their own image. This is how actors attempt to impose order onto anarchy. As powerful as this account is, I suggest it overlooks a crucial aspect of how figurations of sovereign man are mobilized to craft domestic and international orders. What is missing is an account of how not just a singular logos but a plural logoi potentially figures sovereign man and orders international politics in ways that construct and deconstruct these figures and orders. Why this matters in Queer IR contexts is because this plural logoi can be understood as simultaneously normal and/or perverse as it is enacted through sexes, genders, and sexualities as well as through various registers of authority (something I will explain further with reference to Neuwirth/Wurst). A plural logoi—especially a normal and/or perverse logoi—appears, on the face of it, to be counterintuitive. This is especially the case because of how Derrida initially sets up “the logos” as the necessarily singular (and presumptively normal) “word” that he opposes to the necessarily plural (and possibly perverse) “text.”9 Following Derrida, Ashley analyzes accounts of sovereign man as the necessarily singular (and presumptively normal) “sovereign orderer” who is opposed to the necessarily plural (and presumptively perverse) “anarchy.” While Ashley insists on the plurality of man (1989:308), he does not consider how this plural man might function as a sovereign man who might be necessarily plural.10 As a result, Ashley neglects to consider how the plural might be empowered not just because it is foundationally normal(ized) but because it is also foundationally perverse (perverted). Ashley’s analysis therefore misses opportunities to investigate how the normal and/or perverse plural might function as a possible or even necessary foundation of meaning in a logocentric system, rather than always in opposition to the singular (presumptively normal) logos. What might a plural logoi look like, and what might its implications be for understandings of statecraft as mancraft? My notion of a plural logoi comes from Roland Barthes’ (1974, 1976) description of the rule of the and/ or. To explain what the and/or is and how it functions, I use illustrations of sex, gender, and sexuality first to contrast the and/or with the more traditional “either/or” and second to pluralize the rule of the and/or itself. The “either/or” operates according to a binary logic, forcing a choice of either one term or another term to comprehend the true meaning of a text, a discipline, a person, an act. For example, in the binary terms of the “either/ or,” a person is either a boy or a girl. In contrast, the and/or exceeds this binary logic because it appreciates how the meaning of something or someone cannot necessarily be contained within an “either/or” choice. This is because sometimes (maybe even always) understanding someone or something is not as simple as fixing on a singular meaning—either one meaning or another. Instead, understanding can require us to appreciate how a person or a thing is constituted by and simultaneously embodies multiple, seemingly contradictory meanings that may confuse and confound a simple either/or dichotomy. It is this plurality that the and/or expresses. According to the logic of the “and/or,” a subject is both one thing and another (plural, perverse) while simultaneously one thing or another (singular, normal). For example, a person might be both a boy and a girl while simultaneously being either a boy or a girl. This might be because a person is read as either a boy or a girl while also being read as in between sexes (intersexed), in between sexes and genders (a castrato), or combining sexes, genders, and sexualities in ways that do not correspond to one side of the boy/girl dichotomy or the other (a person who identifies as a “girl” in terms of their sex, as a “boy” in terms of their gender, and as a “girlboy” or “boygirl” in terms of their sexuality). In these examples, a person can be and while simultaneously being or because the terms “boy” and “girl” are not reducible to traditional dichotomous codes of sex, gender, or sexuality either individually or in combination, even though traditional “either/or” readings attempt to make them so. While Barthes’ rule of the and/or is derived from his description of the castrato’s body that he reads as combining two sexes and two genders (1974), the plural that constitutes a subjectivity can also be more than one thing and/or another. For a subjectivity can be one thing and another and another, etc. as well as one thing or another or another, etc. in relation to sexes, genders, and sexualities, as there are multiple sexes, genders, and sexualities individually and in combination (Fausto-Sterling 1993). This suggests both the limitations of deploying Barthesian plural logics as if they expressed a singular rule of the and/or and the expansive possibilities of plural logics that pluralize the rule of the and/or itself. This discussion makes two significant points. First, the singular choice we are forced to make by an “either/or” logic (for example, boy or girl) excludes the plural logics of the and/or. Plural logics of the and/or contest binary logics, understanding the presumed singularity and coherence of its available choices (either “boys” or “girls,” either normal or perverse), their resulting subjectivities (only “boys” and “girls”), and their presumed ordering principles (either hetero/homonormative or disruptively/ disorderingly queer) as the social, cultural, and political effects of attempts to constitute them as if they were singular, coherent, and whole. Therefore, it is only by appreciating how the (pluralized) and/or constitutes dichotomy-defying subjectivities that we can grasp their meanings. Second, when the (pluralized) and/or supplements the “either/or,” meanings are mapped differently. For in the (pluralized) and/or, meanings are no longer (exclusively) regulated by the slash that divides the “either/or.” Instead, meanings are (also) irregulated by this slash and by additional slashes that connect terms in multiple ways that defy “either/or” interpretations. Importantly, Barthes does not argue that “either/or” logics are unimportant. He suggests it is both the “either/ or” and the (pluralized) and/or that constitute meanings. Yet he stresses texts should not be reduced to an “either/ or” logic, so we can “appreciate what plural constitutes” a text, a character, a plot, an order (Barthes 1974:5; emphasis in original). “[R]eleasing the double [multiple] meaning on principle,” the logic of the (pluralized) and/or “corrupts the purity of communications; it is a deliberate ‘static’, painstakingly elaborated, introduced into the fictive dialogue between author and reader, in short, a countercommunication” (1974:9; my brackets). The (pluralized) and/or, then, is a plural logic that the “either/or” can neither comprehend nor contain. It is how the (pluralized) and/or introduces a kind of systematic, non-decidable plurality into discourse as “that which confuses meaning, the norm, normativity [and, I would add, antinormativities]” (Barthes 1976:109, my brackets; on antinormativities see Wiegman and Wilson 2015:1–3) around the normality and/or perversion of sexes, genders, and sexualities rather than just accumulating differences (as intersectionality suggests; Crewshaw 1991) that makes it a queer logic (Weber 1999:xiii; also see Weber 2014). For a (pluralized) Barthesian and/or accords with Sedgwick’s definition of queer as “the ... excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of anyone’s gender, of anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithically” (1993:8) as exclusively “and” or as exclusively “or.” Identifying these often illusive figurations, the now queer Barthesian and/or suggests how we should investigate queer figures. Barthes’ instruction is this—read (queer) figures not only through the “either/or” but also through the (pluralized) and/or. While Barthes offered this instruction in the context of reading literature (1974), his queer rule of the (pluralized) and/or applies equally to foreign policy texts and contexts. For “sovereign man” as a plural logoi in a logocentric procedure can figure foreign policy and (dis)-order international politics.11 For example, consider the case of the 2014 Eurovision Song Contest winner Tom Neuwirth and/as Conchita Wurst. At least since winning the 2014 Eurovision Song Contest and announcing in her/his/their acceptance speech, “We are unity, and we are unstoppable,” Neuwirth/Wurst has been taken up by some Europeans as a figuration who embodies either a positive or a negative image of an integrated Europe. This places Neuwirth/Wurst in an “either/ or” logic of statecraft as mancraft (Ashley 1989), in which the crafting of a singular “sovereign man” for the European Community functions through a traditional understanding of sovereignty as “a complex practice of authorization, a practice through which specific agencies are enabled to draw a line” between who can legitimately be included and excluded from the political community this “European sovereign man” grounds (Walker 2000:22). In this traditional “either/or” logic of statecraft as mancraft, what is debated is whether or not Neuwirth/Wurst as a proposed “sovereign man” of the new Europe is/should be licensed to draw a line between properly integrated and normalized Europeans and improperly integrated and perverse Europeans in a Europe that has been striving for integration in one form or another since the end of World War II. This is in part why Neuwirth/Wurst’s Euro-vision of Europe engendered such strong expressions of disgust or approval. For example, far right Bulgarian MEP candidate Angel Dzhambazki remarked that, “This bearded creature, called with the European name Conchita Wurst is like genetically modified organism and won the Eurovision. And I wonder, if the vice of our time is that we tolerate the perversity. I don’t want such a song contest for my children” (Kosharevsk 2014:np). In contrast, the UN spokesperson for Ban Ki-Moon commented: Everyone is entitled to enjoy the same basic rights and live a life of worth and dignity without discrimination. This fundamental principle is embedded in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Conchita is a symbol in that sense and I think it’s good for them to meet. [The meeting allows us] to reassert his [Ban Ki-Moon’s] support for LGBT people and for them to ensure that they enjoy the same human rights and protection that we all do (Duffy 2014:np; my brackets). Understanding Neuwirth/Wurst as either normal or perverse required Europeans to read Neuwirth/Wurst as a figure who is knowable and placable along an “either/or” axis—in relation to Europe and in relation to traditional European debates about European integration. And yet, while Neuwirth/Wurst certainly seems to be making a call for some kind of unity from a platform that has traditionally promoted European integration, Neuwirth/Wurst does so as a figure who defies traditional understandings of integration across multiple axes. These include (but are not necessarily confined to) sex, gender, sexuality, nationality, race, civilization, and authority. For example, Neuwirth/Wurst’s and/or sexes, genders, and sexualities are evident in how this bearded drag queen is read through vast matrices of sexes, genders, and sexualities that minimally include either male or female, masculine or feminine, heterosexual or homosexual, normal or perverse as well as simultaneously male and female, masculine and feminine, heterosexual and homosexual, normal and perverse. This figures Neuwirth/Wurst as queer, because he/she/they do not signify monolithically around sexes, genders, or sexualities. Neuwirth/Wurst, then, is a performative embodiment of a plural logoi that functions as a deliberate static which confounds and confuses traditional understandings of sexes, genders, and sexualities (Barthes 1974, 1976). Neuwirth “himself,” however, seems to signify (more) monolithically around sex, gender, and sexuality, identifying as a male “homosexual” who eschews descriptions of himself as trans\* (Davies 2014).12 This and his statements in support of gay marriage, for example, make him compatible with “the LGBT” Clinton (2011) describes, whose “homosexuality” can be classified, domesticated, and homonormative. At the same time, Neuwirth/Wurst embodies a pluralized and/or logic in international politics in the registers of nationality, race, civilization, and authority that confound a simple understanding of Neuwirth/Wurst in “either/or” terms. This is evident in the various official biographies of Neuwirth and/as Wurst that appeared since Neuwirth/Wurst’s selection as Austria’s representative to Eurovision 2014.13 These bios state Neuwirth was born and raised in Austria, while Wurst was born “in the mountains of Colombia” to a Colombian mother and German father and “raised in Germany.” They position Neuwirth as a “natural” European citizen and Wurst as a diasporic Colombian and/or German subject who has relocated from the global South to the global North. This has implications for how Neuwirth/Wurst is read nationally, racially, civilizationally, and as a “sovereign authority.” Nationally, Neuwirth/Wurst is Austrian (like Tom) and/or Colombian (like Conchita’s mother) and/or German (like Conchita’s father). Racially, Neuwirth/ Wurst is white (presumptively like Tom and like Conchita’s father, because neither are marked as nonwhite) and/or mestiza (because Conchita’s Colombian mother who is from rural Colombia is likely to be indigenous or mestiza). Civilizationally, Neuwirth/Wurst is European (like Tom and like Conchita’s father) and/or indigenous and/or Hispanic (like Conchita’s mother). All of this puts Neuwirth/Wurst’s ability to function as a singular “sovereign man” for a new Europe in doubt— whether that Europe is normal or perverse. This is because Neuwirth/Wurst pluralizes by crossing and combining so many of “fortress Europe’s” boundaries territorially, racially, and civilizationally because of how Neuwirth/Wurst crafts his/her/their sexes, genders, and sexualities through “the two hearts beating in [the one] chest”14 of Tom Neuwirth and/as Conchita Wurst. At the same time, Neuwirth/Wurst’s plurality—not just singularity—in all these sexualized international registers make this figure repulsive and/or attractive to statesleaders. This figures Neuwirth/Wurst as both a plurally anarchical force—a potentially unruly threat to bring “the violence of the world we live in at the heart of the home, at the heart of the national [and regional] self” (Fortier 2008:60; my brackets) and as a singular “sovereign man” upon whom a normal or perverse European order might be founded and as a plural “sovereign man” upon whom a normal and/or perverse European order might be founded. This is because Neuwirth/Wurst is both one thing or another (normal or perverse) while simultaneously being one thing and another (normal and perverse), with respect to European integration and with respect to integration more broadly. This makes Neuwirth/Wurst a potentially singular “sovereign man” in a traditional logic of statecraft as mancraft and a potentially plural and/or foundation of what I call queer logics of statecraft, whose call for unity from a European integration platform is far more complex than it might at first appear to be (Weber 2016). This regional illustration of statecraft as mancraft suggests that statecraft as mancraft is less straightforward than Ashley suggests. Because the logos/logoi of the logocentric procedure can be plural as well as singular by being normal and/or perverse around sexes, genders, and sexualities and around numerous important registers of international politics, sometimes statecraft as mancraft is (also) a queer activity that results in unusual sexualized orders of international politics. We cannot account for these queer instances of statecraft simply by adding the singular “homosexual”—as either sovereign man or his foil—to our analyses. Rather, tracing how plural logics of the and/or function in global politics—as queer logics of statecraft—is to appreciate how the normal and/or perverse plural sometimes scripts sovereign figures and/as their adversaries as well as the unusual orders these mixed figures produce and are productive of. Queer logics of statecraft are evident in those moments in domestic and international relations when actors or orders rely upon a queerly conceptualized Barthesian and/ or—an and that is at the same time an or in relation to sexes, genders, and sexualities—to perfomatively figure sovereign man, the sovereign state or another political community, or some combined version of the order/anarchy and normal/perverse binaries as normal and/or perverse. Analyzing IR through a lens of queer logics of statecraft directs us, following and then extending Ashley’s arguments, to categories that connect and/or break apart foundational binaries like order/anarchy and normal/perverse, by understanding the stabilizing “slash(es)” in these binaries as multiplying and complicating connections, figures, orders, and anarchies rather than reducing and simplifying them. It leads us to ask how “the plural” as “a deliberate static” (Barthes 1976:5, 9) is introduced into these binaries to both establish and confound their meanings and the meanings of “men,” “states,” “orders,” and “anarchies” as well as the meanings of “sexes,” “genders,” and “sexualities” which are foundational to them. In a Butlerian vein, queer logics of statecraft require us to take seriously how the plural is performatively enacted, enabling a plethora of national and international figurations and logics that can be (queerly) inhabited. Following Sedgwick, queer logics of statecraft are attentive to how sexes, genders, and sexualities that fail or refuse to signify monolithically are productive of and are produced by unexpectedly normal and/ or perverse “sovereign men,” “sovereign communities,” and sovereignly ordained orders and anarchies. Queer logics of statecraft, then, do not just describe those moments when the performatively perverse creates the appearance of the performatively normal. Nor do they describe only the opposite, when the performatively normal creates the appearance of the performatively perverse, although those can be among their effects. Rather, queer logics of statecraft describe those moments in domestic and international politics when the logos/logoi as a subjectivity or the logos/logoi as a logic is plurally normal and/or perverse in ways that “confound the norm, normativity [and anti-normativity] (my brackets; Barthes 1976:109; Wiegman and Wilson, 2015:1-3) of individually or collectively singularly inscribed notions of sovereign man, sovereign communities, or sexualized orders of IR. This is not to say that queer logics of statecraft do not give rise to “institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations” (Berlant and Warner 1995:548, footnote 2) that make “sovereign men,” “sovereign states,” and international orders appear to be singular, coherent, and privileged. In this respect, they can be akin to sexual organizing principles like heteronormativies and homonormativities (Berlant and Warner 1998:548; footnote 2; Duggan 2003:50). For, by “confusing the [singular] norm, normativity [or antinormativity]” (my brackets; Barthes 1976:109; Wiegman and Wilson, 2015:1-3), queer logics of statecraft can produce new institutions, new structures of understanding, and new practical orientations that are paradoxically founded upon a disorienting and/or reorienting plural. This can make them more alluring, more powerful, and more easily mobilized by both those who, for example, wish to resist hegemonic relations of power and those who wish to sustain them (Weber 1999, 2002; Puar and Rai 2002; Puar 2007). Unlike heteronormativities and homonormativities, though, we cannot name in advance what these institutions, structures of understanding, and practical (dis)/ (re)orientations will be. We cannot know whether they will be politicizing or depoliticizing. To determine this, it is necessary to identify both the precise plural(s) each particular queer logic of statecraft employs to figure some particular “sovereign man,” “sovereign state,” or other “sovereign community” and international order, always asking, “For what constituency or constituencies does this plural operate?” The case of Neuwirth/Wurst is striking, then, because it illustrates how Europeans leaders debated—albeit very briefly—a plural logoi as a possible ground for contemporary Europe, whether they recognized Neuwirth/Wurst as a plural logoi or not. In discussions about the “new Europe,” both sides in this debate employed Neuwirth/ Wurst to construct and authorize their Euro-visioned hierarchies of order vs. anarchy, as if they were true. In this way, Neuwirth/Wurst generated not only competing sexualized orders of contemporary Europe; he/she/they also practically (dis)/(re)oriented and (de)/(re)railed any idealized contemporary European-wide vision of an already united Europe. It is not surprising that in their mobilizations of Neuwirth/Wurst, European leaders attempted to claim him/her/them as either normal or perverse, for this is how traditional logics of statecraft as mancraft operate. Because European leaders failed to consider Neuwirth/ Wurst through the lens of queer logics of statecraft, they generally failed to appreciate what plural(s) constituted him/her/them and how the plural and/or logic he/she/ they embodies is what made their attempts to claim or disown—to normalize or to pervert—this normal and/or perverse figure both possible and impossible. Yet it is this very failure on the part of European leaders to read Neuwirth/Wurst through the plural(s) that constitute(s) him/her/them that suggests an additional set of research questions for international theory and practice, including: • Can a paradigm of sovereign man be effective without being—as Ashley claims the ideal type of sovereign man must be—“regarded as originary, unproblematic, given for all time, and, hence, beyond criticism and independent of politics” (Ashley 1989:271)? • What happens when a political community like a state or the European Union considers grounding itself upon a pluralized and/or logoi? • Under what conditions might this be desirable or even necessary, and what might it make possible or preclude? • How might queer logics of statecraft effect the organization, regulation, and conduct of international politics?

**Queer modalities of international political theorization are marginalized by the disciplinary force of their model that pathologizes queer analytics as unproductive and ahistorical thus effacing its value.**

**Weber ’14** -- (Cynthia Weber, 4-3-2014, "Why is there no Queer International Theory?," University of Sussex, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1354066114524236, accessed 7-25-2022) -- nikki

Since its formation as an academic field, Queer Studies has questioned ‘the uniformity of sexual identities,’ tracing how sexual and gender variance undo fixed identity categories like gay, lesbian, and straight. This led to theorizations of sexuality and gender as flexible, often anti-normative, and increasingly politicized (Duggan, 2003). Most of this work involved thinking sex, sexuality, and their performances on a personal, institutional, or national scale (Berlant and Freeman, 1992; Butler, 1990; Rubin, 1984). In response to contemporary global incidents ranging from ‘the triumph of neoliberalism’ to the ‘infinite “war on terrorism”’ to ‘the pathologizing of immigrant communities as “terrorists”’ (Eng et al., 2005: 1), Queer Studies has largely transformed itself into Global Queer Studies (GQS). In this guise, it produces significant insights on the global workings of ‘race, on the problems of transnationalism, on conflicts between global capital and labor, on issues of diaspora and immigration, and on questions of citizenship, national belonging, and necropolitics’ (Eng et al., 2005: 2; also see Povinelli and Chauncey, 1999). GQS contributions to what are arguably the three core areas of International Relations (IR) research — war and peace, state and nation formation, and international political economy — are regularly featured in top-ranked journals and in top-ranked book series (e.g. Binnie, 2004; Briggs, 2003; Cruz-Malave and Manalansan, 2002; Eng et al., 2005; Hoad, 2000; Khanna, 2007; Kuntsman, 2009; Luibhied, 2002, 2007; Luibhied and Cantu, 2005; Puar, 2007; Puar and Rai, 2002; Schulman, 2012a; Spurlin, 2013). But not in the field of IR. Strikingly, this resurgence of activity in and attention to GQS and to the scholarship it is producing has largely bypassed IR. Since Queer Studies made the turn to Global Queer Studies over the last decade, only six journal articles and no special issues on GQS themes have been published in the top 20 impact-rated IR journals, and only one GQSthemed book has been published or commissioned by a top IR book series.1 All of this begs the question: if Queer Studies has enhanced understandings of international politics by going global, why has IR not gone somewhat queer? Or, to paraphrase Martin Wight, why is there no Queer International Theory? Three likely answers spring to mind. Answer 1: ‘IR scholars are not interested in queer-themed work.’ This may be the case for many, yet it does not account for the fact that membership in the International Studies Association (ISA) LGBTQA Caucus, which (among other things) sponsors ISA panels, is steadily growing. Nor does it explain why the first interdisciplinary conference to focus on Queer IR2 received over 100 submissions and drew 200 participants.3 Answer 2: ‘This interest in GQS has not (yet) led IR scholars to produce any Queer International Theory.’ This answer ignores an expanding body of queer-themed work authored by IR scholars that dates back some 20 years (e.g. Agathangelou, 2013; Altman, 2006; Jauhola, 2010; Kollman, 2007; Owens, 2010; Peterson, 1999, 2013; Pratt, 2007; Rao, 2010; Sabsay, 2013; Shepherd and Sjoberg, 2012; Sjoberg, 2012; Smith, 2003; Weber, 1994a, 1994b, 1998b, 1998c, 1999, 2002, forthcoming). Yet, because most of this work is not published in IR outlets, this does contribute to the impression that there is no Queer International Theory. Answer 3: ‘All of the GQS-themed work produced by IR scholars is so interdisciplinary that it lacks a primary focus on core IR concerns, which is why IR scholars are not interested in it and why it is not published in IR outlets.’ Yet, the primary foci of most queer-themed work published by IR scholars are classic IR themes such as war, security, sovereignty, intervention, hegemony, nationalism, empire, colonialism, and the general practice of foreign policy. Of particular relevance to IR scholars are investigations that explore how failing hegemonic states perform queerness through their conduct of interventions and wars to solidify their hegemonic status (Weber, 1999), how states produce themselves and their citizens as pro-LGBT subjects in part to constitute other states, ‘civilizations,’ or peoples as national and global threats (Puar, 2007), how the articulation Weber 29 and circulation of global (economic) value through queer and racialized bodies supports the practices of empires (Agathangelou, 2013; Scott, 2013), and, more generally, how ‘queer’ is mobilized to designate some state practices as progressive and others as nonprogressive as a mechanism to divide the world into orderly versus disorderly (anarchic) spaces (Agathangelou, 2013; Haritaworn et al., 2013; Puar, 2003; Rao, forthcoming; Remkus, forthcoming). This suggests that multiple queer international theories do exist, which means we need to ask a different question: why does there appear to be no Queer International Theory? My claim is that the presumed non-existence of Queer International Theory cannot be explained merely by its absence from prestigious IR journals and book series because this absence is the (un)conscious effect of how so-called Disciplinary IR codes various types of theory as failures. ‘Disciplinary IR’ — which aspires to be but is not equivalent to the discipline of IR as a whole — is, of course, as imagined as it is enacted, and it changes as social, cultural, economic, and political forces change. Yet, at any particular historical moment, IR scholars have a working knowledge of Disciplinary IR because it embodies the general commitments and standards that regulate, manage, and normalize ‘the conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 1994: 237) regarding IR publishing, funding, hiring, promotion, and tenure decisions. While there are certainly institutional and national variations in how these standards are enacted (Hoffmann, 1977; Waever, 1998), most IR academics are required to justify their work with regard to these standards at some point in their careers. Disciplinary IR’s commitments and standards are as much the performative result of so-called ‘mainstream’ agendas of learned societies, universities, independent funding agencies, and governments that support socially, culturally, economically, or politically ‘policy-relevant,’ ‘useful,’ or ‘impactful’ research as they are the performative outcome of so-called ‘dissident’ practices (Ashley and Walker, 1990; also see Soreanu, 2010) that seek to rewrite, resist, or rebel against so-called mainstream agendas, be they ‘scientific,’ ‘positivist,’ or ‘neoliberal,’ for example. Together, these intricately intertwined positions produce a Disciplinary IR that claims to speak for the whole of the discipline of IR because it wields sufficient power to (de)legitimate IR scholars and their work for many user communities. Because of its power, Disciplinary IR is as often contested as it is assimilated to by IR scholars of virtually all intellectual dispositions.4 A central tenet of what I am calling Disciplinary IR is embedded in the work of Martin Wight. Wight claimed that for international theorizing to succeed, it must accumulate knowledge about interstate relations (Smith, 2000; Wight, 1966). My claim is that from a Disciplinary IR perspective, theories — including queer international theories — fail because they are judged not to be making progress toward this goal. This is what explains the subsequent absence of queer international theories from prestigious IR journals and book series and the presumed non-existence of Queer International Theory. To substantiate this claim, I investigate how Disciplinary IR employs three strategies — homologization, figuration, and gentrification — to make it appear as if there is no Queer International Theory. Homologization describes the act of using a homology to describe relationships, relative positions, and structures in a set of elements in order to prescribe how relationships ought to be ordered and how elements and their aims ought to be valued (e.g. Wight, 1966).5 Figuration describes the act of employing semiotic tropes that combine knowledges, practices, and power to shape how we map our worlds and understand actual things in those worlds (Haraway, 1997). Gentrification describes the replacement of mix with homogeneity while pretending difference and privilege do not exist (Schulman, 2012b). My analysis is grounded in Martin Wight’s famous homology: ‘Politics is to International Politics as Political Theory is to Historical Interpretation’ (Wight, 1966). This is not only because Wight’s homology illustrates and/or authorizes homologization, figuration, and gentrification. It is also because Wight’s homology elegantly encapsulates how Disciplinary IR has traditionally thought of itself since its formation in the wake of the First World War — as separate but parallel to the discipline of politics and as capable of achieving its aim to produce unique cumulative knowledge about international politics only if it models itself on how political theory is practiced. In the 1960s, Wight mobilized this generalized view to make his case for a historical approach to the study of IR — both as a participant in the first ‘great debate’ over method and methodology between traditionalists and behavioralists and as a historian who founded an International Relations department. This in part accounts for Wight’s contentious claim that international theory can only succeed if it transforms itself into historical interpretation and his contentious placement of the term ‘Historical Interpretation’ in the place one would expect to find the term ‘International Theory’ in his homology. IR debates about methodology and history have certainly moved on since Wight’s time (e.g. Lapid, 1989; Rosenberg, 2006). Even so, the values and relationships expressed in Wight’s homology are still widely accepted in Disciplinary IR, to the point that Wight’s homology remains a generalizable guide to regulating how international theorizing ought to be conducted. Beginning with Martin Wight’s homology, I trace how Wight’s strategy of homologization equates international theory and the discipline of International Relations with failure, authorizes the figuration of specific types of international theory and specific ways of producing international theory as failures, and embraces a gentrified strategy of substitution as a legitimate response to these failures. Applying these logics to queer international theories, I suggest that homologization, figuration, and gentrification combine to make it appear as if there is no Queer International Theory. In so doing, they authorize the discipline of IR (on Disciplinary IR’s behalf) to dismiss queer international theories as International Theory, resulting in negative consequences not only for the scholars who produce this type of work, but for the discipline of IR as a whole. I conclude by reflecting on the costs of using Wight’s homology to regulate, manage, and normalize the scholarly conduct of international theorizing — for queer international theories and for the discipline of IR as a whole. I argue that while most scholars in the discipline (un)consciously embrace Wight’s homology as their guide to disciplinary success, my analysis of Queer International Theory reveals that Wight’s homology has three detrimental effects on the discipline: it limits how international politics is enriched by critical inquiry, it cedes consideration of key international phenomena to other disciplines, and it paradoxically leads to disciplinary failure on the discipline’s own terms. Because the case of Queer International Theory illustrates how Disciplinary IR manages not just queer international theories, but all theories that profess to be International Theory, generalizable lessons can be drawn from this case for the discipline as a whole. Primary among these is that IR’s disciplinary attachment to Wight’s homology compromises possibilities for doing international theorizing and thinking international politics not only on terms the discipline rejects, but on terms the discipline embraces.

**The idea of “objective” IR that represents an accumulation of historical fact pushes out queer scholarship – queer political theory and practice is based in the construction of subjective and embodied epistemologies that form multiplicities of “truths.”**

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Even those scholars who do not overtly employ Wight’s homology often unconsciously abide by its recommendations. If they do not, they risk not being recognized as proper international relations theorists. In this way, then, Wight’s homology normalizes the conduct of international theorizing rather broadly in the discipline of IR because it governs how a critical mass of IR scholars (un)consciously think about international theories in general and about their own practices as international theorists specifically. This is what makes Wight’s homology so dangerous and so powerful. It is dangerous because it is a highly biased expression of what politics, theory, and knowledge ought to look like in Disciplinary IR’s view of the discipline of IR, which is applied to the discipline as if it were objective. It is powerful because it functions as a technology of differentiation to designate failure and pathways to success for international theories that can be applied to normalize (by validating, dismissing, or correcting) any type of theory and theorist that/who would dare to make a claim to be (doing) International Theory. This is why Wight’s homologization of international theories matters for queer international theories. For when Wight’s observations about International Theory are applied to Queer International Theory, queer international theories are homologized out of existence. Like International Theory, Queer International Theory ‘does not, at first sight, exist’ (Wight, 1966: 17) because it fails to measure up to its ‘twin,’ Queer Political Theory, in content and in function. This is for three reasons. First, queer international theories lack a substantial, significant body of classical texts (Wight, 1966: 17) that Queer Political Theory provides (from Foucault (1979 [1976]), to Butler (1990) to De Lauretis (1991) to Sedgwick (1991) for example), offering in its place scattered, unsystematic texts published almost exclusively in non-IR outlets. Second, while queer international theories contribute to scholarly discussions about war, security, terrorism (Owens, 2010; Weber, 2002), states, nationalism (Peterson, 1999, 2013; Weber, 1998b), sovereignty, intervention, hegemony (Pratt, 2007; Weber, 1994a, 1994b, 1999), empire (Agathangelou, 2013) and other international forms of violence, they do not restrict themselves to focusing on ‘high politics’ or ‘the states-system, the diplomatic community itself’ (Wight, 1966: 22). Instead, they often twin the content of Queer Political Theory by using an array of interdisciplinary high and low theories, epistemologies, and methods (see Sedgwick, 1991) that defy Wight’s tidy boundaries between Politics and International Politics, between Political Theory and International Theory, and between successful and unsuccessful knowledge accumulation to describe Queer International Politics ‘as they really are.’ This is widely seen as acceptable practice in queer political theorizing in general because queer political practices are themselves so mixed that they can only accurately be described with a mix of theories, epistemologies, methodologies, and foci. But it is infrequently viewed as acceptable practice in Disciplinary IR theorizing. This is because Disciplinary IR rarely recognizes boundary-breaking theoretical, epistemological, and methodological approaches to international theorizing as being productive of valuable knowledge about international politics (Weber, 2013).7 What this means in Wight’s terms, then, is that queer international theories stray too far from telling the one true story that all International Theory must tell — the story about the survival of states in the states-system. And they stray too far from deploying acceptable approaches in telling the stories they do tell about international politics — approaches that use positivist methods to accumulate knowledge. Finally, because much of the ‘low,’ boundary-breaking content of queer international political processes is classified out of existence by Wight, Wight’s homology places queer international theories at a fork in the road where both paths lead to failure. If queer international theories explore a mix of high and low, domestic and international queer international political processes using appropriate epistemologies and methodologies, they are faulted by Wight’s homology for twinning the content but not the function of its twin, Queer Political Theory. Yet, if they neglect to explore this mix of queer international political processes, they are faulted for not reflecting international political processes ‘as they really are.’ What this means is that while it might be possible to claim that Queer Politics equals Queer Political Theory, Wight’s homology offers no successful route to a claim that Queer International Politics equals Queer International Theory. This is how queer international theories are homologized as failures. Because queer international theories are (un)consciously homologized as failing the discipline of IR, Queer International Theory is, following Wight’s contestable logic, deemed to be non-existent. And Disciplinary IR’s next logical step is to again follow in Wight’s footsteps, by substituting a ‘successful’ type of International Theory in its place. Wight’s homologization of theory, then, first authorizes the figuring of various types of theory as failures and then authorizes their substitution with successful theory. Explaining how these processes work in relation to queer international theories is the task of the next two sections.

**Queer engagement with international relations is coded as an already failed project – a political road not taken that exists in a space of perpetual elimination at the hands of modern IR’s calculative normativity – vote affirmative to unsettle the construction of IR as we know it.**

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Figuring failure Failure is the map of political paths not taken, though it does not chart a completely separate land; failure’s by-ways are all the spaces in between the superhighways of capital. (Halberstam, 2011: 19) My argument so far has focused on how Martin Wight’s famous essay renders international theories — and particularly queer international theories — non-existent by homologizing them as failures. In this section, I extend this discussion to the figuration of failure by pursuing two aims. The first is to examine how Wight’s homologization of international theories (including queer international theories) illustrates and authorizes the figuration of failure. I do this by applying a simplified version of Donna Haraway’s theorization of figuration to Wight’s homology.8 The second is to analyze how Wight’s homology thwarts attempts to celebrate queer international theories as what Judith Jack Halberstam calls ‘successful failure,’ a concept that has recently gained traction amongst some Queer IR scholars. To do this, I read Wight’s figuration of theoretical failure in tandem with Halberstam’s work on queer (as) failure. Haraway describes figuration as the act of employing semiotic tropes that combine knowledges, practices, and power to shape how we map our worlds and understand actual things in those worlds (1997). Haraway argues that figurations take specific form through their reliance on tropes, temporalities, performances, and worldings (1997: 11). Tropes are material and semiotic references to actual things that express how we understand actual things. Tropes are not ‘literal or self-identical’ to the things they describe (Haraway, 1997: 11). Rather, tropes are figures of speech. Haraway argues that ‘[a]ll language, including mathematics, is figurative, that is, made of tropes, constituted by bumps that make us swerve from literal-mindedness’ (1997: 11). This is because all language — textual, visual, artistic — involves ‘at least some kind of displacement that can trouble identifications and certainties’ (1997: 11) between a figure and an actual thing. Wight’s homology is a figuration that deploys a mathematical trope. Describing his homology as an equation (1960: 22; 1966: 32), Wight invites a mathematical engagement with his homology, one that makes us ‘swerve from literal-mindedness’ (Haraway, 36 European Journal of International Relations 21(1) 1997: 11), away from the fact that (in this case) queer international theories exist to make us consider their non-existence. It does this by figuring relationships among actual bodies of theory and how we ought to understand them. Wight’s homology is also figurative because it is temporal, performative, and worlding. Haraway notes that figurations are historically rooted in ‘the semiotics of Western Christian realism,’ which is embedded with a progressive, eschatological temporality. Western Christian figures embody this progressive temporality because they hold the promise of salvation in the afterlife (1997: 9). This medieval notion of developmental temporality remains a vital aspect of contemporary figurations, even when figures take secular forms (e.g. when science promises to deliver us from evil with a new technological innovation; see Haraway, 1997: 10). Developmental progress as the route to secular salvation is equally present in Wight’s homology. With the achievements of Queer Political Theory as its developmental goal, would-be Queer International Theory is advised by Wight to journey down the same path as its righteous twin by replicating Queer Political Theory’s project of accumulating knowledge to accurately reflect the realm of politics it should describe. For Queer International Theory, this means making it its ‘business to study the states-system, the diplomatic community itself’ (Wight, 1966: 22). Queer International Theory only comes into existence by performing the same function as Queer Political Theory. This illustrates the performative aspect of figuration. Performativity expresses how repeated iterations of acts constitute the subjects who are said to be performing them (Butler, 1990). Haraway argues that ‘[f]igurations are performative images that can be inhabited’ (1997: 11). Applying this to Wight’s homology, Queer Political Theory is the performative image — the body of knowledge that is the effect of ritualistically repeated practices of specific forms of knowledge collection — that Queer International Theory must inhabit through its disciplinary performances in order to exist. What we have with Wight’s homology, then, is a figuration taking the form of a mathematical equation that posits the pathway to success charted by Queer Political Theory as the developmental and performative goal of Queer International Theory. Wight’s homology shows queer international theories/theorists the one true path to theoretical success, and, in so doing, it delivers them from failure. As the logical formula for disciplinary success, Wight’s homology maps the superhighway to the accumulation of intellectual capital and the disciplinary power that comes with it that queer international theories so far lack. By charting this and only this course to theoretical and disciplinary success, Wight’s homology provides Queer IR theorists with the final aspect that Haraway argues all figurations possess, worlding. Like figurations in general, Wight’s homology ‘map[s] universes of knowledge, practice, and power’ (Haraway, 1997: 11). Successful practice is ‘studying the states-system, the diplomatic community itself’ (Wight, 1966: 22). Successful knowledge is the developmental, cumulative, and representational result of this practice. And power is the disciplinary capital one acquires by being practically and knowledgably successful. Wight’s figurations of theoretical success and failure are remarkably similar to Halberstam’s figurations of success and failure in queer theory. But these figurations are Weber 37 valued and mobilized in significantly different ways. While Wight’s aim is to identify failure so international theories (like queer international theories) can overcome it, Halberstam’s aim is to identify failure so queer theories and queer people can revel in it as a way of undoing disciplines and disciplinization. This is strategically possible because Halberstam understands queer failure (a term he9 borrows from Jose Munoz (2010) and refines through the work of Lee Edelman (2005)) as a productive negativity that can be deployed to ‘dismantle the logics of success and failure with which we currently live’ (2011: 2). To make this case, Halberstam begins much like Wight does — by defining success and figuring failure in its wake. Couching his discussion of success and failure in the context of ‘a heternormative, capitalist society,’ Halberstam argues that such societies equate success with ‘specific forms of reproductive maturity combined with wealth accumulation’ (2011: 2). Halberstam’s aim is to deploy queer failure to interrupt and disrupt heteromaturity and wealth accumulation (2011: 92). To do this, Halberstam makes two important moves. First, he claims failure as something intrinsic to queers.10 Halberstam writes of failure as ‘something queers do and have always done exceptionally well’ (2011: 3). Not only do queers fail, they fail with flair. ‘[F]or queers, failure can be a style, to cite Quentin Crisp, or a way of life, to cite Foucault’ (2011: 3). Given this, Halberstam suggests that queers are the prototypes of failure (2011: 3). Second, Halberstam specifically figures queer failure by using all the elements Haraway associates with figuration. Queer failure is worlding because if success is the heterosexual matrix that establishes ‘the punishing norms that discipline behavior and manage human development with the goal of delivering us from unruly childhoods to orderly and predictable adulthoods’ (2011: 3), then queer failure (like failure itself) is ‘the map of political paths not taken’ (2011: 19). Still on the map but perversely off course, Halberstam claims queer failure challenges heterosexual orthodoxies and how they model queer lives and queer futures. Queer failure is temporal because it rejects developmental temporalities (to normatively grow up, reproduce, and accumulate capital) that lead to theoretical and personal maturity in the terms successful theorizing and living demand (2011: 3). As such, queer failure repudiates the salvation narrative found in classical Christian and contemporary secular figurations. The temporality of queer failure is instead a counter-temporality — a refusal to mature in heteronormative terms — that is situated more broadly in Halberstam’s Gramscian-inspired counter-hegemonic queer politics. Queer failure’s reliance upon tropes is evidenced by its figurative rather than literal strategies to interrupt and disrupt success. For example, queer failure might strategically inhabit ~~stupidity~~ [unintelligence] — not literally by lacking knowledge but figuratively by miming ‘unteachability’ in the modes of conduct prescribed by the dominant heterosexist matrix. By displacing ‘real ~~stupidity~~ [unintelligence]~~’~~ for ‘figural ~~stupidity~~ [unintelligence],’ queer failure exposes ‘the limits of certain forms of knowing and certain ways of inhabiting structures of knowing’ (Halberstam, 2011: 11–12; see also Ranciere, 1991). In this way, queer failure becomes a refusal to be read, which becomes a refusal to be normatively streamed down the pathways of success. Finally, queer failure is performative because — as the ritualistic repetition of undisciplinable performances by queer bodies that are incongruous with the dominant heterosexist matrix — queer failure interrupts and disrupts success and produces alternative images of (un)being and (un)knowing that failing queer bodies might inhabit (Halberstam, 2011: 23). Not all failure is queer failure. For example, Halberstam argues that the film Trainspotting illustrates ‘unqueer failure.’ For even though the characters in this film reject productive love and wealth accumulation, their drug-fueled lifestyle becomes ‘the rage of the excluded white male, a rage that promises and delivers punishments for women and people of color’ (2011: 92). In contrast, Halberstam argues that queer failure is a negativity that interrupts and disrupts heteromaturity and wealth accumulation — and is ‘productively linked to racial awareness, anticolonial struggle, gender variance, and different formulations of the temporality of success’ (2011: 92). Collectively, these points allow Halberstam to tell the story of failure differently, as ‘a tale of anticapitalist, queer struggle’ set within a narrative about ‘anticolonial struggle, the refusal of legibility, and an art of unbecoming’ (2011: 88). In that story, queer failure is ‘a way of refusing to acquiesce to dominant logics of power and discipline and [is] a form of critique’ (2011: 88). Were Halberstam’s figuration of queer failure to live up to its promise and were it to be embraced by international theorists and applied to international theories, it might well achieve for international theories what Halberstam argues it achieves for queer theory. It might elevate the detours of international theories off the disciplinary pathways of success into valued philosophical insights. This could bring Queer International Theory ‘into existence.’ For if, as Halberstam suggests, ‘queer is the art of elevating perversion to philosophy’ (Halberstam, quoted in Ristic, 2013), then Queer International Theory might be accepted as an (artful) instance of elevating ‘queer perversions’ of IR’s disciplinary pathways to knowledges, practices, and power into valuable queer philosophical insights about Queer International Politics. This might be an attractive option for IR scholars doing queer international theorizing. Yet, it would require several leaps of faith on their part to move from Halberstam’s celebration of queer failure to a Queer International Theory that is not so hampered by disciplinary knowledges, practices, and power that they would be left with anything to celebrate. This is not only because many of the positions Halberstam attributes to queer failure are worthy political aims he attaches to queer failure rather than generates from it (e.g. that queer failure is necessarily anticolonial, illegible, counter hetero-/homonormative, and counter-hegemonic), making his claims more idealistic than realistic (which he admits). It is also because, as Halberstam figures it, queer failure does not ultimately ‘dismantle the logics of success and failure with which we currently live’ (2011: 1). Rather, Halberstam performs a radical reversal — not a dismantling — of success and failure with his notion of queer failure, marking success as something that fails queer bodies and failure as something that successfully liberates queer bodies from the burdens of conventionally understood success and failure (2011: 3–4). From the standpoint of a Disciplinary IR (un)consciously governed by Wight’s homologizing technology of the conduct of international theorizing, nothing could be more alarming. For the point of Wight’s homologization and its figuration of failure is to move IR scholars from the ‘perversion’ of misapplying themselves to their studies of international politics to correcting how and what they study. This spirit is encapsulated in the title of Barry Buzan and Richard Little’s Wight-inspired essay, ‘Why international relations has failed as an intellectual project and what to do about it’ (2001). If this analysis of Wight’s figuration of failure tells us anything, it is that charting the course toward international theories’ salvation was always Wight’s motivation for naming their sins. Halberstam’s figuration of queer failure ultimately proves unhelpful for escaping Wight’s homologization. This is not primarily because it departs from Wight by celebrating ‘the sin’ of failure. Rather, Halberstam’s figuration of queer failure is at its weakest where it charts the very same course as does Wight’s homology. That course is to take the worlds and the mappings of success and failure (but not, in Halberstam’s case, their values) as given. In so doing, both Wight and Halberstam overlook how ‘figurations are condensed maps of contestable worlds’ (Haraway, 1997: 11, my emphasis). To call these contestable worlds into question requires not just revaluing their terms, but challenging how they are mapped. It comes as no surprise that Wight performs this neglect in how he maps success and failure. For he attempts to place any contestability of his worlding practices beyond discussion through his recourse to ‘mathematics.’ Not only does Wight definitively figure international theories as failures by excluding them from his equation, Wight figures success as something that can only be achieved by following Wight’s dubious calculations. What is more surprising is that Halberstam performs this same neglect, by never contesting how ‘the dominant system’ maps success and failure. For while he revalues failure as success and argues that ‘[f]ailure is the map of political paths not taken,’ he still insists that failure ‘does not chart a completely separate land; failure’s by-ways are all the spaces in between the superhighways of [intellectual] capital’ (2011: 19). In charting these specific pathways to queer failure, Halberstam accepts a worlding of success and failure that is strikingly similar to Wight’s. This allows Wight’s chartings of successful international theoretical practice (‘studying the states-system, the diplomatic community itself’; 1966: 22), knowledge (the developmental, cumulative, and representational result of this practice), and power (the disciplinary capital one acquires by being practically and knowledgably successful) to remain intact. What this means is that ‘the punishing norms that discipline behavior and manage human development’ (Halberstam, 2011: 3) — while disavowed by Halberstam — continue to be applied to any theory that would dare to call itself International Theory. Halberstam’s neglect to query success is, I suspect, a result of his overinvestment in failure. For Halberstam imbues failure with an authentically queer essence. Were he to remap success — tear up its maps, dig up its roads, focus on how success employs its power to zigzag around and pave over its own innumerable failures in its attempt to make us think it never swerves from literal-mindedness — he would also be required to remap failure, rethink queer, and rethink his investment in queer failure. This may well explain why Halberstam, like Wight, places the pathways (but not the value) of success beyond contestability. Were IR scholars doing queer international theorizing to embrace Halberstam’s celebration of queer failure, they would suffer from these same shortcomings. As a result, they would not disrupt Disciplinary IR’s ideal of disciplinary success any more than Halberstam does, even as they repudiated disciplinary success in favor of a Queer International Theory revalued as successful failure. Should they embrace this move, it could have three unwanted consequences. First, it could further exclude Queer IR scholars from participating in refiguring what success and failure mean for/in Disciplinary IR and how they are applied to international theorizing. Second, it could forfeit any demand that Disciplinary IR evaluate queer international theories as successful in terms that Disciplinary IR already regards as constituting success — contributing to understandings about interstate relations. Finally, it could unwittingly confirm what Disciplinary IR already believes — that Queer International Theory is not a figuration it wishes to inhabit. As a field shamed by its failure and determined to achieve success in conventional terms, celebrations of queer failure may not only convince Disciplinary IR that Queer International Theory does not exist. They may convince the discipline more generally that Queer International Theory must not exist. For this reason celebrations of queer failure may unintentionally participate in authorizing the final step in Disciplinary IR’s disavowal of queer international theories. That step is gentrification.

**Queer IR is appropriated into the disciplinary academy through a process of ideological gentrification whereby critical divergence is supplanted with a domesticated and homogenized version of genuine radicality – embracing the 1AC’s deviant scholarship is a bulwark against academic assimilation.**

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Gentrifying failure There is a gentrification that happens to buildings and neighborhoods and there is a gentrification that happens to ideas. (Artist Penny Arcade, 1996, quoted in Schulman, 2012b: 29) In this section, I argue that Wight’s homology authorizes the substitution of ideas produced by ‘failing’ queer international theories with ideas produced by a ‘successful’ type of International Theory of Disciplinary IR’s choosing. To make this argument, I apply Sarah Schulman’s analysis of what she calls ‘the gentrification of the mind’ (2012b) to a discussion of what I call ‘the neighborhood of IR.’ Conceptualizing IR as a neighborhood is gestured toward but not elaborated on in Anna Agathangelou and L.H.M. Ling’s ‘The house of IR’ (2004), in which they map relations among IR traditions as those of a multi generational family led by ‘Grand Pater Imperialism’ and ‘Grand Mater Capitalism’ and their spawn, including Realism and Liberalism living upstairs, with support from ‘Native-Informant Servants’ like Area Studies living downstairs. While Agathangelou and Ling’s characterization of IR as a house offers useful insights into how IR is organized, it does not capture the movement amongst traditions within the discipline. We get no sense of the comings and goings of ‘family members,’ of who gets booted out of a bedroom to accommodate a new arrival, of whose intellectual capital is rising or falling, and of which tradition has accepted a makeover to avoid being shunned. If we were to remap IR as a neighborhood, the dynamic nature of the discipline would be more apparent. We could take account of who is sitting on prime real estate, how urban/disciplinary blight and renewal shake things up, and how (re-)zoning organizes IR’s complex living arrangements. Diagramed in this way, one specific force organizing the houses of IR would become apparent — gentrification. The term gentrification was coined by the British sociologist Ruth Glass to describe ‘the influx of middle-class people to cities and neighborhoods, displacing the lower-class worker residents’ (Schulman, 2012b: 24). But as the artist Penny Arcade notes, gentrification does not just happen to buildings and neighborhoods. It also happens to ideas. Sarah Schulman traces how the physical gentrification of ‘failing’ urban neighborhoods leads to the gentrification of ideas, what she calls ‘the gentrification of the mind’ (2012b). For by moving diverse people out of buildings, one is also moving diverse ideas out of neighborhoods. Schulman describes gentrification as the replacement of mix with homogeneity while pretending difference and privilege do not exist (2012b). Among the key elements Schulman identifies as part of the gentrification process are substitution, homogenization, and assimilation. Substitution refers to the physical replacement of mix with sameness. Thanks to zoning laws that refigure where prime real estate is located, formerly poor, mixed, ‘failing’ neighborhoods are ‘regenerated’ by moving in wealthy, predominantly white residents. As wealthy residents move in, high-class businesses appear, real estate and rental prices soar, and poor residents are priced out of their own neighborhoods. This not only has the effect of driving out people marked by difference. It also recategorizes these ‘different’ residents as dangers to newly gentrified communities. ‘The relaxed nature of neighborhood living becomes threatening, something to be eradicated and controlled’ (2012b: 28). This is because gentrifiers ‘brought the values of the gated community and a willingness to trade freedom for security’ with them (2012b: 30) and therefore ‘sought a comfort in overpowering the natives, rather than becoming them’ (2012b: 30). As former residents disappear, so too do their ideas and ways of living. The lived realities, tastes, points of view, and stories of the rich and powerful replace those of former inhabitants. Traces remain, but in the form of what Schulman calls ‘the “fusion” phenomena.’ Fusion is expressed by the kind of food one sees in gentrified neighborhoods — food with ‘toned-down flavors, made with higher quality ingredients and at significantly higher prices, usually owned by whites, usually serving whites.’ More troublingly, it is equally present in the toned-down, ever-blander, simplistic, and superficial ideas that replace the complexity of ideas and relationships that marked pre-gentrified mixed neighborhoods (2012b: 31). This intellectual homogenization is part of what Schulman means when she refers to the gentrification of the mind. Because they control the story that is told about themselves, gentrifiers believe ‘that corporate support for and inflation of their story is in fact a neutral and accurate picture of the world’ (2012b: 28). In this way, gentrification erases not only difference, but the economic, political, social, and cultural privilege that makes it possible for gentrifiers to erase difference because ‘gentrification is a process that hides the apparatus of domination from the dominant themselves’ (2012b: 27). Not only is gentrification naturalized as a pure good, with the costs to replaced populations erased. Gentrification encourages all those living in gentrified neighborhoods to internalize gentrified values and assimilate to gentrified modes of conduct. As Schulman explains it, ‘There is a weird passivity that accompanies gentrification’ (2012b: 33). ‘It’s like a hypnotic identification with authority’ (2012b: 34), which brings with it ‘an acceptance of banality, a concept of self based falsely in passivity, an inability to realize one’s self as a powerful instigator and agent of profound social change’ (2012b: 13–14). This is the final component of what Schulman calls the gentrification of the mind. 42 European Journal of International Relations 21(1) Schulman made her argument to explain the 1990s’ gentrification of her East Village New York City neighborhood and how this gentrification was enabled in part by the loss of a generation of edgy artists and queer activists to AIDS. What Schulman observed in her neighborhood parallels the theoretical gentrification of the neighborhood of IR, where substitution, homogenization, and assimilation have replaced the ‘wrong’ kinds of theoretical, epistemological, and methodological mix with disciplinary homogeneity while pretending difference and privilege do not exist (2012b). The poorest neighborhoods of IR have always been those populated by new intellectual immigrants to IR. These include Marxists, poststructuralists, feminists, critical race scholars, postcolonial scholars, critical studies scholars, and queer studies scholars. These scholars are poor because they wield the least disciplinary capital in IR. This is because their analyses deviate from an exclusive focus on ‘the states-system, the diplomatic community itself’ (Wight, 1966: 22) and because they refuse Disciplinary IR’s epistemological and methodological claims about knowledge collection and accumulation. Rather, these residents debate everything from post-positivism to gender and sexuality hierarchies, to the global dominance of neoliberalism and empire, as well as how and why these ideas, epistemologies, methodologies, and phenomena shape international politics. There have been numerous turf wars amongst these scholars over the years, yet, for the most part, this mix of relative newcomers to the discipline have peacefully lived together in their broadly defined ‘critical theory’ enclave (Cox, 1981), a kind of East Village of multiple, interdisciplinary-mixed IRs whose residents have relatives in a vast range of other disciplinary neighborhoods. From time to time, Disciplinary IR scholars have visited this enclave to sample its ideas. This happens most frequently when Disciplinary IR is in crisis, as it was, for example, when it failed to predict the end of the Cold War. During that period in the late 1980s to early 1990s, this East Village of IRs became a go-to location for new insights into the workings of international politics. This put critical IR on Disciplinary IR’s map as an up-and-coming area, thus raising the disciplinary capital of critical IR scholars, however temporarily. But visits by Disciplinary IR scholars to this area could be dangerous. The ideas and approaches of Disciplinary IR scholars were not accorded the same respect here as they were elsewhere in the discipline (e.g. Ashley, 1984; Weber, 2010). What some Disciplinary IR scholars saw as their generous engagements with and support for emerging critical IR traditions were met with what they experienced as aggressive assaults on their core ideas and on the character of Disciplinary IR itself. In contrast, critical IR scholars saw themselves battling to save their neighborhood from IR’s disciplinary takeover (see Keohane, 1989; and in reply, Weber, 1994c). These ‘non-productive’ engagements added to the growing sense that critical IR was failing Disciplinary IR (Holsti, 1985). For, at least from Disciplinary IR’s perspective, these exchanges introduced dangerous mix into disciplinary homogeneity (Keohane, 1988) and detracted from rather than enhanced IR’s core goal — to progressively accumulate knowledge about interstate wars. Once critical IR was marked as a failure, it could legitimately be ‘regenerated’ by ‘overpowering the natives, rather than becoming them’ (Schulman, 2012b: 30). Employing the gentrification toolkit, Disciplinary IR first re-zoned critical IR’s enclave and then subjected it to substitutions. Recognizing that this peripheral area producing marginalized intellectual ideas could potentially re-center and revive a discipline in crisis, some Disciplinary IR scholars took up residence in this edgy neighborhood. As their numbers reached a (non-)critical mass, institutional authorities took notice and amended publishing and hiring strategies that effectively re-zoned this outlying turf as central to disciplinary regeneration. But making critical IR’s areas of investigation central to Disciplinary IR’s regeneration came with costs. Those costs were incurred through the gentrification strategies of substitution, homogenization, and assimilation. The hard, troubling, political edges of critical IR were substituted with the softer, more soothing critiques of Disciplinary IR that left most critical politics behind. A generalized international political economy was offered as a replacement for Marxism (Strange, 1988), ‘the gender variable’ for feminism (Jones, 1996; in reply see Carver et al., 1998), constructivism for poststructuralism (Wendt, 1992), ‘the clash of civilisations’ for critical race and postcolonial studies (Huntington, 1993), and ‘soft power’ in the service of state power for cultural critique (Nye, 2004). This is not to say that critical IR traditions disappeared. Rather, they were pushed off what was becoming some of the discipline’s prime real estate and beyond the barricades of Disciplinary IR’s newly erected gated communities (e.g. most of IR’s top 20 journals). This made critical IR’s status in the discipline all the more precarious, which enabled the homogenization of critical IR’s ideas through ‘the fusion effect.’ This created toned-down gentrified versions of critical IR’s ideas that were compatible with both what Disciplinary IR most valued (being ‘a realist and a statist’; e.g. Wendt, 1992) and what Disciplinary IR viewed as being critical enough. With homogenization came assimilation. From the perspective of ‘old school’ critical IR scholars, gentrified ‘critical’ IR scholars exhibited ‘a weird passivity’ (Schulman, 2012: 33) about the political stakes of critical IR aims and ‘a hypnotic identification with authority’ (2012b: 34) as they themselves became the new authorities within Disciplinary IR (Wendt, 1992). There seemed to be little if any critical self-reflection on how disciplinary privilege and power enabled and sustained this reorganizing of IR’s living arrangements. And there seemed to be no awareness within Disciplinary IR that its attempts to insulate itself from internal critique limited its ability to generate expert knowledge about international politics broadly and narrowly defined. Or, to put it in Schulman’s terms, Disciplinary IR did not grasp the relationship between the gentrification of a neighborhood and ‘the gentrification of the mind’ (2012b). In fairness to Disciplinary IR scholars who were practicing at this time, how could they have grasped this connection? How could they have avoided doing precisely what they did? For the gentrification of critical IR had it roots not just in the failure of IR to predict the end of the Cold War. It had its roots in Martin Wight’s famous homology. This may well have had two (un)conscious consequences. First, it may have stirred up Disciplinary IR’s nagging doubts about the discipline of IR. It may have led Disciplinary IR scholars to ask if Wight was right, if IR is a failing discipline because it produces no successful International Theory. Even though Wight’s test of success is not predicting future events but rather accumulating knowledge about states and the states-system, Disciplinary (and especially Realist) IR scholars at the time lamented the fact that the knowledge they had been accumulating about international politics left them ~~blindsided [~~caught unaware] by the end of the Cold War. As a result, securing the viability of the discipline urgently rose to the top of many Disciplinary IR scholars’ agendas. Second, while Wight’s iconic reading of International Theory as failure may have stung at this time, it also provided the solution Disciplinary IR scholars needed. If Wight could rescue the discipline of IR by substituting Historical Interpretation for failing international theories, then Disciplinary IR could substitute all manner of discipline supporting gentrified theories for discipline-challenging critical theories of these multiple IRs. (Un)Consciously taking Wight’s homology as their licensing proof, Disciplinary IR scholars not only erased much of the critical difference within IR; they seemed to do so without any consideration of how this might impoverish IR intellectually. This is because — as Wight’s homology taught them — securing disciplinary success overrides insuring intellectual freedom. Following in Wight’s footsteps, Disciplinary IR continues to make these moves. It substitutes ‘successful’ (often gentrified) International Theory wherever and whenever ‘failed’ international theories threaten it with good, but unpalatable, ideas and challenges. Which brings us back to queer international theories. Queer international theories are ripe for gentrification by Disciplinary IR for three reasons. First, queer international theories are producing intellectual insights that could prove valuable to the discipline. By analyzing how sexual- and gender-variant identities, hierarchies, institutions, and systems function internationally, it investigates war, security, terrorism, sovereignty, intervention, hegemony, nationalism, empire, and foreign policy more generally and contributes to understandings of interstate wars and international politics understood more broadly. Second, queer international theories occupy just enough real estate for the discipline to take an interest in their (re)generation. Thanks to support from the ISA via the LGBTQA Caucus and the Feminist and Gender Section, queer international theories are slowly but steadily being institutionalized into the neighborhood of IR. Third, by breaking most of the rules about what successful International Theory is supposed to be (singular, focused exclusively on interstate wars, respectful of political theory/international theory and domestic/international boundaries, eschewing ‘low theory,’ driven to accumulate disciplinary knowledge without questioning disciplinary knowledge in epistemologically and methodologically ‘unproductive ways’), queer international theories are figured as failures in Wight’s terms. Taken together, this means that queer international theories might be just enough of a success in their own terms and just enough of a failure in Disciplinary IR’s terms for the discipline more broadly to, at some point in the not-too-distant future, come to regard queer international theories as (another) dangerous difference that must be re-zoned. How might queer international theories be gentrified? Or, to ask this question in Wight’s terms: if queer international theories were to be homologized as Queer Politics:Queer International Politics = Queer Theory:X, what might ‘X’ out queer international theories? Queer international theories would likely be ‘X-ed’ out by some form of gentrified ‘Critical’ International Theory. If Disciplinary IR associated queer international theories with poststructuralism, then they would likely be substituted with constructivism. If they were associated with feminism, then queer international theories might be placed in a Weber 45 ‘sexuality variable’ that strips them of all political critique (Weber, 1998c). If they were associated with cultural studies, then they might be mobilized for their soft power in the service of state power. And so on. In whatever way they might be substituted, homogenized, and assimilated, queer international theories in anything resembling their current form would be gentrified out of existence. This would allow Disciplinary IR scholars and gentrified ‘critical’ IR scholars alike to authoritatively declare about gentrified ‘Queer’ International Theory: ‘There is Queer International Theory. It does exist. But only on our terms, which are Wight’s terms.’

**IR theory is an intrinsically failed politics – the methodological landscape of IR is a repetitive fantasy of discipline that seeks coherence through the imposition of totalizing rules-based theories – embracing the queer indeterminacy and incomprehensibility solves.**

**Barkin and Sjoberg 21** (J. Samuel Barkin, PhD, Professor, Department of Conflict Resolution, Human Security, and Global Governance and Program Director of Global Governance and Human Security MA and PhD Programs; McCormack Graduate School; Laura Sjoberg is British Academy Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London. February 10, 2021, “The Queer Art of Failed IR?” <https://doi.org/10.1177/0304375421989572>; accessed 7/23/2022) ng

In the wake of the enduring popularity of the argument that there might be an “end of IR theory” (Dunne et al., 2013), we see a world in which IR theorizing is alive, even if only in repetitive fantasy, and key to disciplinary identification for whatever “IR” is. Some of the responses to the “end of IR theory” argue for a retreat from grand theory to middle-level theory (e.g., Lake, 2013); others warn of a “cacophony” that needs categorization to be comprehensible (Jackson & Nexon, 2013, p. 543); still others call for either re-terming schools of IR (Michelson, 2020) or combining analytic approaches (Grieco, 2019). While we see theory’s continued importance even in scholars’ confusion about its appropriate role, we recognize, with those who declare theory’s end in the discipline, that something has changed in the structure and function of theorizing among scholars interested in global politics. **That something, we argue, is the simultaneous recognition of and denial of the failure of IR theorizing**. We contend that **IR theorizing is both failing and necessarily failed**, but that does not make it over. Instead, we argue, drawing on queer theory, that failure in/of grand IR theory is something to be celebrated and actively participated in. With many queer theorists (e.g., Halberstam, 2011), we argue that failure, rather than a normative bad, can be a necessary corrective to the intellectual and disciplinary stagnation implied by and implicated in practiced and accepted standards of success. We argue that **overwrought debates about the state of IR theorizing could learn from queer methodology** (e.g., Weber, 2014a) **and queer theorizing** (e.g., Weber, 2016a) **not only about global politics but also about the nature of knowledge and disciplinary politics.** Queer IR has asked how cultural ideas about gender and sexuality shape global politics, and how heteronormative, homonormative, and cisnormative frameworks have shaped the ways the world works (Richter-Montpetit, 2018). It has also turned its lenses inward, asking why queer scholarship has had as little influence on IR theorizing as it has (Weber, 2016b), and how **queering IR could change IR’s methodological** (Weber, 2014a) **and theoretical** (Weber, 2014b) **landscapes**. This article looks at a small but in our view important piece of that puzzle—how taking queer work seriously might provide insight about the (sometimes endless) state-of-the-field debates. We see these state-of-the-field assertions, arguments, and debates as first and foremost recursive. Sometimes they are romances, explaining the breaking developments that provide hopeful next steps for a blooming field (e.g., Acharya, 2014; Berenskotter, 2017). Sometimes they are tragedies, spelling gloom and doom for IR as an enterprise (if not academia as a whole) or even global politics itself (e.g., Aistrope & Fishel, 2020; Stevens & Michelsen, 2020). Other times, they are dramas with various players and various arguments taking various starring roles in sparring matches (e.g., Jackson & Nexon, 2009; Parashar, 2013). Sometimes they are histories, tracing the past into the present or the present into the past (Alekseyeva, 2016; Schmidt & Guilhot, 2019). Sometimes they are sociologies, explaining how this and that theory relates to this and that other theory (Aris, 2020; Barkin & Sjoberg, 2019). Sometimes they are serials, explaining how particular approaches ebb and flow or evolve (e.g., Epstein, 2013; Guzzini, 2013). Sometimes they are sports reports, talking about which side wins what when (e.g., Acharya, 2005; Legro & Moravcsik, 1999). Most state-of-the-field evaluations make the various protagonists and antagonists (theories or theorists) seem so at odds, so different, and the stakes of the debates so dire. We argue that, with few exceptions, these stories, despite their different forms, different characters, and different plotlines, are all the same. They are more often than not the product of gender, sex, race, sexuality, national origin, education, and employment privilege that produce a narrow view of what is and what should be, based on the practices that have provided the success from which the privileged writer writes. As Weber (2014b, p. 29) argues, “**disciplinary IR’s commitments and standards are as much the performative result of the so-called ‘mainstream’ agendas of learned societies, universities, independent funding agencies, and governments … as they are the performative outcome of so-called ‘dissident’ practices”** (citing Ashley & Walker, 1990; Soreanu, 2010). In fact, Weber suggests that the radical critical edge of IR and its mainstream “foes” are really “intricately intertwined positions” which “produce a disciplinary IR that claims to speak for the whole of the discipline” out of power rather than legitimacy (Weber, 2014b, p. 29). In concrete terms, we argue that the **current “state” of state-of-the-field stories and debates is intimately and necessarily tied not only to heteronormative, traditionalized rules and norms of scholarly practice but also to heteronormative, traditionalized understandings of success, failure, and their value.** In this article, we argue that the things that the state-of-the-field literature agrees on betray a narrow and problematic approach to what knowledge is, how it works, who has it, and how it can be. We suggest that **IR** on these terms **is always and already a failed enterprise**, no matter what spin the stateof-the-field literature puts on it. **IR fails to reach any expected or desired end of the enterprise of IR theorizing. It fails to achieve coherence or fails to approximate some measure** (citations, downloads, and publisher quality) socially understood as failure’s opposite. **It fails to find clarity or directions**. **It fails because it must—its idealized goals are unachievable and require it to be something that it cannot be**, and remain its seductive unquestioned/unquestionable ends, despite an obvious need for reevaluation and, possibly, the embrace of failure (Baudrillard, 1991 [1979]; Halberstam, 2011). Rather than arguing that IR’s success and failure need to be redefined, we contend that IR’s success and failure need to be normatively reinterpreted. We argue that seeing IR as a failure, and embracing its failings, provides a realistic and intellectually grounded path for IR’s “futures,” putting to rest the state-of-the-field fairy tales and encyclopedias once and for all.

**The paradigm of IR relies on the valorization of traditional research as a metric of “success” – voting negative imbricates debate in the echo chamber of normative political theory that accumulates rigid forms of knowledge while reproducing the exclusion of queerness.**

**Barkin and Sjoberg 21** (J. Samuel Barkin, PhD, Professor, Department of Conflict Resolution, Human Security, and Global Governance and Program Director of Global Governance and Human Security MA and PhD Programs; McCormack Graduate School; Laura Sjoberg is British Academy Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London. February 10, 2021, “The Queer Art of Failed IR?” <https://doi.org/10.1177/0304375421989572>; accessed 7/23/2022) ng

We argue that **knowledge cumulation in IR is a fantasy reified by paradigmatic clusters and the mimicry of research standards and practices in the natural sciences** (e.g., Elman & Elman, 2001, 2003). The “evidence” of “knowledge cumulation” in IR comes as much from the ritualized practice of research behavior as it does from any “true” or genuine notion of knowledge cumulation. One has “succeeded” in the enterprise of IR by cumulating knowledge, and the work of “successful” scholars is by definition cumulated knowledge. Cumulation of knowledge as a standard of success is a condition of possibility for the desirability of success in the field. That ritualized practice at once is institutionalized as success and institutionalizes the need for research success, reified and reproduced by hiring, tenure, merit raise, and promotion standards. This ritualization is a signifier that what counts as knowledge in the field, in particular research programs and more generally, is performative (Barad, 2007; Butler, 1990; Weber, 1998)—where standards are set by their utterance and repetition rather than by some external “objective” standards of (narrowly) good science or (more broadly) good research (Baudrillard, 1991; Shepherd, 2008; Williams, 2003). Scholars iterate and reify standards of measurement of knowledge in each piece of scholarship which “succeeds” in the field, and these iterations make it a paradox for scholars to both occupy the methodological, epistemological, and political space that falls outside of inherited standards and succeed. Outside -the -mainstream work’s underrepresentation in the places understood to be publishing “success” is overdetermined, and the correlation between mimicry of traditional scholarship and “success” of critical scholars a given. We mean “performative” in the sense that Judith Butler uses it (Butler, 1990, 1993), particularly as she talks about it going hand in hand with a Foucauldian notion of disciplining,8 where “performativity cannot be understood outside of a process of iterability—a regularized and constrained repetition of norms” which resonate as “ritualized production” (Butler, 1993, p. 60). This frames performativity as a “specific modality of power as discourse” (Butler, 1993, p. 139) where the politics of the signification and the politics of the sign meet, an act of territoralization, of production, of installation—which does not have to be alone, singular, or unidirectional. Since performatives are their own referent (Butler, 1993, p. 159), they proliferate as manifestations of the power underlying them and interact relatively on the basis of that relative power. In this context, “performances” are actions and events, iterations and reifications, and context-specific, which “bring a subject into being” relationally.9 To escape the recursive, performative loop of “disciplinary success,” we argue that it is important to see the possibility that knowledge cumulation is not, and should not be, a given in IR research. Instead, we argue that the idea itself is an inherited empty signifier with unspoken content which governs the production of what we understand as disciplinary IR. Traditionally, the idea of knowledge cumulation is firmly grounded in a neopositivist understanding of social science, in which the role of theory is to collate observed empirical regularities across cases or what Waltz calls laws (Waltz, 1979). While this interpretation is critiqued in most critical IR, “cumulation,” in that work, becomes a term without clear conceptual content. The paradigmatization of IR theorizing distracts from a particular theory’s internal conditions of possibility by introducing incompatible conditions of possibility drawn from an inherited disciplinary sociology of what knowledge is and how it works. As such, any acknowledgment of the idea of cumulativity from within specific exercises in reflexive IR creates the grounds for necessary failure within those exercises. The simultaneous rejection of traditional “cumulation” and continued performance of acts of cumulation can be understood by seeing the ways that silence frames cumulation in critical IR. We learn from feminist theorists that the unspoken is as important as if not more important than what is spoken (Charlesworth, 1999; Kronsell, 2006), coming from attention to how IR’s others are omitted, excluded, kept out, and not mentioned (Agathangelou & Ling, 2004; Tickner, 1988). We argue that IR’s silences tell us more about the state of knowledge cumulation in the discipline than looking for standards that tell us what we do know. Accordingly, we ask on principle what any given research program does not take account of and how accounting for those omissions could changes analysis. We focus on both visible omissions (like the concepts that a research program fails to incorporate) and invisible omissions. Invisible omissions are those that are unhearable by a research program— normally left out or ignored by both the researchers that form the core of the research program and their critics (Butler, 2001; Edkins et al., 2012; Hansen, 2000). By “unhearable,” we mean either that the omitted content falls outside of the boundaries set for dialog or is assumed by all stakeholders to be by definition irrelevant (for deeper analyses see MacKinnon, 2006; Spivak, 1988). Unlike its visible omissions—variables that its scholars and their critics have added to, re-operationalized, expanded on, or suggested the inclusion of—invisible omissions are often not treated as omissions at all within particular scholarly boundaries.10 The discipline’s “collective” standards for knowledge production, then, can be understood as constituted by social performances of dominance rather than founded on some given or objective notions of what science should be. Rather than being objective judgments of quality, statements like “this is good science” and “these results are robust” are signs without referents used to discipline (Baudrillard, 1995). The invisible disciplining nature of the performative standards of knowledge cumulation is part of the story of Butler’s understanding of performativity. The other part is attention to who is excluded by claims to knowledge cumulation (generally as well as in specific paradigmatic situations), what is left out, and on what axes. These disciplinary standards (both in the conventional and Foucauldian sense) make invisible their own impossibility and their related necessary failure. For example, a submission to a traditional IR journal in the United States or Western Europe which makes an interesting argument, but is not in the format of, methodologically acceptable to, inclusive of the same forms of evidence traditionally used in, and good science to that journal’s traditional reviewers is unlikely to succeed in getting published.11 This will generally be justified with reference to the “quality” of the piece, and rarely if ever will questions of sex, race, gender, class, and other axes of exclusion be discussed as producers of the standards that then exclude on “quality” where “quality” has been set up in a way that excludes all performances of scholarship which are not mimicry of a particular Western, liberal model (Paolini, 1999).12 Even editors and reviewers who note the exclusionary effect of these standards will often mourn that and move on, imagining the only possible alternative being lacking standards, and seeing such a lack of standards as more insidious than the exclusionary effects of using certain sets of standards. “Knowledge cumulation” then becomes a set of reified and artificial standards rather than a journey for truth or interest. The answer to this quagmire is sometimes a liberal politics of inclusion (e.g., Nedal & Nexon, 2018)—how do “we” get more women, more minorities, and more people from underrepresented places in the world to be able to meet the standards of good scholarship in the field? That liberal politics of inclusion, while well-intended, can be read as a (subtle, perhaps accidental) expansion of the violence it (formally) seems to abate. It fails to question the utility of the existing standards of good scholarship and assumes that those currently excluded would be happy to change the form, shape, and/ or nature of their scholarship to fit within the (unquestioned/unquestionable) mold of good scholarship, either loosely or strictly understood. As Puar (2006) argues, liberal “inclusion” to absorb the other within can be as violent as if not more so than exclusion even as it appears progressive. That violence is the reproduction of naturalized, bounded identities when identities are liminal and messy when not policed (e.g., Agathangelou, 2013; Haritaworn et al., 2013; Scott, 2013). The bounded nature of IR inclusion excludes liminality, messiness, and outsideness (e.g., Malksoo, 2012 ¨ ). Expanding the boundaries of IR to include any given particular excluded work maintains an illusion of stability, hiding what is unstable; it maintains an illusion of certainty, hiding what is in doubt; it maintains an illusion of coherence, hiding the rebellious, the failed, and that which remains outside (e.g., Sjoberg, 2017). Queer theorizing of the liminality involved in unstable sex/gender identities shows that even that which is presumed to be the most primordial (sex identity) is really liminality hiding under supposed definition (e.g., Weber, 2016a). Translated to thinking about inhabitability, this theorizing suggests that the apparent safety of (constituting then occupying) inhabitable space hides liminality and uncertainty, and perhaps danger, under its supposed (empirical and normative) clarity (Haritaworn et al., 2014). Therefore, “all the repressive and reductive strategies of power systems are already present in the internal logic of the sign,” such “that violence is an inevitable byproduct of signification” (Baudrillard, 1981). In this way, not only do traditional standards of knowledge make invisible their own impossibility, they hide the violence of IR’s denials of failure and continued insistence on traveling failed paths despite the condemnation of failure and the privileging of success. IR’s continued recursive enactment of its settled “standards” despite their obvious failure and exclusiveness makes invisible the raced, classed, and sexed impacts of those standards and their apparent objectivity. Baudrillard’s work provides a path for navigating this disjuncture between signs (IR’s “standards”) and referents (the fantastic notion that “good scholarship” exists objectively) (Baudrillard, 1975). He argues that “only ambivalence, as a rupture of value… sustains a challenge to the legibility, the false transparency of the sign… questions the evidence of the use value of the sign (rational decoding) and of its exchange value (the discourse of communication).” This ambivalence, Baudrillard argues, “brings the political economy of the sign to a standstill; it dissolves the respective definitions of symbol and referent” (Baudrillard, 1981, p. 150). Endorsing the inclusion of nontraditional perspectives, classifying and categorizing them, and assuming inclusion’s possibility may all have violent impacts (for discussions of the violences of inclusion see Haritaworn et al., 2013, 2014; Mbembe, 2019). Moving of the signification “knowledge” from any referent to which it was originally tied makes method and research performances of scholarship, rather than (the illusive) scholarship itself. If “research” is a performance of scholarship, “standards” for research serve to disguise the fantastic nature of knowledge cumulation. As such, there is no space for liminality, uncertainty, change, inadequacy, and failure in structural rather than passing senses. Yet looking beyond the discourse of certainty, those pervade IR. A Baudrillardian ambivalence toward research programs and their truth statements can reveal the recursivity of IR’s standards of knowledge cumulation. This is because condemnation or rejection of any given research program and its truth statements endorses its assumptions about truth, as well as some of its assumptions about what the international arena is and how it works. As such, the idea that IR knowledge cumulation can be nothing but fantasy is straightforward. If the reification of standards of knowledge cumulation is a signification divorced from a referent, where the recovery of the referent is conceptually and practically impossible, then knowledge cumulation is and will always remain an empty signifier. The only question is how that empty signifier directs and is directed. We suggest that, in IR, more often than not, knowledge cumulation directs and is directed by discursive seduction. In Baudrillard’s words, seduction is “that which extracts meaning from discourse and detracts it from its truth” (Baudrillard, 1991[1979], p. 54). What makes a discourse of knowledge, of science, and of progress seductive “is its very appearance: the aleatory, meaningless, or ritualistic and meticulous circulation of signs on the surface, its inflections and its nuances. All of this effaces the content value of meaning, and this is seductive” (Baudrillard, 1991[1979], p. 54). Therefore, if there could be an interpretive discourse of knowledge cumulation that reached truth value, that truth value would be selfdefeating, since “the meaning of an interpretive discourse, by contrast, has never seduced anyone.” This is the fundamental contradiction, in Baudrillard’s terms, that makes standards for knowledge cumulation in IR internally impossible. He explains that “every interpretive discourse wants to get beyond appearances; this is its illusion and fraud. But getting beyond appearances is appearance, and is hence subject to the stakes imposed by seduction, and consequently to its own failure as discourse” (Baudrillard, 1991[1979], p. 54). As such, what is left in/of the failed discourse can only be the fantastic, and pretensions to success hollow.

**Reject their disciplinary scholarship – the potentiality of international theory exists in the liminality of politics, in the possibilities opened by embracing queer instability and failure.**

**Barkin and Sjoberg 21** (J. Samuel Barkin, PhD, Professor, Department of Conflict Resolution, Human Security, and Global Governance and Program Director of Global Governance and Human Security MA and PhD Programs; McCormack Graduate School; Laura Sjoberg is British Academy Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London. February 10, 2021, “The Queer Art of Failed IR?” <https://doi.org/10.1177/0304375421989572>; accessed 7/23/2022) ng

If IR’s state-of-the-field debates are alternatively narrativized fairy tales, we have a replacement. We suggest that the fairy tales’ idealized end can be found not in success but in failure; not in agreement but in controversy; not in aggrandized claims but in careful thought; not in stability but in liminality.15 It is hitching our wagon to a failure of a discipline and acknowledging that failure that constitutes and creates the possibility of a happily ever after for IR theory. We see the answers to many of these questions bound up in a disciplinary IR that has racist, sexist, heterosexist, and cissexist intellectual orientations and remains silent about them and often the assumptions that prop them up. But even work which decenters or critiques these exclusions in IR, in our view, is positioned compared to or in opposition to the discipline’s existing structure. Rather than being disappointed that IR theories are exclusive, cannot be reduced to a single theory, cannot account for global politics as a whole, and cannot present grand narratives of their competitive advantages visa-vis other approaches, we suggest highlighting and inhabiting these failures. Questioning the terms of disciplinary success as lying in a tightly choreographed dance (peer review in elite journals) or a popularity contest (citation count), or even in the “science” of knowledge cumulation, we ask why empty signifiers continue to dictate value in a wide variety of channels in IR. But we do not think redefining success will “solve” this “problem,” no matter how well-intended or radical the redefinition is. Note that we are not denying the existence or importance of significant transgressive work within IR, work that rejects grand narrativizing, or other explicit or implicit attempts to embrace failure. We are under the impression that authors critiqued here might actually agree with our critiques, either placing themselves within them or taking exception to them. We are not looking to signal virtue or to exclude, simply to suggest an explicit alternative approach. Instead of looking for an alternative, emphasizing some of the “good” transgressions, finding another way to succeed, or recasting success, we look to deconstruct IR’s logics of success and failure, and, with them, its mimicry of reified standards and its fantasies of knowledge cumulation. We see rewards in embracing IR theory’s failure to live up to IR theorists’ expectations of it. With Halberstam, “perhaps most obviously, failure … disturbs the supposedly clean boundaries between…winners and losers” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 3). Declaring, and embracing, knowledge cumulation failure (and thus, IR’s intellectual failure) “allows us to escape the punishing norms that discipline behavior” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 3). The relevant norms in IR are the fetishization of science, the fetishization of progression and progress, and the establishment and reification of boundaries of what ideas matter to the field. In embracing failure and escaping those punishing norms that are as violent in their inclusion (e.g., Haritaworn et al., 2014) as they are in their exclusion, “queer studies offer us one method for imagining, not some fantasy of an elsewhere, but existing alternatives to hegemonic systems” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 89). It “can be a potent form of critique,… a refusal of the norm, an indifference to assimilation, and a route to other ways of being in the world” (Halberstam, 2012). Here, the alternative to the hegemonic system of claims of knowledge cumulation is the queer, understood as both liminal and anti-heteronormative, as a foundation for theorizing more nuanced understandings of knowledge than success or failure at cumulation. If scholars find their affirmation in (hollow) confirmations of their claims to knowledge cumulation, a queer politics of failure suggests a different direction. As Halberstam recommends, “rather than resisting endings and limits, let us instead revel in… all of our own inevitable fantastic failures” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 187). Reveling in fantastic failures, in terms of a queer critique of the fantasy of progressive knowledge cumulation, has two elements: celebrating research as failure and confronting the future given that embrace. Queer theory suggests guidelines for embracing failure; “failing is something queers do well”—not (only) in the self-deprecating sense of laughing at (one’s own) flaws, but also in the more fruitful sense of exposing the ridiculousness of norms by failing to live up to them. In this sense, queer failure is “a map of the path not taken” (Weber, 2014a, 2014b). As such, “queerness offers the promise of failure as a way of life,…but it is up to us whether we choose to make good on that promise in a way that makes a detour around the usual markers of accomplishment and satisfaction” (Halberstam, 2011, loc 3281). “Failing” to meet expectations and being fine repudiates the salvation narrative that accompanies the “right” rules and norms and lifts the often terrible consequences of falling outside “the norm” while removing the privileges of “belonging” to the category of success. The exposure and analysis of queer failure denaturalizes the coherence of knowledge-production performances to show the vapidity inside. We see the replacement of “all-encompassing global theories” with those “subjugated knowledges” which have been “buried or masked in functional coherences or formal systemization” as a key first step but insufficient by itself (Halberstam, 2011). Turning IR’s “losers” into its “winners” would both serve social justice and unsettle the binary itself, but rejecting the categories writ large would both upset the politics of exclusion in those categories and discourage the win-seeking behavior that makes state-of-the-field debates. Celebrating failure instead “provides the opportunity to use [failure’s] negative effects to poke holes in the toxic positivity of contemporary life” where “the negative thinker can use the experience of failure to confront the gross inequalities of everyday life” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 3, 4). The “toxic positivity” in IR theorizing is the attachment to the utility of grand theory that cumulates knowledge which makes the inequalities in the discipline appear to be organized by some sense of objective quality, where “success happens to good people” and good research while failure happens to bad work or bad people (Halberstam, 2011, p. 3). Instead, we see those inequalities as structural and standards of success in IR as political. IR’s happily ever after, then, if it is to have one, must be in the failure, in the mess, and in rejecting both inherited interpretations of success and of the normative relationship between success and failure. It must be not only in not meeting expectations of any given state-of-the-discipline proselytizing but also in instead realizing that IR cannot and should not approximate those expectations. It is not a progressive discipline with a singular end or an exercise in progressive knowledge cumulation. It is instead necessarily undisciplined—it must put aside the straightjackets of research standards, the ego-stroking of aggrandized claims, and the authorial voice of the telling of the discipline’s past, present, and future—to embrace liminality and the necessity (and beauty) of failure. The irony of this argument is not lost on us. Halberstam, making the queer theory case for celebrating failure, has become a very successful academic by many of the traditional disciplinary standards, and The Queer Art of Failure is a successful academic text. Many of the critics and supporters cited here have built on academic success by their engagement with the argument. We are bringing the case to IR, publishing it in a academic journal, through the traditional mechanism of peer review, from the comfort of secure and permanent academic employment. We poke holes where those holes can be seen by those who would police the boundaries between winners and losers. This article does not “practice” as it “preaches,” to itself upend the “winners” and “losers” in disciplinary IR—it is couched in both necessary and unnecessary hypocrisy. But positionally at the very least, our celebration of failure is itself a failure—implicated in our interest in and disciplinary IR’s promotion of success. We are not arguing that failure can be made pure or that it should be—only that it cannot and should not be escaped, especially for the glorification of success as its perceived opposite. As we fail at failure to demonstrate the fantasy of success, we envision a happily ever after of failing, un-discipline, and diversity rather than a faux idealism of synthesis, aggrandizement, “science,” and disciplining.

**2AC -- Swarms of War**

**Modern warfare operates through the necropolitical technology of the swarm – a posthuman modality of violent surveillance that imbricates warfare in militarized queerness.**

**Wilcox ’17** -- (Lauren Wilcox, 10-13-2017, "drones, swarms and becoming-insect: feminist utopias and posthuman politics," Feminist Review volume 116, pages25–45 (2017), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41305-017-0071-x, accessed 7-25-2022) -- nikki

The trope of woman-as-insect in feminist science fiction makes positive associations between women and insect life. Graham Murphy (2008) details this trope in science fiction works that liken matriarchal utopias to hives, anthills or colonies unconcerned with filiation and patrilineal descent. For Murphy (ibid.), ‘becoming-insect’ is a site for non-heteronormative, utopian configurations; it embraces the multiplicity and indeterminacy the insect represents because of its radical difference. Men in these scenarios often cannot cope, cannot embrace the ‘becoming-insect’, seeing it as a site of existential threat. This figuration of the insect and of feminist utopia as bearing a resemblance to the social life of insects in ‘swarms’ is quite at odds with a contemporary materialisation of insect life—of the ‘swarm’ in particular—as ‘drone swarm’ technology at the forefront of military technologies. Contemporary developments in artificial intelligence and warfare suggest that the future of warfare will not be ‘robots’ as technological, individualised substitutions for idealised (masculine) warfighters, but warfighters understood as swarms: insect metaphors for non-centrally organised, self-organising problem-solving. The swarm is not ‘merely’ a metaphor, but the organisational basis for military tactics. As famously argued by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2000) in the RAND study Swarming and the Future of Conflict, swarming is to be the future of war-fighting tactics in the US. Swarming decentralises operational forces in a way that values mobility, unique autonomy, and real-time continuous communication (ibid.; Kosek, 2010, p. 664). The current trend towards the development of swarming technologies, in which artificially intelligent ‘mini drones’ communicate with each other to move in random, non-linear ways does not only blur the lines between human and technology in the ‘posthuman’, but also between the human and animal, and animal and technological. In 2006, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (better known as DARPA) launched a call for scientists in the US to submit ‘innovative proposals to develop technology to create insect-cyborgs’ (Anthes, 2013). ‘Bio-mimetic’ technologies are considered the future of warfare, and the metaphor of the swarm is increasingly displacing the individualised human body as the model of artificial life. I have elsewhere argued that precision warfare in general, and drone warfare more specifically, blurs lines between human and technology in warfare in the form of posthuman bodies (Wilcox, 2015, 2017). The posthuman, as explored by feminist theorists, such as Donna Haraway (1991, 1997), N. Katherine Hayles (1999, 2005) and Rosi Braidotti (2002, 2013), is a process of formation and reformation that reworks and undermines essentialist notions of culture and nature, biology, and technology. Cybernetics and artificial intelligence, I have argued, were developed as means to win wars, but they end up redefining and reorganising the boundaries of the human body in and through both imbrication in technology and in relation to other (killable) bodies. The challenge that the cyborg or posthuman body poses is not the addition of new technological advances to an already-existing human body, but of a body that is always already formed through norms and relations to others, whether these others are human, technological or animal. Rather than a figuration of peaceful communal living, the ‘swarm’ as a posthuman figuration that defies technological/animal/human categorisation appears to be a relatively new site for the development of (political) technologies of warfare. As a figuration that shapes the conduct of war and political violence, it demands new conceptualisations of the relationship between war and gender, which displace the overarching critique of masculinism for a more troubled and troubling posthuman and queer notion of the operation of gender in war. While the swarm’s ability to coordinate without central command could suggest a ‘feminised’ way of approaching war (for example, see Manjikian, 2014), I would suggest a queer reading of the posthuman drone swarm in Weber’s (2016) terms, following Sedgwick (1993), in which ‘queer’ means a failures to signify gender monolithically (see also Daggett, 2015). As such, I argue that the drone swarm has a deeply ambiguous relationship between signifiers of masculinity and femininity. My queer reading of the drone swarm is also influenced by the ways in which forms of animal and otherwise non-human life have played a key role in queer theorising in recent years. The monstrous, abjected non-human and more-than-human have been sites of appropriation for queer and trans theorising, such as Susan Stryker’s (1994; although see Stryker, 2015) trans-theory invocation of Frankenstein, Halberstam’s (2011) inspiration by animated animals, and Chen’s (2012) exploration of animality, race and queerness, among others. Furthermore, the drone swarm is also its own component of a queer, necropolitical assemblage, in which the ‘feminine’ imaginary of insectoid life and the swarm becomes a core component of weaponised technologies. The figuration of the swarm thus exemplifies a ‘queer necropolitics’ (Haritaworn, Kuntsman and Posocco, 2014), which builds upon the work of Puar (2007), Reddy (2011) and others to analyse gendered, national and racial formations that operate under logics of sexuality to produce differential worlds of life and death. Here, understanding ‘queer’ as ‘assemblage’ and as a term detached from gay or lesbian identity, calls attention both to the formation of a ‘terrorist’ subject as queer and as a method of being ‘attuned to movements, intensities, emotions, energies, affectivities and textures as they inhabit events, spatialities and corporealities’ (Puar, 2007, p. 215). Puar’s appropriation of the Deleuzian term ‘assemblage’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2003 [1987]) for her invocation of ‘queer assemblages’, is put into productive tension with models of intersectionality, which presume that the constituent elements in identity models, such as gender, class, race and sexuality can be disassembled. Such methods seek to shed light upon the ‘queerness’ already present in the world in terms of exclusions/inclusions, brutalities and differing regimes of living and dying (Haritaworn, Kuntsman and Posocco, 2014); at the same time, they also seek to broaden queer analyses to include ongoing engagements with shifting identifications, desires, affects and emotions shaping global politics. The politics of the swarm can be considered a kind of ‘murderous inclusion’ or a kind of ‘queer necropolitics’. The figurations of insect and swarm no longer only represent a line of flight outside of the masculinist politics of control; they are also currently being appropriated for a necropolitics of surveillance and warfare. In investigating the ‘swarm’ in its contemporary manifestations, I follow Haraway’s (1997) conception of the figuration. Figurations are semiotic tropes combining knowledge, practice and power that shape the maps of our world and how we understand relations in the world. ‘Figurations are performative images that can be inhabited’ (ibid., p. 11). Figurations, in Cynthia Weber’s (2016, p. 28) recent summary, ‘emerge out of discursive and material semiotic assemblages that condense diffuse imaginaries about the world into specific form or images that bring specific worlds into being’. Importantly, ‘figures must involve at least some kind of displacement that can trouble identifications and certainties’ (Haraway, 1997, p. 11). Figurations are thus ‘living maps’ in Braidotti’s terms (2002, p. 2), and are not totalities but subject to revision and reconfiguration. In considering the ‘swarm’ as a figuration, I take seriously Haraway’s (1991, p. 169) perspective in which myths and stories about cyborgs, insects and women are ‘sociobiological stories [that] depend on a high-tech view of the body as a biotic component or cybernetic communications system’, and for which ‘sex, sexuality and reproduction are central actors in high-tech myth systems structuring our imaginations of personal and social responsibility’. Such an analysis would require more than a critical feminist reading of the ways in which sex, gender, sexuality and reproduction are imagined in cultural products such as literature and film. Feminist science fiction can become a ‘cyborg story’ of recasting ‘myths’ and technologies in subversive ways, as neither cyborgs nor swarms are determined by their origins. At the same time, insects and their collective life—including the figuration of the ‘swarm’—are not only a set of myths or representations, but a form of materialisation, most prominently in military technologies and their practices in necropolitical forms of death-dealing. In thinking through science fiction, feminist and otherwise, I want to follow Haraway (ibid., p. 164) in understanding that ‘myth and tool mutually constitute each other’, or what N. Katherine Hayles (1999, p. 47, emphasis in original) describes as a double vision that ‘looks simultaneously at the power of simulation and at the materialities that produce it’ in order to ‘better understand the implication of articulating posthuman constructions together with embodied actualities’. Privileging neither nature nor culture in their ongoing mutual becomings, I want to develop further the project of relating feminist readings of science fiction to feminist materialist analyses of becoming-insect, not in the service of utopian projects but rather to point towards heterotopic worlds of difference and multiplicity that are up to the task of theorising the dystopian necropolitical worlds embodied by swarming drones. In the following exploration of the figuration of the swarm, particularly its insectoid manifestations, I begin by discussing its linkages to femininity and ‘becoming-woman’ and to racialised forms of life deemed killable. Next, I turn to the ways in which the figuration of the swarm is inspiring a new generation of military weaponry that serve as ‘technologies of racial distinctions’ (Allinson, 2015). In light of this appropriation of imagery and material forms associated with femininity and certain forms of feminist politics, I describe the figuration of the swarm as deeply ambivalent in terms of its politics of gender, race and sexuality. I then turn to ways in which insect and swarm imagery are being reimagined in ways that transcend the contemporary militaristic politics of the swarm.

**The emerging technologies that foreground this topic have transformed warfare from an exercise of singular sovereign power into a multiplicity, a swarm, of bio/necro-political sovereignty mobilized in service of imperial racialized, gendered, and sexual orders.**

**Wilcox ’17** -- (Lauren Wilcox, 10-13-2017, "drones, swarms and becoming-insect: feminist utopias and posthuman politics," Feminist Review volume 116, pages25–45 (2017), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41305-017-0071-x, accessed 7-25-2022) -- nikki

The swarm as a figuration is currently undergoing a material transformation. Over the past few decades, it has become a transformative model underpinning military, technological and tactical innovation. As mentioned previously, the swarm is defined by self-organising capabilities that are non-linear and depend upon the adaptive coordination of individual bodies not necessarily commanded by a sovereign source. Swarming tactics have been part of the repertoire of war fighting for centuries, if not longer. However, what distinguishes emerging military manifestations of the swarm from earlier ones, is their composition as configurations of humans, technological artefacts and various artificial intelligence capacities. The development of these swarm assemblages is driven in part by the perception of a changing threat environment for the US and other advanced industrial states—of threats that stem not only from conventional state military forces or nuclear weapons but also from more mobile and unpredictable elements. As they are more adaptable and fluid, based on biological models rather than on the static model of a network (Scharre, 2014), swarms are seen as an evolved stage of networked warfare. The idea behind the drive to harness the material capabilities of the swarm is that bees, ants and such are not individually intelligent, but can exhibit much more complex behaviour collectively. In laboratories and bases, the US, UK and other militaries are developing what the US military has called ‘SWARM capability’, or ‘Smart Warfighting Array of Reconfigurable Modules’. A key advantage this swarm intelligence is thought to enable is the ability for an entire swarm to be controlled or directed by a single operator rather than a vast network. The ability to adapt and communicate in real time, beyond the ability of humans to process and respond, is also see an advantage of swarm intelligence. The vision of the drone itself, in its most famous manifestation as ‘Predator’ or ‘Reaper’, can be seen as a kind of insect vision; the multiple lenses in the drone swarm are able to provide greater ‘situational awareness’ and monitor the environment from many different angles (see Chamayou, 2015, p. 38). Another foreseen advantage of the technological swarm is that it will not be affected by losses and casualties in the same way that human combatants are (Hambling, 2015, p. 183). In its LOCUST programme, the US Navy is working to develop low-cost swarming drone technology that would enable the formation flight of thirty drones without having to be individually controlled (ibid., pp. 189–190). To develop these capacities, many different kinds of ‘microdrones’ are being developed (see also Bumiller and Shanker, 2011; Thielman, 2015). Inspired by nature’s ability to create small-scale flying machines, these many kinds of ‘insect cyborgs’ are primarily being developed to provide surveillance: they are to be mobile ‘bugs’. Scientist Vijay Kumar at the University of Pennsylvania, for example, studies insects to learn principles upon which ants divide labour to perform different tasks, in order to some day apply these principles to program a fleet of aerial robots to interact with each other towards a common goal (Conner, 2014). Rosi Braidotti (2013, p. 124) describes a ‘techno-beastiary’ of military developments, such as 5 kg ‘Sand Fleas’ that can leap through windows or off of 30-metre ledges while stabilising and filming; six-legged robo-cockroaches that can climb walls; and the DelFly, a dragonfly-shaped surveillance drone with a camera weighing only a few grams. Some ‘insect-cyborgs’ are not technological reproductions of insect life, but modifications of insects themselves: the ‘Beetle Commander’ is a wired-up flower beetle controlled by signals sent to its brain via a backpack containing a radio receiver, battery and custom-built signal board connected to electrodes in the Beetle’s brain (Anthes, 2013).Footnote4 The UK government’s Ministry of Defence has also recently announced a funding competition for the development of technologies that would enable a single operator to control drone swarms consisting of over twenty components (Innovate London, 2016). The US is adapting its popular F-16 fighter jet, to allow a pilot to operate unmanned vehicles alongside it, as well as to deploy a swarm of drones (Axe, 2016). The capacities of insect life and the relations of the swarm are clearly no longer only a source of threat and danger, but a means by which that perceived threat is contained. The swarm as represented in a figuration linking it to ‘becoming-woman’ poses a threat to the political ontology of the ‘body politics’, and thus to political order. The biological swarm, the technological network and the political multitude are variations of an ambivalent negotiation of a political body that bears a similarly ambivalent relationship with sovereignty (Thacker, 2004a, 2004b). The agency of the swarm is unclear; according to studies of animal behaviour going back to the nineteenth century (Thacker, 2004a), it emerges out of interactions between individuals, in response to environmental constraints, and within groups. But now multiplicity is also used on behalf of sovereign power and necropower. While Hardt and Negri (2003, pp. 91–92) celebrate the swarm as a network of a multitude of different creative agents solving problems without centralised control, the mere existence of a network does not necessarily make it more democratic. As Galloway and Thacker (2007) have argued, some swarms are compatible with centralised control; that is, swarms may be controlled or directed, or a swarm can be used for the purpose of control itself (see also Coeckelbergh, 2011). The swarm occupies an ambiguous categorisation between the ‘many’ and the ‘one’ in terms of individual independence and collective coordination. This figure of the ‘swarm’ has much in common with Lauro and Embry’s (2008) articulation of the ‘zombie’, in its indeterminate status between living and dead and in its posthuman consciousness that obliterates the distinction between subject and object. The inspiration and development of ‘drone swarms’ is reminiscent of the creation of the feminine automaton: a machine created in a feminine body designed to do men’s bidding, such as in Metropolis (1927) or Ex Machina (2015). A key critique of automated drones guided by artificial intelligence, including drone swarms, is the potential or anticipated loss of human control over technologies of death. Part of the fear here, in alleged loss of humanity in warfare, is better theorised as the loss of an ideal of humanity associated with a certain form of masculinity: namely, the possessive liberal individual, whose agency is secured in a conscious mind (Hayles, 2005, p. 177, 1999). In her work My Mother Was a Computer (2005), N. Katherine Hayles notes the persistence of gendered representations of artificial intelligence, in which a male creator exacts his will through the use of female automata (female bodies controlled by another agent) against other men. This cultural trope is being realised in the creation of ‘drone swarms’: mechanical creations made to mimic insect and other forms of swarming life in the service of militaristic ends. More to the point, it seeks to harness the feminised power of the swarm for its own ends. As such, the swarm is now not only a metaphor but also a central mode of biopolitical and necropolitical life. Michel Foucault’s (2007 [1978], pp. 21–22) biopolitical analysis of the emergence of different modalities of power revolves around a relationship with certain non-human forms of life/death in the form of disease-causing microbes and viruses—from the sovereign exclusion of infected bodies of leprosy, to the discipline and surveillance of the plague, to the regulation of different kinds of circulations of people and non-human objects in the ‘milieu’. Our contemporary biopolitical analysis requires an analysis of the politics of life and death in the insect and the swarm, which, following Braidotti (2002), cannot be assumed to be a mere metaphor or representation for political life, but an animating materialist logic. The issue of the swarm that defies categorisation between the one and the many, of which sovereignty depends, is a central problem for political organisation. As Eugene Thacker (2011, p. 154, emphasis in original) writes, ‘In the “problem of multiplicities” presented to the body politic concept by plague, pestilence, and epidemic, multiplicity is never separate from, and is always inculcated within, the problem of sovereignty … it is multiplicity that plagues the body politic’. Much of the debate about drone warfare has focussed on the prospect of ‘killer robots’ being deployed and of the lack of human control over the sovereign power of killing. Defenders of the use of artificial intelligence and automated targeting point to their benefits, such as the removal of emotion and human error that can result in increased deaths of civilians (among others, see Strawser, 2010; Byman, 2013; Lewis, 2013). Regardless of the merits of such arguments, the drone and increasingly drone swarm tactics constitute the terrain of war and the subjects who both wage and suffer from war. Eyal Weizman (2011) notes that the swarm plays a key role in the tactics of Israeli ground forces. Achille Mbembe (2003, p. 40, emphasis in the original) writes, ‘in our contemporary world, weapons are deployed in the interest of maximum destruction of persons and the creation of death-worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead’. Mbembe’s thesis amends Foucault’s biopolitical concept and formulates contemporary politics as not only biopolitical but also necropolitical. The lines between war and politics are blurred as they are in biopolitics; however, according to Mbembe, power does not only ‘make life live’ but also creates certain categories of the ‘living dead’ as those always-already dead, and thus subject to massacre. In nineteenth- and early twentieth-century social evolutionary theory, studies of insects played a key role in naturalising racial and colonial hierarchies. Such work often read colonialism and slavery as present in insect ‘societies’ and classified certain insect societies as more or less like humans. ‘The social construction of insect sociality was premised on colonial views of what defined civilization as the “highest” and all others as “lower” in the social scale’ (Rodgers, 2008, p. 139). While ‘drone’ as a colloquialism comes from its ethological use as a term signifying zombie-like non-cognition, the place of the insect between life and death takes on new meaning in contemporary global violence. The militarised techno-swarms created on behalf of a project of biopolitical warfare with the ability to fight war without risk of death to human subjects on one side, also create entire populations who ‘li[v]e under drones’, in which the ‘buzzing’ sound of drone is a source of anxiety and fear. One member of a community in Pakistan affected by drones described the effect of hearing them buzzing overhead as spreading a ‘wave of terror’ over the community: ‘Children, grown-up people, women, they are terrified … they scream in terror’ (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and Global Justice Clinic, 2012). As an apparatus that decides whose life is worthy of living and who is to be put to death, Allinson (2015, p. 120) describes the drone as ‘a technology of racial distinction’. Its development and usage are part of a reconstitution of the theater of war as a frontier zone of American empire, a process that has, in Feldman’s (2011, p. 329) words, ‘contorted the temporality of warfare through notions of preemption and endurance, recalibrated Orientalist imagined geography through far more porous concepts of proximity that challenge received notions of state territoriality and national borders, and fixated on the mystique of “precision targeting” in highly ambiguous structures of race and space’. The description of people killed by drones as ‘bug splats’ in military slang further signifies the dehumanisation and abjectification of those killed by drones, whether targeted or accidentally killed.Footnote5 In these instances, figurations of the swarm are used as instruments of sovereign power to kill and manage other populations figured as inhuman ‘swarms’. The threat of terrorism is figured as the threat of the multitude, of the swarm, of the concerted action of that which does not necessarily have a single head. US (former) Coordinator for Counterterrorism Cofer Black (2003) claimed ‘the threat of international terrorism knows no boundaries’. The threat of terrorism is often represented as boundless and formless. The purported formlessness of such loosely connected organisations is partly due to the transnational organisation of various ‘terrorist groups’; combined with their tendency to make use of territories beyond the reach of the administrative power of various states, this means that the contemporary figure of the ‘terrorist’ is dangerous in part because of his (or increasingly, her) lack of subjectification within the terms of state power and state identity. While marked by difference in this way, ‘terrorist’ figurations are also able to hide this difference. The terrorist, like the communist or homosexual, could be anybody—hiding in a ‘sleeper cell’ or blending in with the population with various forms of deception, such as shaving their beard. Al-Qaeda in particular has been conceptualised as a network—or, more specifically, as individuals who become radicalised—acting in the name of Al-Qaeda with no other formal affiliation. It is a collective that acts without a hierarchy. In this sense, the ‘enemy’ is represented in insect ways as well. In the shift to war technologies and tactics inspired by insect swarms, we may be seeing a final admission that traditional modes of warfare are not always able to control non-hierarchical, feminine/queer and networked spaces.Footnote6 The figuration of the ‘swarm’ has also been applied to refugee and migrant populations, most famously by former UK Prime Minister David Cameron (see BBC News, 2015); rhetorically figured as swarms, refugees threaten to overwhelm like a plague of locusts. Even without using the specific language of the swarm, refugees have been depicted as reproducing uncontrollably and, in turn, threatening to overwhelm, disturb order and defy boundaries. This is a common figuration of the masses, multitudes, rioters, etc., which falls back onto the monstrous as threatening other. Yet, unlike these feminine creations, the entire purpose of the techno-swarm is that they are not controlled or controllable by man: ‘Swarms may not be predictable to the enemy, but neither are they exactly controllable or predictable for the side using them, which can lead to unexpected results … a swarm takes action in its own’ (Singer, 2009, p. 110). The unpredictability of the swarm is at once its greatest promise and its peril.

**The politics of the swarm subsumes queerness by incorporating its subjective divergence into the US military arsenal – to understand contemporary militarism we must first analyze the murderous inclusion of queer radicality in the state assemblage of necropolitics.**

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Insect life and the swarm remain deeply ambivalent figurations. As noted in the feminist works of utopian and speculative fiction discussed earlier in this text, the insect and particularly the collective insect life of the swarm have been claimed by some feminists as a positive mode of being to emulate, in distinction to the characterisation of women-as-insect as alien monster. However, Jinathana Haritaworn (2015) has recently questioned the celebratory nature of queer scholarship taking up monstrosity, animality and morbidity as objects of regeneration and nostalgia, particularly when ‘queer’ intersects with racialisation and the necropolitical. The current wave of militarising the swarm suggests the need for a similarly cautious approach when teasing out the implications of insect/swarm figurations. The symbolic ambiguity of the drone swarm can starkly be observed in the 2017 application of drone swarms flying in formation to create the image of an American flag at that most patriotic of US sporting events, the Super Bowl. This was carried out at the end of a performance by Lady Gaga, known for her legions of queer fans (affectionately called ‘Little Monsters’) and queer-friendly anthems such as ‘Born this way’ (2011) (see Figure 1). To facilitate interrogation of the ways in which the figuration of the insect or swarm becomes ambivalent in light of the militaristic ‘drone swarm,’ we can consider the limitations of evolutionary modes of reproduction. Gilman’s (2015 [1915]) utopian story of female equality and peacefulness portrays insect life as a positive model of society that becomes subject to the unfair prejudice and incomprehension of male (and, importantly, imperial and capitalist) superiority. Whether insect life presents a utopian or dystopian model depends on one’s gendered subjectivity, but it is clearly presented both as an ideal and one that is possible in the absence of men. However, Herland is limited for thinking about our contemporary technological worlds, in which life is folded into ‘code’ as means of reproduction and communications. Herland’s mode of reproduction is largely Darwinistic rather than involving the reassembly of code (see also Haraway, 1991, 1997). Also, as in Perkins’ political works, the utopian elements of the society rely on social evolutionary theory based on contemporary ethology to insist on the superiority of female-led societies (as does Tiptree’s story of insect-like women reproducing by cloning in Houston, Houston, Do You Read?). This cannot speak to the posthuman condition of the drone-swarm assemblage that incorporates what Hayles (2006, p. 160) refers to as the ‘cognisphere’, or the ‘distributed cultural cognitions embodied both in people and their technologies’. In other words, models of reproduction that rely upon Darwinistic or sexual reproduction are incompatible with the ways in which technologies of both reproduction and death-dealing are based on code and increasingly artificial intelligence. The figuration of the cyborg is germinal but insufficient for theorising the complexities of the posthuman figuration of the ‘swarm’, which characterises the human/animal/technological matrix of swarming drones, and the distributed cognitive capacities on which it depends. This shift can be seen in the contrast between different versions of The Fly. David Cronenburg’s 1986 remake of The Fly (1986) stars Geena Davis as plucky investigative journalist Veronica, in lieu of the 1958 version’s accommodating housewife, and Jeff Goldblum as secretive scientist Seth Brundle who turns ‘Brundlefly’. Cronenburg’s version represents the bodily horror of ‘becoming-insect’ in different and significant ways to Neumann’s version. Goldblum’s character does not transform into two separate human/fly hybrids. Instead, in keeping with a contemporary emphasis on the powers and peril of DNA as the ‘code’ of life, Seth and the fly merge into a single being when a circuit infects Seth through a wound in his back, obtained while having sex with Veronica. Rather than experience an instantaneous break, Seth becomes a monstrous figure caught in a state of transformation—of ‘becoming-fly’—which, initially at least, seems to give him ‘better than human’ powers. In this mode of becoming, traditional reproduction and phallocentric power become as irrelevant and detachable as the Brundlefly’s penis (even if this change was instigated during heterosexual sex). The transformation into the alien, feminine ‘other’ does not, at least for a time, prove threatening. For Braidotti (2002, p. 124), this version of The Fly represents Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘becoming-animal’ as ‘a way of scrambling the master-code of phallocentrism and loosening its power over the body’. Braidotti’s (ibid., p. 169) notion of ‘becoming-insect’ is about a materialist becoming, outside of the human; however, this does not erase sexual difference, but rather displaces it. In a related fashion, Elizabeth Grosz (1995), inspired by Caillois’ theories of insects, theorises sex and the politics of sexual difference as an open mode of becoming situated outside of heteronormative reproductive sex (Parikka, 2010), and which can be described as ‘queer’ insofar as desire becomes about opening oneself to new encounters, new bodies, new affects. As the swarm relies on modes of communication and reproduction outside of evolutionary and heteronormative frames, the use of such forms of communication and reproduction in ‘swarm’ warfare participates in a kind of ‘murderous inclusion’ (Haritaworn, Kuntsman and Posocco, 2014) and normalisation of queer subjects and bodies. A related development is the increasing ability for women, gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people to serve openly in the US military. The increased reliance on drones in the US, and increasingly around the world,Footnote7 notably signals a change in the relationship between the military and masculinity. This is at least at the forefront of technology and war, with traditional military values associated with masculinity, such as physical strength and courage under fire, becoming less relevant to operational success (for example, see Bayard de Volo, 2016). One source suggests that 17 per cent of those assigned to drone activities at Creech Air Force Base are female, which is greater than the overall percentage of women serving in the US military (Manjikian, 2014). Today, the US military is more inclusive than ever in terms of gender and sexuality; since 2011, with the official repeal of the ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ policy, it has allowed gays and lesbians to serve openly, and it is also in a contested process of opening up combat positions to women. On 30 June 2016, the US military also overturned its ban on transgender people serving in the military, and it is now required to provide transgender personnel with relevant medical care. In these ways, the military can be said to have shifted from a site of patriarchal values and homophobia to a nominally ‘ungendered’ site where women can be ‘honorary men’ (King, 2016), and to a site of homonationalism (Puar, 2007) that situates the US as a site of exceptional sexual tolerance in opposition to representations of Arab/Muslim sexuality as barbaric and perverse. One example of this form of ‘murderous inclusion’ can been seen in the The Daily Beast’s reporting of a female drone pilot, nicknamed ‘Sparkle’ because of her bedazzled headset. Explaining her decorative choice, Sparkle reproduces the gendered, racialised logic that women need protection from Arab/Muslim men: ‘I use it to emasculate the enemy in the afterlife. […] Considering how they treat their women, I’m OK with rubbing salt in the wound’ (Maurer, 2015). Here we see an example of a symbol of femininity—the frivolous and ‘sparkly’—put into the service of a racialised necropolitics of high-tech death-dealing against dehumanised others, much in the way that the figuration of the insect/swarm has been. We see the drone swarm as a form of queer necropolitics that incorporates queer bodies and queer modes of signification into assemblages of racialised death-dealing; however, this does not exhaust the possibilities for the politics of the swarm.

**2AC -- AT: Russia/China Scenarios**

**Their securitization of “China/Russia” frames them as a perverse homosexual that threatens the familial Western man**

**Weber 16** [Cynthia Weber, 2016, “Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge, Oxford University Press]\\pairie

CONCLUSION

In their analyses of queer migration and queer diaspora, queer migrations scholars demonstrate how any attempt to posit home and homeland as **secure** ontological places is **confounded by encounters** with movement and **queerness** inside the home/land (Eng 1997; Ahmed 2000; Fortier 2001; 2003; Luibhéid 2002; 2008; 2013; Luibhéid and Cantú 2005; Luibhéid, Buffington, and Guy 2014). As this chapter demonstrates, their conclusion is as true in IR as it is in queer migration studies. For the (sometimes) queer movements of the ‘unwanted im/migrant’ and the ‘al-Qaeda terrorist’—as civilizational and sexual development on the move and as civilizational and sexual barbarism on the move—occur across, between, and within heteronormatively understood homes, homelands, and sexualities in ways that expose these foundational sites of national/civilizational reproduction as **irregular, indeterminate, and transposable**.

Western responses to these irregularities—to these intricately produced anarchies—are rooted as much in the desires of Western populations for ease in the homeland as they are in their desires for ease in the home. This is why Western (post)developmental (Bigo 2002) and security narratives reoppose to the ‘Islamic civilizational family’ their figuration of the ‘Western civilizational family’ as the foundation of national/civilizational sovereignties. This is why these discourses contrast the properly patriotic and cultural attachments to nation, culture, and home/land of the ‘Western civilizational family’ with the improper attachments of the ‘Islamic family’ to nation, culture, and home/land (Puar and Rai 2002; Puar 2007). And this is how these discourses fix the ‘unwanted im/migrant’ and the ‘al-Qaeda terrorist’ as the necessary civilizationally and **sexually perverse figures** who are called upon to normalize Western individual, familial, and national/civilizational figures and attachments to ‘civilized, developed sovereign man’ and the sovereign orders he authorizes as rational, reasonable, and just.

These ‘homing desires’ (Brah 1996, 187)—these desires ‘to feel at home achieved by physically or symbolically (re)constituting spaces which provide some kind of ontological security in the context of migration’ (Fortier 2000, 163)—are usually understood to be the desires of im/migrating or diasporic subjects. What this analysis suggests is that the civilizational and sexual movements of figures like the ‘unwanted im/migrant’ and the ‘al-Qaeda terrorist’ implant homing desires in Western subjects. These homing desires take practical form in Western (post)developmental and security discourses that attempt and fail to ‘manage unease’ in the homeland (Bigo 2002) and also in the home by figuring a Western ‘civilized, developed sovereign man’ as the manager of their unease by being the manager of their security. In so doing, they expose the ‘anxious labor’ (Luibhéid 2008, 174) Western discourses expend to create binary sexual figurations of and in the home and homeland that might sustain heteronormative sexualized orders of international relations (also see Peterson 1999).

Chapters 3 and 4 on the ‘underdeveloped’, the ‘undevelopable’, the ‘unwanted im/migrant’, and the ‘terrorist’, considered together, suggest that these ‘homing desires’ have long been a feature of how Western heteronormativities put sex into discourse in intimate, national, and international relations. The tropes of home and homeland participate in creating these four figurations of the ‘perverse homosexual’ as the primary performativities that (post)colonial subjects can inhabit. These tropes tie the ‘underdeveloped’, the ‘undevelopable’, the ‘unwanted im/migrant’, and the ‘terrorist’ to specific places, times, and desires that establish specific figures—the normal sovereign versus the perverse antisovereign—who guarantee various either/or anarchy-versus-order binaries as perverse-versus-normal binaries. And these tropes mobilize these binaries to create specific (albeit unreliable) mappings of the world to contain the movements of these ‘dangerous figures’ in that world, which no amount of determined work can contain geopolitically or sexually. In all of these ways, then, heteronormative Western **discourses script the ‘underdeveloped’, the ‘undevelopable’**, the ‘unwanted im/migrant’, and the ‘terrorist’ **as ‘perverse homosexuals’** who are foundational to traditional either/or Western logics of statecraft as mancraft and Western sexual organizations of international relations.

What we will see in chapter 5 is how this freighted labor is mobilized again, this time through homonormativities, in ways that both reply upon and disavow figurations of the ‘perverse homosexual’ in order to birth a very specific figuration of the ‘normal homosexual’.

**Their demonization of Russia represents the attempt to re-masculinize the US as a heterosexual protector of the feminized, queer other.**

Katharina Wiedlack 20, FWF Senior Post-Doc Researcher at the Department of English and American Studies, University of Vienna and researches primarily queer and feminist theory, popular culture, postsocialist, decolonial and disability studies, “Enemy number one or gay clown? The Russian president, masculinity and populism in US media”, <https://doi.org/10.1080/18902138.2019.1707459>, //lenox

Arguments favoring a **re-masculinization** within the US and as **world power**, which imagine Putin as the enemy, might have been expected among conservatives and the right-wing (Diamond, 2016; Gettys, 2017; Sperling, 2015). Yet, it was liberal sources, such as Politico magazine (Kirchick, 2017), which spearheaded the **proliferation** of populist discourses. With Donald Trump’s election, the liberal media increased its circulation of photographs and drawings depicting Putin as manly in order to draw attention to Trump’s alleged ties to the Russian president, and to delegitimize Trump’s power. News, political magazines, and comedy all exploited the accusations that Russian hackers facilitated Trump’s election along with the alleged financial ties between Trump and Putin (and other Russian agencies), again drawing attention to the idea that Russia was out to harm the US. Political comedy especially, but not exclusively, offered satirical renditions of the Trump-Putin ‘collusion’ (Graham, 2019), manipulating photos or creating cartoon versions of Putin shirtless that exposed or exaggerated his muscular upper body. The Tonight Show Starring Jimmy Fallon ‘zoomed in’ on a photo of ‘Vladimir Putin Riding a Horse’ on 14 April 2016. The political satire site Daily Squat published a photomontage of ‘Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin enjoy riding bareback together’ (Marrs, 2016). The Simpsons’ episode ‘Homer Votes 2016’ picks up the hacking allegations during the 2016 election, showing a horse-riding Russian president entering the voting booth in Springfield. Other satirical half-naked versions of Putin appeared on Colbert’s Late Show on CBS, where cartoon versions of Putin and Trump kissed passionately on 16 November 2016; and Beck Bennett regularly takes off his shirt to impersonate the Russian president in season 42 of NBC’s Saturday Night Live. The depiction of a shirtless Putin committing morally corrupt or illegal acts, and influencing the US president, suggests that Putin is a **threat** to liberal and democratic values. His exaggerated masculinity mocks Putin and underlines the threat of amorality and corruption to a point where toxic masculinity, amorality and corruption become **inseparable**. Of course, political satire is not the same as political commentary, and allows for a multitude of readings, including ironic interpretations. However, the focus on the figure of Putin and its frequency within a range of diverse media support the idea that he poses a threat to the US, contributing to an increase in anti-Russian sentiments. Today, ‘[m]ore than half of Americans believe Russia poses a critical threat to the United States’ and ‘a record-high 73 percent of Americans have an unfavorable view of Russia’ (Lardieri, 2019) according to recent polls. Furthermore, ‘[d]emocrats are more likely to view the country’s power as a critical threat to the U.S. than Republicans – 65 percent compared to 46 percent’ (ibid.). Focusing on president Putin rather than on the Russian government, state or nation, and connecting his performance of masculinity to the ascription of power, US online media and (print) magazines thereby reinforce what Nelson calls ‘**presidentialism’** (2008). The logic of presidentialism **shapes** citizen’s ideas and feelings about the US president as well as democratic practices. ‘Unexamined, these trained feelings can **pull** [citizens] in powerfully anti democratic directions’ (Nelson, 2008, p. 5). Nelson argues that presidentialism can **limit citizens’ agency** in moments of ‘legitimate and pressing questions about the democratic ethics of presidential behavior or about the devaluation of citizen power within [the] government. By keeping [the] democratic hopes oriented toward the **salvific and powerful** [sitting or future] president’ (ibid.). Arguably, the media’s allocation of seemingly unrestricted presidential power to Putin confirms the idea that presidents do indeed have such power and that the sitting US president should have and exercise such power for the benefit of their citizens. The emphasis on Putin’s white, able, masculine body, his strong will, and assertiveness suggests that a (**powerful**) president needs to represent this kind of **white masculinity**. By juxtaposing Putin and Trump, the images do not only suggest ‘collusion’, but they also present Trump as a weak imposter, and as a puppet of the Russian strongman. Ironically, the idea that Trump is a weak president, because he allows Putin to influence US politics, is based on the same ideas about potent white presidential masculinity that actually led to Trump’s election in the first place (Chira, 2017; Katz, 2016). This idea does not simply support any form of presidentialism, but, referring to Nelson (2008), calls for a president who acts as the male hero. Past presidents have often attempted to create discourses of presidential heroism, national victimization, and foreign villains themselves. Masculinities studies scholar, Messerschmidt, shows that both President Obama and President Bush portrayed themselves in their speeches as masculine and powerful men/heroes, capable of protecting the innocent, vulnerable, and needy from foreign, and often racialized dangers, such as Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Saddam Hussein (Messerschmidt, 2016, p. 147). Although not all of their attempts to fashion themselves as masculine protectors succeeded, they were deeply rooted in and evoked conservative notions of **heterosexual kinship**, with the presidents as the patriarchal leaders and women and children as the citizens. Implementing military actions against terrorism, which involved killing and torture, these presidents further ‘reproduce[d] and reinforce[d] male dominance/unequal **gender relations** not only in military forces but also in **society’** (Shen, 2017, p. 139). Although Obama continued to promote notions of hegemonic masculinity in connection with and through military actions, during his presidency the same hegemonic masculinity became partially challenged and alternative versions of masculinity have become increasingly normalized within the sphere of the public. Especially the **gay white man** became increasingly visible and normalized, along with urban phenomena such as metrosexuality that allow men to explore markets and body treatments that were previously seen as strictly feminine. While hegemonic masculinity seemed to have somewhat receded from view within US media only a view years ago, returning the focus to aggressive masculinities like Putin’s in the New Cold War, encourages US Americans to reembrace **equally aggressive forms** of masculinity within otherwise liberal political discourses. Within the realm of popular entertainment, for example in the form of political comedy, white heterosexual male liberals, such as Alec Baldwin, Beck Bennet, or Steven Colbert, can now return to center stage at a time when the dominant presence of white males is contested by people of color, women, and gender non-conforming people. That is, when threatened by a white hyper-masculine enemy, a (white) masculine **heterosexual hero** may become reinstated for the good of the nation and without any real resistance. In particular, the comic versions of Putin make it clear that an explicit compliance to female beauty standards and male ‘posing’ are still seen as non-normative and grounds for ridicule.

**2AC -- AT: Realism**

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**2AC -- AT: Normative Tech Good**

**Queerness is intrinsically related to AI. The logics of the 1AC are not neutral but activate techno-determinstic ideals of AI that deny queer agency through speech acts like theirs.**

Grace **Turtle 22**, Delft University of Technology, “Mutant in the mirror: Queer becomings with AI”, https://doi.org/10.21606/drs.2022.782

2. Queerness, borderland perspectives for becoming with AI As a starting point, this paper acknowledges that queerness is necessarily **indeterminate**, ambiguous and always in relation, denoting **flexible spaces** for the expression of all aspects of non, anti, contra, straight, cultural production and reception. As put by Sarah Ahmed, "queer lives are about the potentiality of not following certain **conventional scripts**, whereby not following involves disorientation" (Ahmed, 2006, p. 189). To reorientate our understand- ings of human-AI relations, from the ontological and **epistemological borderland** of queerness and the gender binary, we first need some sense of what queerness means, and how it relates to (design/ing, with, for and through) **AI systems**. Queerness as described by José Muñoz in Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity, can be read as a “horizon imbued with potentiality”, an "open mesh of possibility”, a rejection of the here and now, and a “basic desire to live otherwise” (Muñoz, 2001, p. 1-2). Always rooted in queer life, struggle and liberation, queerness “is not yet here… we are not yet queer” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 1-2). Accordingly, queer futurity, is less about expanding a range of choices (liberal freedom) than it is about **transforming** the kinds of beings we desire to be while embracing the mutating multitudes and entangled lifeworlds that make up the pluriverse, or as referred to by the Zapatistas, “un mundo donde quepan muchos mundos” (a world where many worlds fit) (Escobar, 2016, p. 42). In considering queer becomings with AI, we cross a threshold, intentionally getting lost in the borderlands of possibility, what Gloria Anzaldúa proposes as a psychic, social, and cultural terrain that we inhabit and that inhabits all of us (Anzaldúa, 1987), by which they mean a terrain where we encounter the world differently; losing our way to find our way (Ahmed, 2006). Importantly, this place of uncertainty is not a weakness but a **power to be explored** (Preciado, 2021). In this way, queerness is just as much about playing with the kinds of beings we desire to be as much as it is about offering a **critique** of the cultural, sociotechnical systems that shape our **becoming with AI**. To the **binary logic of AI**, differently situated knowledge(s) and other/ed perspectives, are **destabilising**, thus demonstrating that binaries, be they imagined, cultural or technological are not natural nor always necessary. Rather, the notion of queerness speaks to a politics of transitivity—relating to, or characterised by, transition, bringing into question modes of gendered embodiment within all humans and non-humans and their configurations (Halberstam, 2016, 2017). In this sense, a queering of AI is a proposal to **unsettle western thought**, including the dominant **techno-deterministic**, cultural fictions, **social imaginaries** and **technical propositions** that shape how we create for, through, and with AI relations (Revell et al 2021, p. 57). Calling for new postures or rather, “queer turnings,” (Ahmed, 2006) towards AI, may help shift how we relate to, and **move with AI differently**. Mutations arising through queerness offer designers a borderland perspective to decode, indeed, to **deterritorialise** AI's fixed binary historical understandings and how it is **deployed** within everyday life (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 69). My point of departure, then, is to think about mutations as a means of unsettling common understandings of or postures towards AI today. This, I hope, will offer designers a mode of leaning into performativity, improvisation and uncertainty in their dealings with AI and the “mutable and the immutable features of our existence” (Levitas, 2013. p. 137). 3. Experiments and speculations on queer becomings with AI In the following section, drawing particular inspiration from Paul B Preciado's Testo Junkie: Sex, Drugs, and Biopolitics in the Pharmacopornographic Era, I present an autotheoretical experiment and provocation centred on queerness. With this, I seek to problematise notions of normativity and the naturalisation reproduced in and through AI systems (Bell et al., 2022). It can also be read as a gesture of resistance, a means to rethink encoded meaning beyond binary hegemonic, heteronormative classification schemes, categorisation, and modes of production. It is, as Preciado (2013) has described, “a body-essay” – a kind of soma-technological fiction relating to self-experimentation (Preciado, 2013, p. 7), or a queer reading into the possibilities of becoming oneself, finding one’s body “through becoming, embodying, a glitch” (Russell, 2020. p 151). The experiment which I will introduce here as Mutant in the Mirror engages with the notion of queering AI by tinkering with an AI system that identifies patterns, abstract meaning and signification, classifies, categorises and creates. Along these lines, I return to the questions: What if we understood AI as queer, a kind of mutant, in **a state of becoming**; a dynamic, relational, non-binary gender variant, how then might AI show up in and act on the world (with us humans) differently? Mutant in the Mirror uses a readily available AI platform, in this case, one that uses StyleGANs, a class of deep learning generative and predictive modelling in which two neural networks compete by discriminating between real and fake data in order to become more accurate in their predictions. In this way, the StyleGAN model performs as a vehicle to grapple and play with the idea of mutations arising through AI and further queer becomings with AI. As such, the experiment itself is not reliant on the technical capacity or limitations of the platform as it is. I start my inquiry by considering how embodied subjects are constituted (subjected and subjugated) through configurations and delegations, intended or unintended, that shape potentialities emerging from the co-performative, intra-actions a user might have with an AI system. Accordingly, following Helga Nowotny’s (2021) claim that the power of AI is performative, playing with the idea of performative power, noticing ways “an algorithm has the capability to **make happen what it predicts** when human behaviour **follows** the prediction” (Nowotny, 2021, p. 19). Here the notion of performativity, **originating through certain speech** acts that pronounce and affect the world can be understood as performative action (Butler, 2002), where action originates through recursive feedback loops of material and discursive practices. As it intersects with the performative, the ‘co’ used here recognises the agency of both the user and the AI system in producing action, where their becoming is mutually dependent on their intra-actions (Barad, 2003). By way of a methodological grounding, I borrow from what Lauran Fournier (2021) has called ‘autotheory,’ used to describe a reflexive praxis that blurs the boundaries between living, making, and theorising (Fournier, 2021). I couple it with speculative research (Wilkie et al. 2017). While all research is subjective in the sense that the researcher's perspective cannot be uncoupled from the research process, autotheory places the researcher's 'self' at the centre of inquiry, always in situated relation to the subject and theory being studied. In this sense, by placing myself within the experiment, I gain a more textured insight into AI, through my own queer experience, dialoguing with queer theory as a means to reflect on the felt, imagined-but-not-yet-real (im)possibilities of AI signaling in the present. Moreover, the experiment in itself is an act of co-performative, theatrical modelling—an ontological reflexive inquiry into the relational, recursive, emergent and exploratory production of fictive becomings with AI, crafted through performative action (Christy, 2017). Through this selfexperimentation process1 , I hope to gain insight into the queer borderland relational aspects of the constituted self, mutating, becomings through co-performative intra-actions with AI. 3.1 The crossing, mutant in the mirror I titled this ongoing experiment as the Mutant in the Mirror for the obvious reason that my self-reflexive experience of observing the images documented in Figure 1 quite literally feels like staring into a mirror, with mutants staring back at me. The potential variations of myself function as possibilities of myself, a uniquely queer skin anticipating changes to my cyberidentity. It asks, do I present as ambiguous? I am a body in mutation? It is my intention. Figure 1 presents some of the mutating synthetic image data produced through the experiment. The images act as a discursive device used to evoke reflections on the kind of queer, mutating becomings with AI discussed in this text. Generating multiple mutant images and synthetic data through the StyleGAN model provided me with a space to play with my own indeterminacy, fluid boundaries, (dis)identifiability and resistance to classification and categorisation. The particular model used in this experiment was trained using a small personal dataset of 70 images of myself across different places in time, some passing more feminine and some as more masculine. Also included in the training dataset were images of other humans (grandmother, mother, etc.), and non-humans (dog, places, etc.) that shape my sense of time, self and world. The 3000+ image(s) and video(s) generated through the experiment function as a mirror, through which I get lost, disoriented and reoriented, turning differently towards myself, my body, my corporal and subjective experience of the world. In this way, the Mutant in the Mirror comes to function as both a looking glass and a crystal ball, surfacing (speculations of) alternative versions of myself—mutating—becoming with AI. What started as an experiment in reimagining the notion of "fixed labels, fluid complexity" concerning who decides how we are read in the world, challenging deterministic binary modes of classification and categorisation (Crawford, 2021), concludes as an exploration into a metaphysics of interconnectedness (Anzaldúa, 2015). Indeed, a reflection on what (queer) intraactions with AI systems might tell us about ourselves when we co-perform with them. So what did the experiment tell me about myself? Am I a woman or a man? A subject or an object? Corporeal or incorporeal? Or, am I something in-between or outside of these dichotomies? Am I hairspray? Or am I a toy poodle? (see figure 2) Design’s current instantiations and orientations towards AI tend towards inscribing binary classifications, engendering human and non-human bodies and experiences—resulting in the misclassification or erasure of nonbinary or trans bodies and experiences via cultural (sociotechnical) classification systems encoded with homonormative (masculine) logic and meaning (Bell & Broad et al., 2021; Keyes 2018). The Mutant in the Mirror calls the binarization of AI into question, offering a glimpse into designing interventions for refusal to 'perform' in a way that was prescribed as much as it provides openings for imagining and enacting the world in unpredictable ways while reaching more diverse probabilistic outcomes. The classification presented in Figure 2, with a high probability that I am hairspray and a low probability that I am lipstick, suggests that the mutable self is reducible to a set of categorical signifiers when in reality data is textural and culturally rich. By playing with AI systems that at once negotiate deterministic and probabilistic outcomes—while neatly classifying and categorising people—one could quickly grasp that this is an area that requires critical design review. As everyday life practices increasingly rely on AI systems, what is at stake are our computational sovereignty (Bratton, 2016) and our ability to imagine and enact different realities as self-determining subjects (Parisi, 2019; O'Shea, 2021), individually or collectively. It is not evident how the classifications depicted in Figure 2 came about. However, through the experiment, it becomes clear that, to paraphrase James Bridle, we (designers) must find ways to deal with an incomputable world while acknowledging that it is irrevocably shaped and informed by computation. Recognising that AI systems are encoded, and thus can be decoded and re-written, allows for a different kind of logic and meaning to take root. Such a rewriting of AI may challenge how the self can be interpreted and labelled by and through AI systems in its open-ended becoming. Upon reflection on the experiment, I am reminded by Muñoz’s (1999) proposal that we view identification as code, a raw material that can be cracked open and reconfigured. This experiment opens doors to rethinking categorical signification, challenging the notion of categories and classification under its current deployments within and by AI systems. In this way, (dis)identification can be seen as a possible avenue for designers to engage with the incommensurate, that which resists fixed definition or measurement. Or otherwise put, disidentification and the failings to read by computational systems may present opportunities to negotiate calculative reasoning, the fine line between incomputability, and cultural computability of AI in more imaginative ways. Along these lines, mutations, rebelling against classification (Preciado, 2021), can be seen to make space for representation and empowerment of minority identities, identifications and positionalities rendered unthinkable by the dominant culture, whereby the potential for computational sovereignty and digital self-determination can be realised. Moreover, as an act of refusal, the mutant starts a conversation with us about AI predictions, categories and classifications. It testifies that AI needs not be deterministic in moving to a singular final destination; it must not assume that how we are read must be chosen for us, as if we were singular and not plural, static and unchangeable. The mutant demonstrates the **dynamic nature** of becoming through relation. The mutant **moves and mutates with me**. In a mutually affecting mutation, we become **grammatically incorrect** singular, plural, by co-performing, intra-acting together, gesturing towards moving in concert, alongside, mutating together. Who is the mutant in the mirror staring back at us? Do we know them? **How** do we move through and act on the world with them? 4. Gestures of resistance, for designers becoming with AI Mutant in the mirror acknowledges that we live in times of digital transformation, yet design practice is ill-equipped to proactively and responsibly deal with such change. Consequently, designing for, with, and through emerging AI systems require new design vocabularies, narratives and requirements adept at negotiating complex human and artificial relations. As such, the Mutant in the Mirror experiment finds particular relevance within the emerging field of AI, HCI and designs’ critical engagement with AI in theory and practice. As we become reoriented towards AI, we (designers) must begin to engage with AI as something that is **not neutral** nor outside us. It is a part of our daily life, mutating the **heterogeneity of systems**, sentient beings, others’ bodies, their **agencies** and affective powers to make the world. Modes of knowing and unknowing under the rubric of mutations compel us to reflect on ways different entities do not merely interact with each other, but rather, define each other through their intra-action (Barad, 2003). In his lecture at the École de la Cause Freudienne annual conference, Preciado posed a question to the 3,500 Psychoanalysts in attendance: “Can the Monster Speak?” By asking this question, and while reflecting on his own experiences of transitioning and embodied mutation, Preciado invited those in attendance to consider a new epistemology capable of “allowing for a multiplicity of living bodies without reducing the body to its sole heterosexual reproductive capability and without legitimising hetero-patriarchal and colonial violence” (Preciado, 2021). Through a **reoriented epistemology of bodies**, human and nonhuman, new possibilities may emerge for humanity to present otherwise, where “pregnant androids and clone sister-mothers can be read as queer and **trans algorithms of kinship**” (Cárdenas, 2018). As fantastic as it may seem, the kinship articulated by Cárdenas offers glimpses into the cultural fictions, social imaginaries and technical propositions stemming from such epistemological reorientations as proposed by Preciado, where bodies might be grounded in relational plurality. In other words, the mutant becomes a ‘theoretically-powered cartographic tool’ to support the multi-directional emergence of a posthuman subjectivity (Braidotti 2019). Reflecting on my own personal experience of subtle mutations with AI, I find the affective power of mutation akin to what Preciado (2013) has called “Potentia Gaudendi” or “orgasmic force”, which he describes as the most abstract and the most material of all workforces. To paraphrase, Potentia Gaudendi embodies an indeterminate capacity; it has no gender; its orientation emphasises neither the feminine nor the masculine. It is not human nor animal, neither animate nor inanimate, and creates no boundary between object and subject (Preciado, 2013, p 34). My mutating body is neither an organism nor a machine. Rather it passes as a “fluid, dispersed, networking techno-organic-textual-mythic system” (Preciado, 2013, p. 35), a performative phenomenon with no absolute exteriority or interiority (Barad, 2013), inhabiting the boundary between the physical and the metaphysical. We inhabit the mutant and it inhabits us. Preciado, recalling the transformative effects constituted by testogel, and the effects of testosterone mixing with their blood (which can be understood within this text as mutation), states that “My body is present to itself" (Preciado, 2013, emphasis added). The self-reflexive awareness of oneself produced through mutation is a critical feature of how we might engage with mutations more deliberately and thoughtfully through design. Preciado writes, "I am the future common artificial ancestor for the elaboration of new species in the perpetually random process of mutation and genetic drift" (Preciado, 2013, p.2). Transferred to the context of AI, becoming with AI can be seen as a sustained performative practice of worldbuilding that embraces mutating multitudes. By understanding AI as a queer body containing multitudes, co-conspiring through synthetic-alliances between differently situated embodied subjects, we may begin to explore how AI embodies multiplicity, mutates, and resists solidified definitions. Recognising the resistance of solidified definitions and sustained performance, AI exists in **constant negotiation** between biological, technological, cultural and computational systems. If a designer were to engage more intentionally with AI, and the social application of AI, they would do well to engage with the stuff of mutations, the orgasmic force between things that changes things. Then, perhaps we could be better prepared to design with mutations, with the social, cultural, political and biological implications and consequences of those mutations in mind. 5. Conclusion There is increasing awareness in design and HCI communities that queering as a strategy may help subvert existing sociotechnical systems and codings of hegemonic worldviews that **reinscribe** unsustainable, unethical and apolitical design practices (Spiel & Keyes et al., 2019) (Light, 2011). Along these lines, there is an urgent need to critically re-think the capacity of design to cope with the increasing complexity and dynamism of (socio)technical systems that actively learn, anticipate and adapt over time while in use (Giaccardi & Redström, 2020). To return to Muñoz's (2009) notion of queer futurity and queerness as an open horizon imbued with potentiality, this research calls for queer turnings toward design’s engagement with AI as a growing research agenda and field of practice (Bell & Broad et al., 2022). As part of a larger research project, this paper aims to contribute to the scholarly discourse on design as it intersects with AI, offering insight into the potentiality for becoming with AI, otherwise, as individuals, as a society and as a species. Although the Mutant In the Mirror provides only a glimpse into designing interventions for refusal or at best an aspirational deterritorialization of AI, it does signal as an experiment novel practices toward queering AI. More critical (and playful) exploration and experimentation in design/ing towards queer becomings with AI are needed.

**2AC -- AT: Nuclear War**

**Reproductive futurism undergrids their spectacle of the “nuclear apocalypse” that results in heteronormative violence against queer people**

**Saint-Amour 13** [Paul K. Saint Amour, 2013, “Chapter 3: Queer Temporalities of the Nuclear Condition,” Cambridge Scholars Publishing][\\pairie](file:///\\pairie)

When Jonathan Schell’s The Fate of the Earth first appeared in 1982, its most talked-about passage was a graphic description of what would happen if a twenty-megaton bomb were detonated over the center of Manhattan. The ensuing account of how a full-scale nuclear change would likely extinguish humankind along with the majority of earth’s species, leaving a “republic of insects and grass,” completed the book’s infernal vision. Largely owing to this vivid thought-experiment, Schell’s book helped reenergize the anti-nuclear movement in the U.S., and its cautionary portrait of a dead, irradiated planet was absorbed into mass-culture such that, read now, it chastens but does not stun. But there is a still-astonishing moment in The Fate of the Earth. This occurs in a section called “The Second Death,” where Schell adopts “the view of our children and grandchildren, and of all the future generations of mankind, stretching ahead of us in time.” A nuclear extinction event, he argues, would wipe out not only the living but all of the unborn as well; this “second death” would be the death of a longitudinal, progenerative human future, the death of the supersession of generations and thus, as he puts it, “the death of death.”2 That we live in the shadow of the death of death, says Schell, is nowhere more apparent than in our growing ambivalence toward—and here is the surprise—marriage, an institution that consecrates a personal relationship by connecting it to the biological continuity of the species. “[By] swearing their love in public,” he writes, “the lovers also let it be known that their union will be a fit one for bringing children into the world.” In a world overshadowed by extinction, the biological future that endows love with social meaning begins to dematerialize, and love becomes, in response, “an ever more solitary affair: impersonal, detached, pornographic. It means something that we call both pornography and nuclear destruction ‘obscene.’” Although Schell is not explicit about what forms of sexual detachment he laments here, “The Second Death” clearly implies that any sex decoupled from biological continuity and seeking refuge in licentious, solitary, distant, or momentary enjoyment—any sex that deviates from a reproductive notion of the future—is a symptom of our nuclear extinction syndrome. Thus when Schell, oddly quoting Auden, says that the peril of extinction thwarts “Eros, builder of cities,” he doesn’t need to invoke “sodomy, destroyer of cities” for a link between queerness and extinction to be forged.3 By **installing a reproductive futurism** at the heart of his admonitory project, Schell implicitly stigmatizes as futureless anyone who stands beyond reproductivism’s pale: not just the homosexual but also the unmarried, the divorced, the impotent, the childless, the masturbator, the hedonist, the celibate.

Schell’s book did not, of course, invent the use of reproduction as a metonym for human futurity tout court or the figuration of the biological child as the chief beneficiary of future-oriented actions in the present. But it contributed to these figures’ prominent standing in the anti-nuclear imaginary. “Believe me when I say to you / I hope the Russians love their children too” went the absurd refrain of Sting’s 1985 single, “Russians,” which placed the (implicitly reproductive) body at a level more fundamental than political difference: “We share the same biology / Regardless of ideology.” One could go on to compile a long list of 1980s movies, novels, speeches, and tracts that made the nuclear family stand in for humanity’s beset future or invoked the child as the figure in whose name apocalypse must be averted or at least survived. These conventions would outlast the Cold War and the waning or reimagining of the nuclear referent. Think of P. D. James’s 1992 thriller The Children of Men, whose protagonist must safeguard a miraculous pregnancy in a future where fertility has declined globally to zero.4 Or of how Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (2006) pares the matter of survival in a post-apocalyptic, ambiguously nuked landscape down to a father’s efforts to protect his son from rape and cannibalism. In both cases, the future is hanging either literally or allegorically by the thread of a single imperiled child.

My aim in this essay is not to trace the reproductivist energies of Cold War anti-nuclear works or of more recent post-apocalyptic fiction. Instead, I chart an alternate path through the nuclear condition,5 one that diverges from—and in places dissents from—the portrait of a future secured primarily for the sake of the biological child and reached along the straight lines of reproductive heterosexual coupling, familial property heritage, and linear time. This alternate path is one on which Nuclear Criticism today might keep company with recent work on queer temporalities, a body of scholarship that places dissident sexuality in a critical relation to normative models of time and history. One of my broader aims, in fact, is to indicate some of the ways Nuclear Criticism might be reenergized by an encounter with queer temporalities scholarship. At the same time, I’ll argue that some of the key theoretical and literary works associated with Nuclear Criticism in its early years were themselves engaged in queering temporality and history. In doing so I don’t wish to claim Nuclear Criticism as the occulted or lost “origin” of queer temporalities work; in addition to straining credibility, such a privileging of origin in a narrative of linear development would install queer temporalities scholarship in just the sort of historical narrative it seeks to vex by its devotion to non-linear modes—the recursive, the discontinuous, the counterfactual. My point is, rather, that reexamining Nuclear Criticism through the aperture of queer theoretical writings on time allows us to see a muted or latent critique in the former—a critique whose object was not so much the existence of nuclear weapons as the straitened portraits of desire, culture, kinship, history, and futurity that were often appealed to in calling for both those weapons’ abolition and their necessity. What emerges is a redrawn Nuclear Criticism that both deplores the existence of nuclear weapons and declines to embrace sexually normative and historically reductive grounds for their elimination.

“Queer temporalities” as a theoretical rubric covers a broad range of scholarship by queer theorists and activists working, at least to date, predominantly in the U.S.6 More specific than a turn toward time as theme, this scholarship considers how heternormative cultures perceive queer subjects in relation to history and futurity; how queer subjects experience and enact particular relations to history and futurity; and how queerness itself might be rethought as having less (or less exclusively) to do with sex and sexual typology than with dissident ways of being in relation to time. I have already referred to one of the chief temporalities from which queer subjects are variously excluded and dissenting: the “**reproductive futurism**” that conscripts the child as mascot for a **heternormative politics** of hope and a linear conception of history as both powered and figured by biological reproduction and the modes of inheritance and political succession it undergirds.7 Such a conception of history militates against certain kinds of transgenerational affect, not least against the notion that the living could invest affectively in or form communities with the dead. In response, some scholars working on queer temporalities advocate just such a queer desire for history or “touch of the queer,” the kind of unpunctual, affective approach that could permit one to ask, as Carolyn Dinshaw does, “How does it feel to be an anachronism?”8 While acknowledging that the feeling of being out of step with one’s contemporaries can be exploited to repressive ends, Dinshaw remains optimistic that transtemporal communities—living anachronisms in league with the dead—might produce politically salutary effects in a present whose dense multiplicity they help to restore.9 Others, contrastingly, refuse a politics of hope they see as irreducibly heternormative, urging queer subjects to embrace the negative position assigned them by reproductivism. Embracing this negativity can take many forms: an insistence on the destructive, anti-communitarian, at once selfish and self-shattering dimensions of sex and particularly homo-sex; an identification of the queer subject with destrudo (i.e., the Freudian death drive) in its relentless opposition to a procreative understanding of libido; or a refusal of queer triumphalism and an embrace of the shame-laced backward look. 10 Still others look to fuse the negativity of these anti-social, arguably apolitical positions to a radical anti-racist and anti-capitalist stance, calling for a “punk negativity” whose oppositional politics declines the language of hope, redemption, and futurity and turns instead to vandalism, masochism, pessimism, and despair.11 Real differences inhere among these approaches. But they share a core conviction: that temporality—and perhaps futurity even more intensively than historicity—cannot be thought apart from the sexual norms through which it is figured, licensed, and imbued with or emptied of affect.

Owing to its semi-dormancy since the early 1990s, Nuclear Criticism has largely missed the chance to think through queer theory, a field whose principal interventions have happened in the interim. You occasionally see comparisons between queer coming-out narratives and a nation’s coming out as a nuclear power or a military person’s coming out as an anti-nuclear activist. But the more suggestive commonalities between Nuclear Criticism and queer theoretical writing—most of them under the sign of temporality—remain unexplored. These include an intimate acquaintance with and even an embrace of the death drive; a related acquaintance with portraits of the future as negated or foreclosed; a commitment not to reopen the future under repressive terms; and the alternative, in the face of a seemingly barred future, of soliciting the queer touch of the dead whom for various reasons we suddenly apprehend as our contemporaries. Exploring these commonalities seems the more urgent, given that queer temporalities scholarship could provoke debate about what nuclear abolitionists and their opponents have most in common: a practically automated recourse to reproductive futurism in arguing for their respective positions. Schell’s equation of low marital indices with a general sense of species futurelessness is an extreme but not an exceptional case of antinuclear rhetoric, which continues today to **invoke “a world safe for our children”** in terms nearly indistinguishable from the pro-nuclear side of the aisle.12 The radical negativity exhibited by some queer temporalities scholars might also expose the limits of a politics of (procreative) optimism on both sides of the nuclear debate—the limits of acting as if the world could be made safe for “our children” or anyone else by either retaining or abolishing our nuclear deterrents.

Queer theorists, for their part, have turned occasionally during the last twenty years to Nuclear Criticism, although usually to jump-start an argument headed away from the nuclear referent. Peter Coviello’s essay “Apocalypse from Now On” (2000) nods in its title to both Jacques Derrida’s inaugural work of Nuclear Criticism, “No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles, seven missives)” (1984) and Susan Sontag’s 1989 AIDS and Its Metaphors (Sontag: “Apocalypse is now a long-running serial: not ‘Apocalypse Now’ but ‘Apocalypse from Now On’”).13 But Coviello’s essay invokes the nuclear condition principally in order to set up what he sees as its succession, after 1989, by AIDS as the apocalypse du jour. “Du jour” in the way a daily special marks the everyday’s domestication of the exceptional: for Coviello, AIDS differs from the nuclear condition in quotidienizing apocalypse, making it a condition rather than a threatened event and thus particularly useful to the day-to-day biopolitical operations of the state. Coviello, in other words, sets sail from Port Derrida for Port Sontag—from Nuclear Criticism to a critique of AIDS and governmentality—without, understandably enough, booking return passage. Before leaving the nuclear behind, however, he notes “how intimately bonded the nuclear and the sexual actually were, before the advent of AIDS gave to such bonding a ghastly quality of inevitability.”14 Coviello’s emphasis is not on the usual string of references to the heteronormative sexualization of nuclear weapons (e.g., “Little Boy,” Bikini atoll, the population bomb, and the nuclear family, although he mentions these in passing). Instead, he reads nuclear discourse as having limned, before AIDS, a “gay death drive” that figured queerness as incarnating (and more rarely as rebuking) the extravagant sovereignty of nuclear weapons. Glossing Martin Amis’s characterization of the nuclear arsenal as a cocked gun in the mouths of the procreative, Coviello writes that “power in the nuclear age is horrifying and unlivable because it makes me—or wants to make me—thoroughly, irremediably queer.” 15

Thus the homophobia of certain anti-nuclear discourses anticipated homophobic responses to AIDS as an apocalyptic threat emanating from queer subjects. What’s more, Coviello hazards, the **apocalypticism that pervaded debates** around both nuclear weapons and AIDS made for strong continuities between Nuclear Criticism and queer theory, both bodies of work responding to high concentrations of state power in the **management of populations**, bilateral depictions of the biological family as under siege, and the pervasive rhetoric of the death wish.162

**Their framing of war only obscures gender and sexual violence and reproduces violent heteromasculine exclusions**

**Montpetit & Weber 17** [Melanie Richter Monpetit & Cynthia Weber, 05-26-2017, “Queer International Relations,” Oxford Encyclopaedia of Politics][\\pairie](file:///\\pairie)

War and Peace

How does Queer IR scholarship contribute to the study of war and peace? Like Mainstream IR, Queer IR examines the use of military force in international politics, including its effects and conditions of possibility. Like Feminist Security Studies, Queer IR approaches war and the use of armed force as embedded in a larger continuum of(gendered and sexualized) violence challenging analytical binaries like war/peace, international/domestic, and public/private. Queer IR research furthers Feminist Security Studies’ inquiries into the constitutive role of the “low politics” of the (allegedly) “merely” private, intimate and/or cultural by drawing attention to how geopolitics and military operations are shaped not only by gendered norms but also by sexualized norms and normativities, specifically heterosexuality and associated ideas about heteromasculinity and cissexism.

Gender, Peace, and Security

Queer IR research on war, peace, and security brings into focus the security needs of LGBT subjects. For example, Queer IR has revealed security problems faced by LGBT people that are rendered invisible even in feminist analyses of human security (Amar,2013), sexual and gender-based violence (Hagen, 2016), and post-conflict reconstruction (Jauhola, 2010, 2013; McEvoy, 2015). Both feminist and non-feminist analyses of International Relations commonly rest on assumptions about gender and sexuality that are damaging to LGBT individuals in a range of conflict and post-conflict related settings.

For example, scholars’ and practitioners’ common assumptions about heterosexuality as the default sexuality and kinship norm (“heteronormativity”) and the twin assumption of two “opposite” and complementary gender positions are cissexist because they leave outsubjects whose sexuality, familial relations, and/or gender expression (“cissexism”) do notalign with these gender and sexual norms. While there is increasing awareness of certain non-normative sexualities (“homosexuality”) and sexual practices (“Men-who-have-Sexwith-Men”), with few exceptions, key international actors and policy frameworks in the area of peace and security rest on what Queer and Transgender theory describes as cisprivilege. Cisprivilege refers to people whose gender assigned at birth matches their gender identity (“cisgender”).

As Jamie Hagen (2016) explores in the context of the UN’s Women, Peace and Security(WPS) architecture, heteronormativity and cissexism **obscure** a wide set of **practices of violence and exclusions** negatively affecting people that are not straight or cisgender. Hagen shows how deploying a limited understanding of a **heteronormative gender binary** allows WPS policy and monitoring to account for the security needs of heterosexual cisgender women, while **obscuring LGBT subjects and their safety**. This framework also reproduces insecurities for the “women” it is meant to protect, in particular those with queer sexualities and non-normative gender expression. For instance, trans people and gender non-binary people are typically refused medical care, safe access to bathrooms in shelters, and refugee camps (see also Jauhola, 2010, 2013). Neither is sexual and gender based violence against gay men recognized and accounted for under the WPS architecture, even though their **presumed lack of masculinity** makes them vulnerable to rape during conflict (Hagen, 2016, p. 315f.).

**2AC -- AT: Space Colonization**

**Their obsession with outerspace colonization is a violent imposition that views us as disposable for their neoliberal reproductive future that we can never be part of**

**Oman-Reagan 15** [Michael Oman-Reagan, 09-11-2015, “Queering Outerspace”, Medium, <https://medium.com/space-anthropology/queering-outer-space-f6f5b5cecda0#.p2lahzwjf]\\pairie>

II. De-colonizing Mars and Beyond

When NASA received a signal from the Voyager 1 spacecraft in 2012, they called it “the sound of interstellar space” and marked the data as the moment human exploration crossed into the “space between stars” (NASA JPL n.d.). And while science and technology take us to the edges of the solar system and beyond, venture capital is planning how they can terraform new worlds — a neoliberal, capitalist project which has, of course, already stolen the phrase “Occupy.” In response, we need to pre-emptively Occupy Mars while taking one of the many important lessons offered by indigenous people to the Occupy movement, and de-colonize Mars in the process. Which means injecting all of our queer and indigenous selves into the discussions about “settling” and “colonizing” Mars, into these plans to fundamentally change the surface of another planet, to reproduce Earth there.

Lisa Messeri, anthropologist and historian of science and technology, points out that if I use queering to mean something odd then something like Elon Musk’s plan to nuke Mars, for example, might be seen as queer. Her excellent question about this and our chat on Twitter inspired me to clarify. I’m looking at Musk’s terraforming language from the position that Mars is already queer. Remaking Mars in Earth’s image, and uncritically assuming this is a great idea, is exactly the kind of process that queering works against. Nuking mars is an unqueer thing to do because it uses the model of razing and rebuilding, cutting it all down to make it possible to build a normative landscape on top of the ruins. We need to think about the ways that terraforming is not always a utopian idea, but can also be seen as a **violent imposition** of earthly normativity on landscapes elsewhere, a colonialization of existing queer-otherworld landscapes.

Biologist DNLee has asked exactly the kind of questions about Elon Musk’s language and the discourse of Mars colonization that need to be asked:

“Who’s version of humanity is being targeted for saving? And with the language of proposed interplanetary exploration and settlement using generous references to Christopher Columbus and New World Exploration and British Colonization and US American Manifest Destiny I was halted. I’m not on board for this type of science adventure. […]

Why aren’t other voices and perspectives at the table? How much is this conversation being controlled (framed, initiated, directed, routed) by **capitalist and political interests** of the (few) people at the table?”

Social scientists, activists, queer theorists and others need to ask themselves why they aren’t asking these same questions (and joining those of us who are). Aside from a few examples, why have sociology, anthropology, and other social sciences and humanities left space science and exploration alone — why do they consistently fail to recognize the importance of work by those who do research in these areas?

Astrobiologist David Grinspoon critiqued this frontier mentality early on. Writing about the ethics of colonizing Mars in 2004, he notes that it’s not only problematic for all of the above reasons, it also sets us up to reproduce the failures that come with thinking we can “conquer” a planet: “If we go to Mars with the idea that we can charge ahead and subdue a new world, our efforts are doomed […] Mars does not belong to ‘America,’ nor to Earth, nor to human beings.” As DNLee also points out, we’re talking about widespread discourse with massive national and corporate funding to support a new era of colonization — isn’t this a subject worth studying? Worth funding studies of? Worth getting involved in?

Space scientists are also working on the problem of how we can create the capabilities to visit another star, trying to figure out what we need to do now here on Earth to make that happen in 100 years. There are many interstellar projects, and it’s a fascinating convergence of calls for longer-term thinking with planning and innovation in space science. When astronaut Mae Jemison describes 100 Year Starship — the project to achieve interstellar travel — she talks about creation stories, mythology, science fiction, and her hopes of “discovering a better version of ourselves in space” (100YSS 2014). We can join with visionaries like her to ensure that the “better version of ourselves” isn’t a vision that ends up reproducing inequality, injustice, and oppressions from Earth out there in space. Space advocates like Jemison, the first black woman in space, will be leaders and allies in the quest to discover not only diversity in outer space but a better kind of diversity — one that is aware of colonial histories, oppressive pasts and presents, ongoing violences here on Earth. A queer diversity.

III. Extraterrestrial Allies

The Interstellar Message Composition program at the SETI Institute (Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence) advocates sending messages across the stars because “the universe beckons” (Shostak 2015). I happen to agree — there’s a lot out there and if there wasn’t life elsewhere, life that we might be able to talk to, it would certainly be “an awful waste of space” (as Carl Sagan wrote). And yet on the flip side when NASA releases vintage-style travel posters for newly discovered exoplanets featuring apparently white, binary-gendered, human couples, what message are we already sending both to Earth and beyond? That we expect the entire universe to look at act like us? Not all of us of course, just the elite few, the **white, cis-gendered, heterosexual colonialist aristocracy** in evening wear.

NASA’s binary gender, heterosexual, nightlife in space poster.

I realize this is supposed to be a light-hearted poster and it’s “all in good fun” — so even writing this critique makes me sound like I’m absolutely no fun. Quite the opposite, I think that poster is no fun! Why couldn’t it depict other life? Like multi-gendered whale-cats dancing instead? Or humans who don’t look like these two? Or something else, anything else — anything otherwise. Where is the imagination? Is this transposition of earthly aristocrats into space the best we can do? It’s more evidence that we need queer visions of life elsewhere, of exoplanets, of alien worlds. We need more of what Haraway (2013), drawing on Marleen Barr (1992), calls “speculative fabulation.”

Illustration of contact with alien life for a NYT Op-Ed by Seth Shostak, SETI (Image: Kilian Eng)

This isn’t just me saying “what about my ideas” or “include me in your game” — because we’ve actually been there since the beginning. We’ve been imagining different worlds since we were born into a world where we often weren’t wanted, didn’t fit, and weren’t following the rules by just being us. Queer folk, of all kinds, are at least united by having the most incredible skills in **speculative fabulation**— in envisioning every possible different future, bright and abysmal, and we do it because it’s something we learned as a survival tactic and later honed as an art form.

IV. Generations of Queer Futures

Queerness has been discussed and debated in terms of the **concept of “no future**.” When thinking about outer space, this could mean the freedom to disrupt normative futures — to remix, twist, adjust, tear, collage and queer the future. As anthropologist Naisargi Dave said about the idea: “I think queerness is precisely about what it means to pursue an orientation to the world, philosophically and politically, that doesn’t need to reproduce itself in recognizable forms.” Being freed from recognizable reproduction means opening up multiple possible futures, even queer futures.

Intelligent residents of Earth who do not seem very interested in structurally oppressing one another.

When space science and fiction imagines a “generation ship,” in which generations of crew live and die during a thousand-year voyage to a distant star (e.g., Ceyssens et al. 2012), we should ask how queer lives fit into these models of reproduction in space. In the recent Sci-Fi series Ascension (Williams 2014), queer people were **excluded from a generation ship experiment**. When one character said “homosexuals” or “anyone who avoids procreation” were left out because they’re “superfluous”— a queer character responded: “We do tend to pop up where you least expect us...”

If we consider science fiction as a “repository of modifiable futures” in science (Milburn 2010) then we can look at how to de-colonize that fiction and challenge the reproduction of normative futures through imagination and science. William Lempert has examined the way indigenous Sci-Fi does this in his article “Decolonizing Encounters of the Third Kind: Alternative Futuring in Native Science Fiction Film” (2014), and a recently published collection of science fiction stories from social justice movements “Octavia’s Brood” (Imarisha and Brown 2015) reminds us that imagination, as philosopher John Dewey said, is our “common faith” (1934) — the shared human capacity to conceive of a better future and work together to make it a reality.

Astronaut Mae Jemison, the first black woman in space, appearing as an extra on “Star Trek: The Next Generation” with Levar Burton.

Science fiction is a “repository of modifiable futures” not only in science but also in society. Sci-Fi has been a site of racism, sexism, and xenophobia, as often as it has been the site of imagining better worlds and liberation (Haraway 2013). The recent battle over the Hugo awards demonstrates the lengths that some will go to to **protect their visions** of hostile, racist, misogynist, **anti-queer, normative futures.**

So what’s next? We — all us queer, trans, disabled, black, native, etc. folk and more — we need to fight back, take back, de-colonize and **re-imagine our futures in outer space,** we need to pop up where they least expect us.

**2AC -- AT: Hegemony**

**Hegemony can’t function without the consolidation of violent heteronormative worlds. The empire is legitimized by affective economies of fear---the affirmative fear of a “no other alternative either than US hegemony” is only a way to shock us into obedience and reproduce economies of violence against queer life!**

**Agathangelou et al 08** [Anna M. Aganthangelou, M. Daniel Bassichis & Tamara L. Spira, December 2008, “Intimate Investments: Homonormativity, Global Lockdown, and the Seductions of Empire,” Radical History Review, DOI:10.1215/01636545-2007-025][\\pairie](file:///\\pairie)

Global lockdown thus functions as one of the looming underbellies and conditions of possibility of the (un)freedoms and (non)futures being promised by neoliberal empire. Consigning the collective traumas of slavery and colonization to a remote and irrelevant past while drawing on their logics to instantiate its rule, global lockdown shows itself to be neither cruel and unusual nor exceptional, but rather as foundational. Importantly, these (un)freedoms and (non)futures carry very different promises and pleasures depending on our relationship to the human surplus motoring the global political economy. Global lockdown, then, is not simply the newest outside, but quite literally the material redefining off what life can even mean in the wake of so much “necessary” death. 136 Radical History Review Agathangelou, Bassichis, and Spira | Intimate Investments 137 Toward an Intimate Politics of Decolonizing Abolitionism We have thus far argued that across diffuse spaces and moments—the homonormative turn, the neoliberalization of the economy, the war on terror, and global lockdown—we see different dimensions of a promise project, which is also a project **forever seeking to (re)consolidate empire.** On the one hand, there are those for whom subjectivity, capital, and satiating pleasures and rights are being forever promised. This occurs, we argue, at the expense of compliance with, or perhaps distraction from, the larger structural underpinnings of social relations and processes. On the other hand, there are the (non)subjects for whom the same promise has not been issued, the abject(s) whose lives and deaths are completely nonspectacular within the dominant imaginations. Adding to this contradiction is the dimension that even the promises themselves are tenuous: indeed, as elite queers privilege homonormativity over more radical political and economic praxes, neoconservative forces continue to criminalize queerness. While first and foremost queers outside this elite or national racial strata are produced as exterminable sodomites, the category of the abject and killable always threatens even elite queers in first world spaces. This is part of the politico-economic and affective logics that have fueled a frenzied search for an end to pain: continue imperial soldiering in exchange for a mirage of security, or spend your energies fighting other queers for a prized space as most radical. With such a paucity of choices, our energies are directed away from building solidarities and exhausted by fixing on individualized solutions and fueling the (re)production of neoliberal, neoconservative, homonormative, and ultimately **heteronormative worlds.** If the neoliberal turn has been part of a larger strategy of counterinsurgency mobilized in the wake of revolutionary decolonization movements threatening capitalism, (hetero)sexism, and white supremacy, it is important to pause on some of the impacts of that (counter)mobilization. In this paper we have worked to foreground the affective logics that function on the level of feeling and desire in the service of a neoliberal project of a world remade. To begin to articulate the ways in which our most ‘intimate’ sensibilities—our fears, desires, mourning, and yearning—are being mobilized by a regime of global lockdown is to make urgent the production of solidarities not premised upon exploitation, profit, or death. For those engaged in movements dismantling the prison industrial complex and any form of imperial violence, it is precisely these affective economies to which we must be attentive. If we do not work to articulate the ways in which we become libidinally and erotically invested in the status quo of mass lockdown—in effect, the various promises that the prison issues—we run the risk of reproducing the racialized and sexualized economies of benevolence and exploitation that fortify so much of conservative, liberal, and even radical praxis. However, as we have sought to argue, the price of such dismissals is nothing less than participation in imperial violence that, ultimately, impacts us all. Amidst the many affective callings and seductive offerings we are issued, we must continue the work of imagining alternative ways to feel, be, and love in this moment of intensified empire-building. To become completely drawn into challenging homonormativization without attention to the larger structural underpinnings of social relations and processes may ultimately prove unproductive as it misses the larger imperial logics that may be embodied differentially in other sites. Moreover, it becomes impossible to discern the relationship between our own struggles and the set of promises and nonpromises offered to other others. Foreclosing potential and increasingly crucial solidarities, we are drawn into our own corners and ultimately diverted from the possibilities of massive, cross-bordered mobilizations, movements and revolutionary projects. In the place of this vision, we offer first and foremost a disruption of complicity, a refusal of empire’s promise project. The series of wars in which empire asks us to participate are utterly genocidal, rather than constituting processes that enable our security and healing. As members of different and overlapping communities and struggles, the authors have each grappled personally with this process. As activists and intellectuals who are engaged in struggles around war, migration and trafficking, labor and homelessness, mass imprisonment, and state violence against queer and transgender communities, we are confronted with the seductive—yet ultimately murderous—promises that are described in this essay. Moreover, as members of the academy at different levels (undergraduate student, graduate student, and faculty member), we have witnessed how the strategies of promise and nonpromise projects have worked to fragment, divide, and conquer people of color, working-class people, queers, transgender people, postcolonial subjects, and others within powerful academic zones of knowledge production. Recognizing that we can never be **outside empire’s seductive offerings,** we engage these questions out of rage, hope, and the desire to form life-sustaining solidarities and intimacies. We strive with others toward a politics that enables intimacies as both means and ends, as a strategy of movement-building in which relationships are formed not to instantiate empire’s incessant production of internal and external enemies, but to disrupt it. This is a politics that would challenge histories that dichotomize and fragment our worlds, and instead offer praxes of erotic resistance in which we might be able to glimpse a breathing space for reconstituting connections and relations based in collectivity and healing. With this analysis in mind, all attempts to separate and make discrete struggles for social justice and transformation—those working for prison abolition, sexual and gender freedom, decolonization, and the end to war, for example—prove unsuccessful. They are always already imbricated in one another. When one struggles to resist coercive sexual or gender regimes—heternormativization as well as homonormativization—one is already engaging in a politics deeply implicated in the wars on terror, poverty, and drugs, and in the (neo)slaveries of the prison industrial complex. 138 Radical History Review Agathangelou, Bassichis, and Spira | Intimate Investments 139 This is true not only because of the devastating impacts these wars have had on queer communities and sexually aberrant (non)subjects locked away, and because of the ways in which a racializing “sodomotification” is drawn on to produce the criminal and the terrorist. Indeed, the violence and death that we authorize and face operate through and within **our libidinal, erotic, and affective investments,** investments that we must engage directly and rigorously if we are to disrupt the seductive workings of power in their most intimate dimensions. If, then, all **queer politics** are already **organizing around and implicated in the buildup of global lockdown and imperialist war**, the question is not if a praxis of decolonization and abolitionism is pertinent to queer struggles, but how and why it is. If it is true that our deepest desires, feelings, and arousals are tapped into for imperial production, it also becomes crucial to ask how we might organize, mobilize, and **form alternative intimacies and desires**. These alternatives, which continue to be nurtured in radical and revolutionary movements and collectivities, are forged **as a disruption to individualized, consumptive, and privatized erotics** in the name of broader collective projects of freedom and transformation that cultivate the pleasures of substantial connection and the production of more egalitarian relations. These are the intimacies that form the core of decolonizing imaginaries, those that understand sexual freedom only through collective self-determination. It is only when we engage the traumas as well as the yearnings of our pasts and our futures that we might be able to seize the possibilities increasingly foreclosed by empire’s seductive promises.

**Their AFF’s idea of “hegemony” and an increase legitimises logics that deem queer lives not worth living**

**Wool 14** [Zoë H. Wool, 10-09-2014, “Critical military studies, queer theory, and the possibilities of critique: the case of suicide and family caregiving in the US military,” Critical Military Studies, :http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23337486.2014.964600]\\pairie

The family

Though the sociality of the US Army breeds all kinds of intimacies (see MacLeish 2013), when “Family” (very often written with a capital F) is evoked in military programs or official materials, the referent is the domestic unit comprising soldier, spouse, and usually children. One reason for this is that soldiers are, as a population, more married than civilians of the same age. But this fact is neither mere coincidence nor evidence of some soldierly essence. It is a fact cultivated through structures of entitlements and benefits that have sought to make the military a more “family-friendly” place, part of a concerted strategy to recruit and retain soldiers after the end of the draft in 1973. Today, the military considers the families of soldiers part of its “total force” (Chu, Hall, and Jones 2007), acknowledging that without them, and with the intensity of multiple deployments that has characterized the last decade and a half, they would be unable to meet their own institutional readiness needs. This specific form of family is further honed by the logistics of military life, which can mean frequent moves with a **nuclear family** away from broader networks of kin.4 Together with a whole slew of **heteronormative forces**,5 the picture of “Army Family” that emerges is multiply reinforced and decidedly nuclear, with the conjugal couple squarely at the centre. And more than an aspect of demographics, this picture literally represents Army Family in countless images accompanying websites and promotional material about military life and resources for families.

The military is an institution that amplifies, projects, and is deeply invested in exemplary forms of normativity – especially those addressed to embodiments of gender.6 No surprise, then, that the normative force of the conjugal couple at the centre of this picture of the Army Family does not belong to the Army alone. Queer theory has done much to illuminate how this form – and the logics of personhood, proper and improper intimacy, and generational time that subtend it – structures public and political life in the contemporary US (Berlant 2000; Berlant and Warner 1998), aligning the good life, or perhaps even life worth living at all, with heteronormative forms of reproduction and sociality (Edelman 2004; Haritaworn, Kuntsman, and Posocco 2013). Elizabeth Povinelli has elaborated how the conjugal couple in particular, rather than the group (a competing social form in active duty army life; Povinelli 2006, 181), is a key form through which proper personhood is seen to emerge in liberal fantasies (Povinelli 2006, 175–236). This remains true in the Army, where the conjugal couple both supports and threatens the other forms of institutional intimacy out of which soldiers’ socialities are made (MacLeish 2013, Chapter 4), as well as in the afterwar for soldiers and veterans whose lives are forever marked by war but who are nonetheless supposed to be edging further away from those institutional intimacies of the Army and toward other sustaining civilian ones (Wool, forthcoming, Chapter 5).

There is a long history of concern for soldiers’ sexual lives and hope that, especially after war, they might settle into normative patterns of husband and fatherhood (Linker 2011). Given the ways that post-war rehabilitation has always been a gendered project, and the **inextricability of gendered personhood** and the configuring of sexual intimacies, this should hardly be surprising. But in the post-9/11 context, this family form has become more vital to fantasies of veteran futures than in American wars of the past. What seems new in the contemporary moment is the explicit centrality of such hope and concern to rehabilitative projects (broadly defined; Wool 2014), and, of special interest to the problematic I’m sketching here, the hinging of normative family forms to fears about suicide through the mechanisms of support and care.